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Introduction
Subrata K. Mitra/Bernd Rill
The image of India in the Western world
has altered radically over the past decade.
Thanks to the cumulative effects of glob-
alization, rapid and successful introduction
of new technologies of communication and
nuclearization, the picture of India has
changed from that of a backward country
with mass poverty to one with global am-
bitions.
No doubt, immediately after independence
in 1947 India faced the challenge of devel-
oping the infrastructure required to sustain
modern life. Barring some exceptions such
as a network of railways, everything had to
be built afresh. This is the challenge that
independent India undertook as one of the
first, important countries to emerge into the
community of nations after the Second
World War. During those early decades,
with Jawaharlal Nehru at the helm of af-
fairs, India engaged in providing leader-
ship to the movement of non-aligned
countries, carefully looking for a middle
path between West and East. At home, this
was reinforced by a model based on the
mixed economy that sought to combine the
productivity of the market with the com-
passion of the welfare state. A structure of
democratic planning sought to combine
these two contradictory principles into a
coherent design of development.
The profile of foreign policy alluded to
above kept its course as long as it corre-
sponded to the division of the political
world, roughly speaking, into an Eastern
and Western Bloc. But after the demise of
the Soviet Union in 1991, it became neces-
sary for India to formulate a new foreign
policy to cope with the requirements of a
changing international context that is dif-
ferently described by scholars and politi-
cians alike, as either multipolar or as one
predominantly influenced by the United
States of America.
This radically new environment demanded
a major course correction on the part of
India's foreign policy. The definition of the
relationship between India and the United
States had to be the pivotal point of the
new orientation that Indian foreign policy
has to undergo. There are three main rea-
sons for this.
In the first place, clearly, India needs a
'normalization' of relations with the United
States, to be on the safer side for the politi-
cal (not juridical) legitimation of her nu-
clear armour which has been produced
over the last three to four decades while
Inda has remained a non-signatory of the
Nuclear Proliferation Regime.
Secondly, India has to face up to two
strong neighbouring powers, Pakistan and
the People's Republic of China, both of
which remain a constant threat to her secu-
rity. The situation remains perilous as a
lasting solution to the apparently never-
ending dispute over Kashmir still seems far
from sight. The readiness of both sides to
discuss issues along the Sino-Indian border
bears promise but still there is no guarantee
that other areas of common or overlapping
interests, for instance in South East Asia,
will not cause tensions. Constructive ties
with Washington can be highly advanta-
geous for India, if the use New Delhi puts
them to is well calculated.
Thirdly, India perceives herself as a global
player and therefore wants to be seen as
such by the international community. The
most appropriate way to convince the
world that this is not only a claim based on
rhetoric but one backed by substantial
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reality, is an elaborate relationship, more
or less on an equal footing, with the para-
mount power of the current decades.
Questions of prestige must not be underes-
timated, since they are basic to the career
of nations. And the constant attention India
enjoys presently by all the important states
around the globe is an infallible indicator
that this ascendant process is under way.
So it has become obligatory for the observ-
ers not only of the South Asian region but
of the Asian continent as a whole and of
the entire international political network
(we hesitate to call it a "system") to enter
into a deeper analysis of India's new dy-
namics in foreign politics. The editors of
the present publication, the Department for
Political Science at the South Asia Insti-
tute, University of Heidelberg, and the
Academy for Politics and Current Affairs
of the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Munich,
acting in cooperation with the Center for
International Trade & Security at the Uni-
versity of Georgia, USA, are therefore glad
to submit to the academic but also to the
generally interested public this collection
of essays on the principal aspects of con-
temporary issues in India's foreign policy.
The papers which are presented here are
based on a conference held during June
2005 in Berlin in the premises of the In-
dian embassy, and have been updated
since. The editors are very happy to ac-
knowledge the roles of Professor Erich
Pohl of the University of Heidelberg, and
Professor Gary Bertsch, Director, Center
for International Trade and Security, Uni-
versity of Georgia, for their help in bring-
ing the internationally reputed scholars to
the conference. The meticulous attention of
Mr Amit Dasgupta, Deputy Chief of Mis-
sion, Indian Embassy, Berlin, to every sin-
gle logistical detail of the conference is
gratefully acknowledged. In addition we
would like to thank the Embassy's
supporting staff who ensured that the
conference ran smoothly and Ms Jivanta
Schöttli and Mr Siegfried O. Wolf, Lectur-
ers in Politics, South Asia Institute,
University of Heidelberg, for making
the event a success. Finally, it is our hon-
our and joy to thank His Excellency
Ambassador Rangachari who not only
gave his generous help for the organization
of the conference, but also enabled the
participants to experience the genius loci
of the incomparable atmosphere of India,
transported into the heart of the capital of
Germany.
Engaging the World: the Ambiguity of India's Power
Subrata K. Mitra
1. An Indian exceptionalism? The
problem stated
Judged by the conventional criteria of in-
ternational diplomacy, India is alone
among the major powers of the world to
publicly possess the nuclear bomb and
delivery capacity, but not an explicit doc-
trine of what these ultimate weapons of
mass destruction are meant for nor who
they are aimed against.1 The Indian nuclear
test of 1998 was not merely a flash in the
pan, nor, judging from the reference to the
nuclear option in the UPA's Common
Minimum Programme, was it merely an
expedient ruse of the Hindu nationalists.
Still, there is no coherent doctrine that un-
derpins India's nuclear policy.2 Americans,
never coy in these matters, justify their
status as the world's only superpower. The
G8 countries validate their power in terms
of control over the resources of the world,
and the Chinese see their race to the top as
a method of challenging this Western
hegemony. Closer home, Pakistan very
openly treats the nuclear option as a
guarantee against any temptations that
India might have to stray off the narrow
and straight path of neighbourly virtue.
Power backed by doctrine is a fact of in-
ternational politics. While doctrine without
power is mere rhetoric, power without
doctrine is unconventional and uncon-
vincing. India's difference and ambiguity
produce confusion about her real inten-
tions.
Not surprisingly, the 'peaceful nuclear ex-
plosion' of 1974 and subsequently the nu-
clear tests of 19983 have both been the
source of intense speculation.4 The ambi-
guity produces the urge to 'engage' India,
through sophisticated scholarly attempts at
comprehension5 or the more straightfor-
ward method of sanctions to constrain her
errant ways.6
The paper raises some of the issues con-
nected with the core fact of the ambiguity
of Indian power. Is Indian policy out of
sync with India's power? Is India still the
Quixotic lone warrior, seeking a form of
world politics without power in a Nehru-
vian mould, despite her recently acquired
nuclear teeth? Or, is 'power-without-
doctrine' merely a pragmatic gambit to put
a foot in the door of the nuclear club
(without quite appearing to want to do so);
in other words, "playing poker", albeit in
the name of morality and sweet reason-
ableness?7 I explore some of these issues
by juxtaposing India's military capacity,
arms procurement and deployment, threat
perception and the explicit and implicit
ways in which India relates to the South
Asia region and beyond. The analysis of
these empirical problems prepares the
ground for some larger issues. Does an
Indian doctrine underpin her military ca-
pacities? How does the absence of an ex-
plicit canon affect India's role in interna-
tional politics? Even if there is no explicit
dogma, can one be construed from the re-
cent pronouncements, policies and
choices?
2. India's military capacity: still an
emerging power?
India's contested status as a nuclear
power8, the scale of her arms purchases,9
her investment in missile technology and
the huge deployment of ground troops on
the western front, particularly in Kashmir,
are issues of immediate concern to her
South Asian neighbours. Since tension
feeds on tension, war in Afghanistan, ter-
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rorist attacks in Kolkata, Delhi, Jammu and
Srinagar, mounting tension between India
and Pakistan over the issue of cross-border
terrorism in Kashmir and the formal policy
of Pakistan to consider the first strike op-
tion as part of her strategic response to
Indian aggression have contributed to the
seriousness of the state of affairs. The
probability of the regional conflict esca-
lating into large-scale nuclear war, or
weapons of mass destruction finding their
way into the hands of non-state actors,
have drawn world attention to South Asia,
which has had visits in quick succession by
political leaders and military delegations
from the United States, UK, Germany,
France, Russia and China.
The paper juxtaposes the views of observ-
ers and actors. These factors of contempo-
rary politics are to be seen in the larger
context of India's political and security
culture, history, and the structure of the
political system. Western nation states,
products of a long process of nation build-
ing, industrialization and state-formation,
seek the promotion of national interest
through their strategic initiatives. Post-
colonial state-nations, engaged in the proc-
ess of nation-creation, are more complex in
their rhetoric. For these actors, interna-
tional politics, in addition to being used as
an instrument of national interest, also
plays a symbolic role in the building of a
national profile. The paper seeks to com-
bine both the material and symbolic as-
pects of Indian policy in a manner that can
bring potential power into an effective fo-
cus, in the absence of which mere appurte-
nances of power like guns and ships are
just that and not much more.10
Though there is considerable force to the
argument that South Asian security is cru-
cially contingent on the India-China-
Pakistan triangle,11 India remains the big-
gest power in South Asia, and her signifi-
cance, in terms of how India sees herself
and how others see her, is a key considera-
tion for regional politics. The need for a
sophisticated methodological analysis
arises paradoxically from the fact that In-
dia is a democratic state and an open soci-
ety, both of which give a false sense of
visibility to India's security profile.12 For-
eign observers, depending on their own
national origin and the context, place their
bets on predictions of India's next move
either as the 'regional bully' or the 'regional
push-over', and India, Janus-like, often
proves both speculations to be right, ap-
pearing in the process to be either mysti-
cal-moral, or utterly devoid of principle or
doctrine.13
One of the main difficulties of approaching
the theme of India's position as an emerg-
ing major power is that it is difficult to
measure India's power with any degree of
precision. Methods of ranking such as the
one based on economic resources and
military hardware, the reputational method
and a 'class analysis' which measures a
state's net power in relation to putative
adversaries14 come up with conflicting re-
sults. The net outcome is a sense of ambi-
guity with regard to India's rank as a power
and the conclusion that India belongs to the
class of countries that are always emerging
but never quite arriving.
The data on the conventional criteria of
power such as population, economy, mili-
tary personnel and hardware, are generally
accessible. In terms of gross indicators of
size of the population and the economy,
India is among the leading states in the
world. As regards the number of inhabi-
tants, India has the world's second largest
population, having just passed the billion
mark, and on current trends, could surpass
China in the next few decades. India is far
ahead of the United States (270 million),
and other points of reference like Russia,
Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Brazil, and
Nigeria all of which are home to between
100 million and 250 million people. Ac-
cording to the World Bank's World Devel-
opment Report 1999/2000, India's econ-
omy is gigantic in terms of overall gross
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national product (GNP). It ranks eleventh
in the world, with a total figure of US$421
billion, compared with China's US$929
billion, and Japan's US$4,090 billion.
When measured by purchasing power par-
ity (PPP) taking into account local rates of
exchange, India scores higher with
US$1,661 billion, the fourth largest in the
world. As international politics recognizes
states as the main actors, these figures
should rank India among the leading 'pow-
ers' of the world. But from the point of
view of relative power, these figures are
misleading, for the transformation of GNP
to power must take into account the ability
of an actor to mobilize the economy to a
war economy, and for the population to be
able to sustain a war over an indefinite
period. Seen in this light, the impact of
India's size is modest on her relative power
position because of the poor performance
on the per capita indicator. India ranks low
in terms of GNP per capita, with a figure
of only US$430, far below China's
US$750. On social indicators, the picture
is just as dismal, for India does rather
badly on the human development index of
the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP).15
India, with a huge economy and a poor
population, thus presents a somewhat con-
tradictory picture. The picture has changed
since the beginning of liberalization in the
early nineties, and the quality of life is
slowly going up. But, in terms of relative
power, this does not help India, for both
GNP per capita and the quality of life are
going up even faster among her competi-
tors. It is also an intensely politicized soci-
ety, and a contentious democracy, which
affects the ratio of potential power to ef-
fective force negatively, contributing to the
overall ambiguity of India's international
presence.
With regard to India's defence outlay, the
state spends approximately 3 percent of its
gross domestic product (GDP) on defence,
amounting in 1998 to only US$14 per per-
son. By comparison, India's adversaries
spend more. Pakistan spends over 6.5 per-
cent of national income on the armed
forces, and, about US$28 per person, while
China spends 5.3 percent and US$30 per
person.16 In terms of aggregate figures,
India is usually in the top dozen states in
terms of overall military expenditures,
ranking twelfth in 1999-2000 with spend-
ing at about US$14 billion.17 This is mod-
est compared to China's US$40 billion or
Japan's US$37 billion, which is equivalent
to the amount spent by most major Euro-
pean powers. Russia spends US$54 billion,
but the United States, which spends well
over US$250 billion in military equipment
and personnel is ahead of everyone else.
How do these figures translate into actual
power? Cohen18 mentions a multiplier ef-
fect of "low wages and generally high
quality of Indian armed forces" which
"magnify the effect of India's mere US$14
billion in defence spending." India has the
largest volunteer military establishment in
the world, with well over one million
regular soldiers, sailors and airmen, and
nearly the same number of paramilitary
forces. But, in terms of effective logistics,
as we learn from Jaswant Singh's influen-
tial Defending India19, a large part of this
force is tied up with other tasks and as
such, should be discounted for when it
comes to the calculation of national power.
The growing use of the Army for Internal
Security (IS) duties, senior Army officers
fear, has affected the morale and fighting
qualities of the soldier by realigning his
mission and adversary orientation from
external to internal enemies, which can be
potentially very dangerous, blunting his
battlefield skills - the time he would oth-
erwise spend in training for conventional
war is spent on IS duties, providing him no
rest and respite, and exposing him to, and
infecting him with, the lax and corrupt
values of the police and paramilitary
forces. It is not the occasional but full-time
'aid to civil power' which is the problem.20
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Singh's criticism of the Indian strategy of
withdrawing troops from the border to em-
ploy Army personnel for the maintenance
of internal security for which the Army
was not intended, is echoed by the results
of a high level inquiry commission set up
by the Government of India which states
that the withdrawal of paramilitary (Army)
forces from the borders has in the past ex-
acerbated the problems of border manage-
ment.21 This internal-external security link
persists in recent discussions of India's
security management and underscores the
necessity for political science to see both
themes as connected. India's contentious
democracy and the worsening communal
relations have greatly exacerbated the need
for effective policing. The police are a
State subject under the federal division of
powers and, being under the control of
India's regional governments, are not al-
ways considered politically neutral. At the
slightest outbreak of communal violence,
therefore, there is a clamour for the de-
ployment of the army. Already over-
stretched in view of its engagement with
anti-insurgency operations in Jammu and
Kashmir, Punjab, the Northeast and sundry
other trouble spots where the state is en-
gaged in fighting Naxalites (a left-wing
guerrilla), the additional demands on its
personnel greatly reduce the effective fire
power of the armed forces.
In contrast to armed personnel, the situa-
tion is marginally better when it comes to
hardware. As we learn from Cohen,22 In-
dia's armed forces have a significant num-
ber of armoured vehicles: 4,000 tanks, and
about 500 armoured personnel carriers
organized into 60 tank regiments, almost
200 artillery regiments, including a few
equipped with short-range "Prithvi" mis-
siles manufactured in India. To further
improve and to modernize this arsenal, in
2000, India signed the biggest MBT-deal
in Asia with Russia, which provides for the
delivery of no less than 310 modern T-90S
Main Battle Tanks, 184 of which will be
build in India by licence.23 Indian airpower
has an edge over Pakistan in terms of
numbers, with almost double the aircraft
(India has 774 combat aircraft, mostly
multipurpose fighters; Pakistan has only
389). But in comparison, China is better
endowed than India, with a vast armoured
force, more than 8,000 tanks and more than
3,000 combat aircraft. Ironically, India,
China and Pakistan share vintage Soviet air
technology for a variety of reasons: China
because of the old Soviet links in the early
years after the second world war, India
because of the years of close collaboration
and technology transfer and Pakistan be-
cause of the trading relation with China!
However, Cohen writes that each of these
three countries possesses a small core of
advanced fighters, capable of serving as
delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons.
India and China possess the nuclear-
capable Sukhoi 30; India and Pakistan each
possess a variant of the Mirage 2000, al-
though Pakistan is the only air force in this
triad that flies the relatively advanced
American F-16.
India had sought in the past to increase her
room to manoeuvre against Pakistan
through diversification in arms procure-
ment which lowers the dependence on any
particular arms supplier, and through a
programme of indigenization which re-
quired supply contracts to include a provi-
sion for their production in India under
licence. The 1965 Indo-Pak war had dem-
onstrated the advantage of this strategy, for
India, unlike Pakistan, was not dependent
on an outside supplier for spare parts, or
for continued supply. But these advan-
tages, as the paper will argue below, have
been neutralized through nuclearization,
which has helped Pakistan bridge the
'strategic depth' against India, and the abil-
ity of Pakistan to draw on both China and
the USA against India. In addition, there
have been allegations that Indian armed
forces are suffering from waste and cor-
ruption and are under-equipped compared
even with Pakistan.24 A recent 17 percent
increase in defence spending will still have
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a limited impact on India's power projec-
tion capabilities.25
India and Pakistan are self-declared nu-
clear powers and their devices, with the
multiplicator of delivery vehicles, must
also be factored into the regional military
balance. China is supposed to have nearly
300 deployed nuclear weapons. While the
question of deployed nuclear weapons in
India is still subject to speculation, India is
estimated to have the capacity for building
between 25 and 100 warheads, and Paki-
stan to have enough fissile material to pro-
duce between 10 and 15 "devices", al-
though recent reports suggest that Pakistan
holds the larger inventory.26 It remains un-
clear as to how many weapons are de-
ployed at a given time, but one can safely
assume that both have at least a few de-
vices and could produce many more on
fairly short notice. China is believed by
some Indian analysts to have several nu-
clear weapons deployed in bases in Tibet.
As for delivery, aircraft still remains the
main mode, but Pakistan is assumed to be
moving toward a missile-based capability.
Some experts assert that India lags behind
Pakistan in this category, with only a few
short-range missiles (the Prithvi) in its in-
ventory, and a medium-range missile (the
Agni) still under development. China has
nearly seventy medium-range missiles, a
few intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), and a dozen sea-launched me-
dium-range missiles (India has neither an
ICBM nor a sea-launch capability, al-
though programmes of both are under
way). Most of these Chinese systems could
theoretically target major Indian cities or
Indian nuclear weapons based in northern
and eastern India.27
In terms of naval power, India's fleet is
smaller than China's, but anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that it is better trained and
more experienced. Indian ships range
throughout the Indian Ocean, paying
regular calls on ports in East Africa and
Southeast Asia. Although in terms of
quantity, the Indian navy is shrinking,
since many obsolete vessels are being re-
tired, and although a new carrier28 may be
out of (financial) reach for the Indian
Navy, the quality of the Indian warships is
gradually improving through the acquisi-
tion of Russian Kashin-Class destroyers or
Russian Granit-SLCMs for their Kilo-
Class submarines. So, the Indian Navy
may currently not be able to conduct sus-
tained operations far from base (for exam-
ple in the South China Sea), but it is defi-
nitely well positioned to defend India's
interests in the Bay of Bengal and in the
Arabian Sea. India's capacity to deploy a
substantial air-sea operation within forty-
eight hours of the Tsunami catastrophe
demonstrates this point.
As far as India is concerned, a brief perusal
of her nuclear programme quickly reveals
a long, expensive engagement with techni-
cal development but without the backing of
a well conceptualized doctrine.29 The pro-
gramme started way back in 1944, with the
founding of the Tata Institute for Funda-
mental Research under the leadership of
the noted physicist Homi J. Bhabha who
had the ear of Nehru. The original inten-
tion was to use nuclear research as a source
of energy which nicely dovetailed into
Nehru's economic plans for self-
sufficiency in energy-deficient India. In
1948 the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) was established. In 1956 and 1960
the first two civilian nuclear reactors were
opened. An inconclusive national debate
about exercising this option, chiefly be-
tween Homi Bhabha and V.K. Menon,
India's defence minister, ensued. China
tested its nuclear bomb for the first time in
1964. India, with enough nuclear material
and the necessary technology, has the op-
tion of "going nuclear" for the first time in
1965. However, no clear policy evolved
during these politically turbulent times of
India. From 1968 onwards a second nu-
clear debate begins due to pressure from
the West, the Soviet Union and Japan to
sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
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(NPT). India developed the counter argu-
ment of the "discriminatory" international
nuclear order. In 1974 India tested a
'peaceful nuclear device' for the first time
at Pokhran. During the 1970s India gained
respect for its nuclear advances but failed
to develop a plan for the future policies on
nuclearization. The 1980s show India de-
veloping a nuclear doctrine30 of "recessed
deterrence", meaning nuclearization to a
point where deployable weapons can be
produced at very short notice, but short of
full weaponization, since the threat of that
should suffice politically.
The bomb gradually came to acquire the
aura of a symbol of India's power. Support
for this view ranged from the Hindu na-
tionalist Bharatiya Janata Party to others,
including the socialist George Fernandes,
originally opposed to the bomb, but even
more opposed to the bullying by other nu-
clear powers. The 'Subrahmanyam logic',
so-called after the most celebrated Indian
'hawk', pressuring the "nuclear haves" into
disarmament while protecting India against
nuclear blackmail by nuclearization (dating
back to the mid-1970s) still applies today
to India's official position.
The push towards nuclearization appears to
have been authorized by Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi in the late eighties after his
own de-nuclearization initiative was cold-
shouldered by Western powers. In Indian
eyes, from 1990 on Pakistan was consid-
ered a nuclear weapons state. From 1995 to
1997 the NPT/Arms Control Regime be-
came greatly tightened, threatening closer
scrutiny of India's nuclear programme. The
advent of the Bharatiya Janata Party to
power turned the bomb into a symbol of
Indian nationhood and an act of peaceful
resistance to international bullying. The
integration of India's search for power and
her nuclearization is however far from
complete. In Cohen's view, if at all India is
to be viewed as a major power, it is "de-
spite [and] not because of its overt nuclear
capabilities."31
The last variable that needs to be taken into
consideration with regard to the extent and
ambiguity of India's power is 'morale', that
ultimate force-multiplier, which Cohen
holds to be high in the case of India.32 But
still, the sum of parts is less than the
whole. Pulling all these factors together,
Cohen concludes that "for the past several
decades, India has had a weak or at least
highly variable reputation, as judged by the
ability to influence without attempting to
exercise influence, ... one that is easily
written off as a regional power."33 India's
relative weakness was not fully visible at
the height of the Cold War. Inevitably, her
ranking has been adversely affected by the
decline of the Soviet Union, though the
fact does not appear to have been fully
registered by Indian policy makers. India,
of course, continues to be regarded warily
by her neighbours but any comparison with
her neighbours is seen by Indian policy
makers as condescending towards India
and unappreciative of her true power.
India's ambiguous profile results from the
hiatus between self-perception and the
evaluation by others. This is compounded
by the contradiction between nostalgic
self-perception as a major player in the
international arena at par with China, the
real attainment of which would require a
commensurate strategic engagement, and
the current commitments in South Asia
which restrict her strategic vision and en-
gagement basically to the region. This
hiatus between the perception of India and
her self-perception also causes her to shut-
tle uneasily between grandstanding on the
one hand, and inexplicable acquiescence
with situations that are contrary to her in-
terests or declared principles on the other,
lowering, in the process, her credibility
even further.
With regard to the Asian strategic land-
scape, thus, India's position remains un-
specified. While quite clearly the leading
military power on the subcontinent, India
is not accepted as the paramount power.
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Indeed, the Indian analyst Raju Thomas
argues that "India does not yet have clear
superiority in the event of a combined at-
tack by Pakistan and China, a point borne
out by the situation on the border with
Pakistan, where because of demands on
Indian forces elsewhere, Pakistan is still
able to match India almost division for
division."34 India has been making efforts
to counter this by attempting to revive
closer relations with Russia and undertak-
ing high level diplomatic exchanges with
China. What does this make out of India in
so far as her rank is concerned?
3. Nuclear, and still non-aligned?
India's threat perception and
response
India has a nuclear programme, but "one
without clear purpose or direction."35 In-
dian public opinion supports the bomb, but
not for warlike purposes (Tables 1 and 2
below). India is engaged in the production
of weapons and missiles but there are no
plans for or policies about the sale or diffu-
sion of such technology. President A.P.J.
Kalam, one of India's leading military sci-
entists and the 'father' of India's missile
programme, has urged India to get into the
business of missile sales in order to break
up the "monopolies" of the dominant pow-
ers and their unfair regulating mechanisms,
such as the Missile Technology Control
Regime. Kalam's rejection of the MTCR
(Missile Technology Control Regime) re-
flects the ambiguous, often contradictory
Indian stance on international regimes to
restrict proliferation of nuclear and missile
technology. Accordingly, in the course of
negotiations on the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty in the mid-1990s, India, which
initially had been a committed advocate,
turned to its most outspoken opponent.
Finally, in a move to save both parties
face, India accepted the provisions of the
CTBT and declared a moratorium on nu-
clear tests in 1999 without formally sign-
ing the treaty. India continues to reject the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as
any binding commitment to full-scope
safeguards of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). As IAEA regu-
larities prohibit exports of nuclear technol-
ogy into states which do not accept safe-
guards, India's nuclear energy sector has
been cut off from urgently needed know-
how and hardware. Since India's nuclear
test of 1974, technology imports from the
West almost ceased, which led to a steady
decline in the efficiency of the civilian
nuclear energy sector. Nuclear energy has
never been produced cost-effectively and
until the mid-1990s, India produced no
more than 1500 megawatts of nuclear
power, as compared to the target of 10.000
megawatts planned in 1985, and less than
2% of India's overall power supply. 36
India's active media and contentious de-
mocracy provide effective conditions for
an influential role of Indian public opinion
in the formulation and implementation of
strategic decisions. The data reported in
Table 1 show that Indian security and for-
eign policy are both firmly in the realm of
national political consciousness, a fact that
no government in politically contentious
India can afford to ignore. But, while the
Indian public appears to be conscious of
the problem of security, what do they
really want from their government? The
data reported in Table 2, possibly reflect-
ing the effects of Kargil, show a public that
is agitated but indecisive. Whereas Table 1
shows the perception of Pakistan as India's
'public enemy number one', with regard to
the right course of action to follow, the
Indian public is surprisingly conciliatory.
Significantly many more people agree that
'India should make efforts to develop
friendly relations with Pakistan' compared
to those who disagree.37 On the general
issue of "war as the only solution to Indo-
Pakistan problem", the number of those
who disagree far exceeds those who agree
(while a substantial number express no
opinion), but these conciliatory and peace-
like opinions are contradicted by the strong
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support for "increased spending on the
army even if it increases the burden on
ordinary people", with over half of the
total sample agreeing to the proposition
and less than a fifth expressing their dis-
agreement.
Table 1. Public Opinion on State-to-State Relations
Q: Now I will read the names of some
countries. Have you heard the name of
these countries?
 (If yes) How is their relationship with India –
friend, neither friend nor enemy or enemy?
Yes No  Friend Neither Enemy
Nepal 65.3 34.7  41.3 16.8   1.7
America 70.3 29.7  27.1 25.9 11.1
Pakistan 82.9 17.1    6.9   7.4 64.2
Bangladesh 65.5 34.5  32.5 21.4   5.7
China 64.3 35.7  21.7 23.4 13.0
Sri Lanka 66.5 33.5  36.1 21.0   3.3
Russia 61.9 38.1  42.1 12.7   1.4
Source: post-poll survey of the Indian electorate, CSDS, Delhi, 1999
Table 2. Public Opinion on Security Issues
Q: Now I will talk about some specific issues on which different people have different
opinions. I will read out some statements to which you may agree or disagree.
Statements  Agree No Opinion Disagree
India should make efforts to develop
friendly relations with Pakistan.
Do you…
 42.4 33.9 23.7
Country should increase spending
on army even if it increases the
burden on ordinary people.
Do you…
War is the only solution to Indo-
Pakistan problem.
Do you…
 50.1
 25.2
32.6
35.6
17.3
39.1
Source: post-poll survey of the Indian electorate, CSDS, Delhi, 1999
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How does India's status as a nuclear power
affect her self-image as a non-aligned
country, committed to international peace?
Panchasheela, the five principles of peace-
ful coexistence to which Jawaharlal Nehru
gave an institutional expression in terms
of the Non-aligned Movement provided a
complete if not coherent statement of
India's strategic doctrine at the height of
the Cold War.38 Following the decline of
Nehru's Panchasheela, despite attempts
by Indira Gandhi to formulate a general
framework for India's engagement with
the world, no single coherent doctrine
has emerged. New generations of policy
makers, voters, parties and major changes
in the regional and international contexts
have influenced the development of stra-
tegic thinking. Each of the major wars
of South Asia, or war-like incidents
(see table 3 above) have sparked off both
bouts of doctrine elaboration by the gov-
ernment and political controversies around
them.
Table 3. Major Military Operations of India (1947-2005)39
A.         Inter-State Wars
1947-48 The First Indo-Pak Conflict
1962 Sino-Indian Border War
1965 The Second Indo-Pak War
1971 The Third Indo-Pak War: Creation of Bangladesh
B.         Other Internal Military Operations
1947 Punjab Boundary Force
1947 Junagarh deployment
1948 Hyderabad police action
1961 'Liberation' of Goa
1984 The sending of the IPKF to Sri Lanka
C.         Counter-insurgency Operations
1954-74 Anti-insurgency operations in Nagaland
1965-67 Anti-insurgency operations in Mizoram
1971 Anti-insurgency operations in Tripura and Mizoram.
1985-90 Anti-terrorist deployments in Punjab
1989- Anti-terrorist deployments in Jammu and Kashmir
1991 Anti-insurgency operation in Assam: Operation Rhino
As things stood at the outset, foreign pol-
icy and strategic planning were almost
exclusively in the hands of Nehru and his
close advisers during his tenure as Prime
Minister until 1964. More recently, this
formerly relatively closed circle of policy
experts has opened up to allow regional
political forces (which have come to wield
influence as coalition partners at the cen-
tre) to air their respective views on strate-
gic planning. Essentially, as Cohen argues,
the defence and strategic planning of India
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has come from one voice (Nehru's) in the
early years to many voices and coalitions
in more recent times.
The Nehruvian Tradition of strategic
thinking, which went through many meta-
morphoses under his successors, namely
Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66), Indira
Gandhi (1966-77, 80-84) and Rajiv Gandhi
(1984-89), represents a mix of liberal in-
ternationalism and a "strong state" ap-
proach. It was originally characterized by a
sceptical view of the US and a reliance on
the Soviet Union and support for other
anticolonial movements. Nehru acknowl-
edged the problems facing a weak state in
the international system and consequently
aimed at co-operation where possible and
necessary. The "Militant Nehruvians" en-
tered the scene after India's defeat in the
1962 Indo-Chinese border war. They
shared Nehru's suspicion of the unbalanced
international power system. Subcontinental
hegemony became the goal of foreign pol-
icy. Pakistan, China and the US were seen
as basically hostile towards India. This
thinking persisted from 1972 to about
1992.
According to Cohen, the Nehruvian origins
of strategic thinking in post-independence
India have been enriched by two additional
currents which he calls, respectively, real-
ists and revitalists, to distinguish them
from the overall idealism of Jawaharlal
Nehru. The realists started as offshoots
from the generally liberal, market oriented,
pro-American Swatantra party in the mid-
1960s. The realists hold a more pragmatic
view of Sino-Indian and Indo-US relations
and support increased economic openness
and integration with the international mar-
ket forces. The revitalists take a more re-
gional perspective, stemming from their
preoccupation with indianizing South Asia,
which they see as essentially the main
theatre of action for Indian foreign policy.
They, like the realists, deem nuclearization
necessary. For Cohen the modern synthesis
of realist and revitalist perspectives was
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's
approach.40
Nehru saw himself first and foremost as a
great modernizer and as such, social and
economic development was the corner-
stone of his political thinking. Defence as a
political and strategic issue was mainly
used to advance these objectives. Nehru
was deeply distrustful of the military as
such. Not surprisingly, no coherent secu-
rity doctrine developed during the period
of Nehru's stewardship, non-alignment
being an overall guide to the ways and
means of avoiding conflict rather than a
strategy of the enhancement of national
power and security. India established good
neighbourly relations with her smaller
neighbours on the basis of treaties with
Bhutan 1949, Sikkim 1950, Nepal 1950,
Burma 1951 and Ceylon 1954/1964. Force
during this phase was used primarily for
domestic purposes, the invasion of Goa in
1961 being the exception.
The period during the Indo-China war of
1962 and the Indo-Pak war of 1971 caused
a major re-thinking, for India had to con-
ceptualize the possibility of a war on two
fronts. The increase in defence allocation
during this period, and increased military
co-operation with the West saw the begin-
ning of a greater security consciousness.
After Indira Gandhi came to power in 1966
she displayed a greater willingness to link
politics and military affairs. She also
turned India firmly in the direction of the
Soviet Union with the Indo-Soviet Treaty
of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation,
signed on 9 August 1971. After 1971, the
balance of power in South Asia was altered
significantly, with the defeat of Pakistan in
1971, the emergence of Bangladesh and
the "peaceful nuclear explosion" of 1974
which gave yet another indication of an
'Indira Doctrine', which visualized India as
the hegemonic power of South Asia.41
The defeat of Indira Gandhi in the Parlia-
mentary elections of 1977 and the ushering
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in of the first Janata government in Delhi
under the leadership of Morarji Desai, seen
at that time as pro-American, tilted the
balance away from the Soviet Union, but at
the same time, introduced another dose of
uncertainty to India's strategic vision. This
changed again in 1980 with the return of
Indira, but the period of 1980 to 1984 saw
India isolated, and funds for defence
spending getting scarce. Increased US sup-
port to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion in
Afghanistan saw India's return to reliance
on the Soviet Union and greater Soviet
arms imports in India.
In retrospect, the period that intervened
during the two assassinations, of Indira
Gandhi in 1984 by her Sikh bodyguards
and Rajiv Gandhi by Tamil terrorists in
1991, were one of continued 'Indira Doc-
trine' which saw attempts to expand India's
influence in South Asia and hostility to-
wards China, Pakistan and the US grew
stronger. Missile programmes were initi-
ated after 1983 and defence spending dou-
bled from 1980 to 1989. Operations
Siachen (1984) and Brasstacks (1986-87)
occurred. Support was lent to the Tamil
Tigers (1987-90) and an Indian interven-
tion in Male (Maledives) took place in
1988.
Though the onset of liberalization of the
Indian economy in 1991 prepared the
ground for a rapprochement with the
United States, the contradictory pulls
within India's strategic thinking continued
from 1990 to 1999. The collapse of the
Soviet Union necessitated a radical change
in policy, while economic reforms in India
necessitated budget cuts, affecting the
military adversely. This might have opened
a window of opportunity for Pakistan,
which, taking advantage of the onset of
militancy in Kashmir started supporting
cross-border insurgency in Kashmir and
covert military operations. While on the
political front the unilateralist Gujral doc-
trine and subsequently, the BJP initiatives
for a diplomatic deal with Pakistan first of
the Lahore bus trip and subsequently the
Agra summit continued, the Pakistani
military operated on more conservative
lines and sought to take advantage of the
perceived weakness of the Indian military
establishment. One consequence was the
war in Kargil in 1999, but the forceful re-
action of India's army once again under-
scored the need for a coherent Indian stra-
tegic doctrine.
The conceptual disarray and the lack of
strategic vision that characterize Indian
thinking on strategic and security issues
can be attributed, in Jaswant Singh's view,
to the lack of mapping skills and geo-
graphical knowledge of the North-east and
North-west frontiers. This in fact is in con-
tinuation with British colonial times when
borders were deliberately left inexact in
order to act as buffer zones. The continua-
tion of this policy, however, assumed the
same amount of force that the British had
been able to mobilize as an imperial
power. The continuation of these soft fron-
tiers, particularly with China, was to be a
major contributory cause to the conflict of
1962.42
All modern states, as Tilly has argued, seek
to develop an integrated security doctrine
that combines internal and external secu-
rity, basically to safeguard the interests of
the ruling elites.43 That India did not go in
that direction during the crucial two dec-
ades following independence is an issue of
great theoretical interest. Could this be the
consequence of the lack of a strategic cul-
ture in India?
The issue has been investigated at length
by Jaswant Singh. The fact that though
India is a full-fledged state with all the
rights and obligations due to a state under
the conventions of the international system
and still one has to discuss why India has
not pursued national power like others is of
particular significance. It arises in this
form primarily because of the attribution of
a non-strategic, spiritual culture to India by
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colonial anthropology. In its loose, idealis-
tic formulation, Panchasheela appears to
give institutional form to this non-strategic
attitude. Singh, taking issue against this
reading of Indian history, shows how,
buried under the layers of spiritual rhetoric
and rituals there was a strategic culture and
appropriate institutions in pre-modern In-
dia. As a key member of the NDA gov-
ernment and one of its main strategists,
Singh argued that the government was able
to build on this basis in order to bring in a
new institutional arrangement of security
management.
Since the existence of a tradition of strate-
gic culture in India is not often acknowl-
edged by specialists in the field, it is im-
portant to take cognizance of it at this
stage. The evidence that Singh builds his
assertions on comes chiefly from Kauti-
lya's Arthaśastra, a text on governance that
has been traced to four centuries before
Christ. The text has an obsessive occupa-
tion with "spies, secrets, and treachery.
When listing the virtues of a king, Kautilya
includes, along with energy, controlling his
sensual nature, cultivating his intellect, and
associating with his elders, the need to
keep ‚a watchful eye by means of spies'."44
Exactly why India's strategic tradition
failed to develop on the same lines as the
modern state in the West is a larger debate
on India's state tradition, which need not
detain us here. The important point here is
that the loss of autonomy in the wake of
foreign invasion caused India's strategic
culture to get internalized, and got ob-
sessed with curbing the enemy within
rather than combating external foes. This,
Singh contends, "created a yawning chasm
of mutual suspicion between the state and
the citizen. This signal failure, the estab-
lishment of a confident, viable and effi-
cient Indian state, nourished by effective
institutional instruments, and sustained by
a willing and co-operative citizenry has
become a political and cultural trait; it both
prescribes the form and constricts the
functioning of the Indian state, even today.
In the process it has prevented India from
developing a proper strategic doctrine."
The 'rediscovery' of India's strategic cul-
ture has now become the basis of an avid
discourse within India's security establish-
ment. Singh's Defending India45 in a way
has set the pace but there are several other
texts46 that have come out with institutional
arrangements that base themselves on this
revival of India's security culture. Jaswant
Singh's evocation of how this security
culture formed the basis of the continua-
tion of Indian resistance to foreign aggres-
sion is of great interest.
Quoting extensively from the writings of
the main actors involved in some of India's
recent security issues, particularly the dis-
astrous experience of the IPKF in Sri
Lanka, Singh shows the negative conse-
quences of the absence of a clear strategic
doctrine. In early 2001, the Group of Min-
isters (GoM), comprising of four key min-
isters of Defence, External Affairs, Home
and Finance submitted its own report to the
Prime Minister. The report summarized
several reform proposals proposed since
1998. On the suggestions of the GoM re-
port, the government created an Integrated
Defence Staff as well as a Defence Intelli-
gence Agency. In its attempt to create a
Chief of Defence Staff, it faced some re-
sistance from the services, who feared a
loss of authority.
In January 2003, the government finally
decided to establish a Nuclear Command
Authority (NCA) with the highest compe-
tence for nuclear weapons. The NCA is
linked to the Political Council, chaired by
the Prime Minister, and the Executive
Council, chaired by the National Security
Adviser to the Prime Minister. Next to the
Nuclear Command Authority, the post of a
Commander-in-Chief or the Strategic
Forces Command was established as the
responsible decision maker for nuclear
deployment and warfare. Parallel to the
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introduction of the NCA, the government
gave an official status to the Nuclear Doc-
trine drafted the National Security Advi-
sory Board in 1999. With a single excep-
tion, the official doctrine remained un-
changed from its draft version. The com-
prehensive no-first-strike-use posture of
the draft was softened by introducing the
option of a nuclear first strike in the case of
an attack with biological or chemical
weapons.47
The discussion of the assumptions that go
into Pakistani decision-making are indica-
tive of the thinking at the highest level of
the government of India with regard to the
Indian strategic doctrine. There is every
indication that there are similar delibera-
tions in process with regard to China as
well. In view of the sensitivity of the issue,
the declassified report withheld this infor-
mation, but made an oblique reference to
the unsettled problems with regard to
China through a general reference to the
problems of India's borders which are un-
defined and undemarcated on the ground.
The report acknowledges that disputed and
unsettled borders are matters of contention.
In addition, it mentions the porousness of
borders due to their artificial character (i.e.,
not necessarily corresponding to natural
boundaries), lack of clear accountability
for border security, command and control
problems arising out of divided responsi-
bility among too many different forces
deemed to be responsible for border man-
agement duties, and finally, the unsatis-
factory equipment situation, lacking in
night vision and surveillance capacity are
mentioned as major problems facing In-
dia's security management.
4. Engaging the world: challenges to
Indian diplomacy and the pattern
of non-alliances
Sophisticated observers of the Indian scene
like Stephen Cohen and Sandy Gordon
have reported on India's ambitions for
great power status. At least in terms of
rhetoric, quite discernibly, an attitude to
that effect often lurks behind the moral
postures and grandstanding by India's
leaders, when they are asked to pronounce
themselves on global problems. How much
of this is empty rhetoric and should neces-
sarily be discounted as Indian garrulity,
and how much of it is for real, which In-
dia's counter-players can ignore only at
their peril? This section attempts to answer
this question with reference to a series of
specific issues.
4.1 India and the international system
At the height of the Cold War, Pan-
chasheela, the 'five principles of peaceful
coexistence', spelt out the ideal state of an
international system from the Indian point
of view. The ideal scenario for India was to
be a world of largely status quo powers
where just national interests would be me-
diated through international law, arbitra-
tion and fair use of the natural resources of
the world. In such a perfect world, it was
assumed by Nehru, India, whose commit-
ment to the third way between the East and
the West, communism and capitalism,
hallowed by the legacy of Aśoka and Gan-
dhi, would play an important role, one that
the world would see as both natural and
legitimate. Major powers would act re-
sponsibly to keep order and promote jus-
tice in their parts of the globe. International
politics would be governed by mature and
responsible states that would not meddle in
the affairs of others.48 In his terse descrip-
tion of Indian expectations during the early
years after Independence when the foun-
dations of her foreign policy were being
laid, Cohen points out how little thought
Indians gave to how the policies of such
states could be co-ordinated or how devi-
ance from the system by rogue states could
be sanctioned. The fact that India got a
hearing in international conflicts and
played a mediating role with some distinc-
tion was attributed to the inherent virtue of
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the Indian position and not to contextual
factors such as the bipolar world where
India played a pivotal role. The Nehruvi-
ans, taken in by the hectoring tone and
pedagogical intents of their leader, as-
sumed that the Soviets were committed to
peace and that the United States would
eventually retreat to its own hemisphere
and cease its interference elsewhere around
the world. Failing that, in the short term,
the United States and to a lesser extent its
allies and dependencies, such as Japan,
could possibly be "educated" into the
proper norms of international behaviour.49
During the Cold War India could afford to
sit on the fence rather than entering a con-
flict or siding with one bloc or another,
rationalizing its non-engagement in moral
terms. Similarly, Cohen explains, India, a
large, important and democratic power, did
not need to join an alliance. However, the
emergence of Sino-Soviet rivalry, the de-
cline of global bipolarity, and most cru-
cially, the humiliating defeat of India in the
1962 Indo-China conflict forced India to
rethink many of the assumptions that went
into the Panchasheela. The positioning of
India in the international arena today re-
quires nothing short of two paradigm-
shifts, from non-alignment to a world
based on alliances, and from a state-centric
mode of thinking to an international arena
where non-state actors are an increasingly
important presence.
India does not have much of a choice with
regard to holding aloof from the world.
Her declared status as a nuclear power in-
vites an engagement by the world, which
her poverty and peacelike gestures of an
earlier period did not. Her commitment to
liberalization of the economy, while
opening up opportunities for her vigorous
and vibrant middle classes, also puts an
obligation on the part of the government to
engage with the rich, capitalist world. The
Hindu nationalist sentiments of the gov-
ernment led to the initiative to link Indian
diplomacy with overseas Indians. Finally,
being energy-deficient, India needs to
maintain good ties with some of the major
oil producers, whose sympathies are
mainly with Pakistan.
4.2 Global and regional security
regimes
Under the impact of the new contextual
and indigenous developments, India is re-
examining its approach to international and
regional organizations. Nehru was a great
supporter of international peacekeeping
and mediation initiatives50 and, a staunch
advocate of Asian regional co-operation, it
was Nehru who organized the Asian Rela-
tions Conference even before India
achieved independence. In the new scheme
of things, with much of the world clam-
ouring for mediation in Kashmir, and India
holding out obstinately, claiming that
Kashmir is an internal problem of India,
the Indian position needs to be looked at
seriously afresh. This holds out both a
challenge and an opportunity. The United
Nations, as Cohen suggests, can be a dan-
gerous place for India where, if Kashmir
comes to a vote in the General Assembly,
"India runs the risk of having its Kashmir
policies come under critical scrutiny, and
perhaps fresh UN resolutions, and even
sanctions."51 On the other hand, a proper
deal can expedite India's case for a seat on
the Security Council. The problem is
similar in nature though different in scale
with regard to India's security links with
her South Asian neighbours. Although the
remote sources of India's insecurity often
lie within the territories of her neighbours,
India has so far refused to have the issues
discussed as a common problem of South
Asia, preferring, instead, to take things up
at the bilateral level. There is a structural
problem here that India needs to solve. As
Cohen points out, regional co-operation
will only work when one of two conditions
exists. The first is the presence of a be-
nevolent, dominant regional power that can
regulate regional behaviour, or the exis-
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tence of a set of regional players with
roughly similar resource endowments, or
similar threat perceptions from outside the
region. The leading role of the United
States in the western hemisphere, and the
successful regional organizations in
Europe and South East Asia are pointed
out as examples of these conditions. How-
ever, neither condition obtains in South
Asia.52 A successful solution to the issue of
joint management of security threats at the
regional level will reduce India's security
burden and increase her support from re-
gional powers at the international arena,
but, for reasons to be discussed below,
India might not find it easy to move in that
direction.
4.3 India, Pakistan and Kashmir
Though at a reduced scale compared to the
recent past, India is still at war in Kashmir.
It is a war of attrition, which India cannot
manage to win and Pakistan cannot afford
to lose. South Asian discourse on this issue
is particularly rich in analogies and allu-
sions. Cohen cites an observation by G.
Parthasarathy, a former adviser to Indira
Gandhi, that an India-Pakistan reconcilia-
tion is like trying to treat two patients
whose only disease is an allergy to each
other.53 An all-party resolution of the In-
dian Parliament, voted unanimously by the
Lok Sabha in 1995, affirms Kashmir as an
integral part of Indian territory and Kash-
mir as India's internal problem. Any move
away from that, liable to be perceived in
India as 'giving in to the demand for plebi-
scite in Kashmir' can thus be blocked both
by opportunist political parties or deter-
mined special interests. A 'land for peace
deal' in Kashmir, under these circum-
stances, is difficult to conceptualize, nor is
the Israeli experience in this regard par-
ticularly encouraging. In addition, belea-
guered with similar problems with seces-
sionist movements in the Northeast, the
Indian fear of 'setting the wrong example'
has to be seen as realistic.54
4.4 India's future procurement
problems
In view of the above, it is difficult to
imagine how India can afford to reduce the
heavy outlay of resources in regional secu-
rity in the short term, which only adds to
the overall burden of security. Other, con-
textual factors make it even harder for In-
dia to meet these needs financially. Cohen
summarizes these arguments in terms of
the following, namely, the cessation of
defence credits from the erstwhile Soviet
Union forcing the Indian military procure-
ments to be done on a 'cash and carry' ba-
sis, the economic restructuring in Russia
and CIS leading to persistent demands for
steep price hikes for defence exports to
India, and, the steep fall in the exchange
value of the rupee, resulting in an equally
steep increase in the debt repayment obli-
gations for past purchases from both West-
ern and Russian supply sources.55
The consequences are the erosion and de-
pletion of the already lean defence re-
sources, which is likely to continue into the
foreseeable future. Hence, India's defence
financial planning will continue to be out
of sync with the Services' force planning
and also because Russian and CIS pres-
sures will persist owing to the 70-85 per
cent dependency on ex-Soviet military
equipment. This situation cannot be re-
versed quickly because the effects of, at
best, a slower devaluation of the Indian
currency relative to hard currency will
mean restrictions on what and how much a
shrinking defence rupee can buy from al-
ternative Western sources. India's defence
demands are caught in a pincer of rising
rouble and dollar value conjoined to
dearer, internationally available military
hardware, spares and services. Therefore,
almost any reasonable level of funding of
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defence programmes will be found to be
inadequate to sustain the existing and
planned force structure.
4.5 A thaw in India-China relations?
The easing of tension in India-China rela-
tions can help India free up some of the
resources tied up in the Northeast. From all
indications, such efforts are afoot. But the
legacy of 1962 is hard to live down. In
addition, the relative freedom of political
expression and association in India which
results in periodic movements in favour of
human rights in Tibet, particularly on the
occasion of high level visits from China,
set limits to India's room for manoeuvre.
Beijing has supported separatist and auto-
nomist groups within India in the past.
Stephen Cohen is sceptical of any chances
of early breakthroughs: "As its own re-
quirements for Middle Eastern oil draw it
into the Indian Ocean, China could also
emerge as a naval rival to India. The real-
ists in Delhi see China continuing its strat-
egy of encircling and counterbalancing
India, preventing it from achieving its
rightful dominance of the Subcontinent.
This next decade is seen as a transition
period, when India must cope with ex-
panding Chinese power, achieve a working
relationship with the Americans, and cau-
tiously use each to balance the other's
military, economic, and strategic influence.
India's new balancing act combines ap-
peasement of China on the issues of Tibet
and Taiwan with the pursuit of improved
ties with China's other potential balancers,
especially Vietnam and Russia."56 There
are shared interests such as the threat of
terrorism combined with increasingly res-
tive Muslim minorities. Both sides clearly
need to search for a political formula that
will allow for minor adjustments in their
respective claims so that political honour is
served on both sides.
4.6 India and the 'small' South Asian
neighbours
The so-called 'small' neighbours, namely
Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, are
comparable in terms of population to larger
European states. The epithet 'small' is in-
dicative of an approach that is part of In-
dia's problem in the region. In addition,
there are historic and demographic reasons
that contribute to the complexity of the
problem. Soft borders, illegal immigration,
terrorism, smuggling, drugs, water re-
sources and the treatment of minorities are
among the factors that create pressures on
India to intervene in what these countries
perceive strictly as their domestic affairs.
Cohen reports two positive developments
in this regard. First of all, the revolution in
economic policy that has swept over India
makes it a far more attractive country for
all of its neighbours and the more devel-
oped states of Southeast Asia. Indian man-
agement expertise, technology, and organ-
izational skills are now widely exported to
the rest of Asia, giving substance to the
Indian claim that it is a major power. Sec-
ondly, India's democracy is having a great
impact on many of its Asian neighbours.
For the smaller states of the region, India is
something of a model of how to peacefully
manage a multiethnic, multireligious state.
4.7 India and the Indian Ocean
Unfortunately, it seems that up to now,
India has not actually developed an Indian
Ocean policy, not even an Indian Ocean
economic policy. Despite some efforts of
some institutions like the Institute for De-
fence and Strategic Analyses (IDSA) or the
Society of Indian Ocean Studies (SIOS),
both in Delhi, there is no maritime strate-
gic doctrine as such in India. According to,
for example, Commodore C. Uday Bhas-
kar57, there is neither an understanding of
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India's maritime history nor an Indian
Ocean awareness. India is part of the In-
dian Ocean region, but that is not very im-
portant for its foreign policy, especially so
since all conflicts with neighbouring states
are situated at India's land borders. In the
perception of most Indian specialists on
maritime affairs, an Indian Ocean aware-
ness began to develop because of the im-
portance of SLOCs (Sea Lines of Commu-
nication) and the EEZ (Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zones) only very recently.
Perhaps the most important factor for this
neglect is that the current security envi-
ronment in the Indian Ocean is being per-
ceived as a stable and overall positive low
threat environment. Compared with the
superpower conflict in the 1970s and
1980s, the security situation has improved
considerably since the beginning of the
1990s. Also, there is a consensus among
naval officers interviewed that those major
sea powers which are capable of disrupting
the SLOCs are agreed that the Indian
Ocean should remain peaceful. So, in the
opinion of all Indian experts, today there is
no power competition visible in this area.
Somewhat surprisingly, both the United
States Navy and the Chinese Navy (Peo-
ple's Liberation Army Navy, PLAN) are
not seen as threatening by Indian naval
officers, either. In the wake of the events
of September 11, the USN and the Indian
Navy even embarked on a bilateral polic-
ing of SLOCs in the Arabian Sea. "India is
a maritime nation strategically straddling
the Indian Ocean, with a substantive sea
borne trade. The country's economic well-
being is thus very closely linked to our
ability to keep our sea-lanes free and open
at all times."58
Rahul Roy-Chaudhury goes into more de-
tail to drive this point home: virtually all of
India's foreign trade, some 97 per cent in
volume, is transported over the sea; in
1994-95 this accounted for an estimated 20
per cent of GNP. In addition, as much as
80 per cent of India's demand for oil is met
from the sea, either carried aboard ships
(46 per cent) or extracted from offshore
areas (34 per cent).59
In Indian perception, the only possible
source of threat to stability in the Indian
Ocean are non-state actors like pirates
(mainly in the Bay of Bengal and the
Straits of Malacca and the South China
Sea), drug traffickers, gun runners or fish
poachers. However, India is well aware of
the fact that the Indian Navy does create
some unease, especially among Bay of
Bengal rim states like Sri Lanka, Bangla-
desh and Myanmar. The reason for this is,
in the opinion of the experts, a capability
mismatch between the Indian Navy and
other regional navies. For this reason, a
process of confidence building has been
encouraged by the Indian Navy, like invi-
tations for port visits or invitation of dele-
gates from countries with only a small
navy or no navy at all. Milan (an annual
initiative under which the Navy ships make
port calls in most countries through South-
east Asia and Japan) in the Bay of Bengal
(now Milan East) can be mentioned as a
successful example of such confidence
building measures. In 1999, Milan was
introduced to the Arabian Sea as Milan
West, where naval co-operation already
exists between the Indian Navy and the
navies of Iraq, Iran, Oman and the United
Arab Emirates. Whether the new Milan
West will be as successful as Milan East
remains to be seen – in the eyes of some
Indian naval officers, the success of Milan
East was due to the happy fact that "the
trouble maker [Pakistan] is not present
there".60 In the Arabian Sea he is present,
and both states' navies are trapped in
something akin to a naval Cold War.61
4.8 Ambivalent attitudes towards the
United States
A lot of Indian dilemmas are summed up
in terms of the Indian ambivalence towards
the United States. The Indian public and
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policy makers alike have problems under-
standing why the United States, itself a
secular state and a democracy, does not, as
a result of such shared values and institu-
tions, necessarily favour India, as against
Pakistan, and to a limited extent, against
China. The fact that the United States de-
cries atrocities against minorities in India
but accepts the institutional discrimination
against minorities in Pakistan raises ques-
tions about the real American intentions in
Asia.
India has remained ambivalent with regard
to the United States in the recent past.
Thus, during the Operation Desert Storm
against Iraq, the world was first treated to
pictures of a smiling Indian foreign minis-
ter in Baghdad, then the grant of refuelling
facilities to American aircraft, which were
promptly withdrawn when the Indian anti-
American lobby got wind of it. Americans,
who had their fall-back arrangements any-
way and had only needed an Indian show
of support for propaganda purposes, were
not amused. On the other hand, the sup-
portive rhetoric of the United States in the
1962 India-China war did not translate into
actual support on the ground and the
sending of the USS Enterprise to the Bay
of Bengal at the height of the India-
Pakistan war of 1971 remains a reminder
of American incomprehension of South
Asian realities and insensitivity towards
Indian sentiments. The increasingly visible
and politically active Indian-American
lobby in the United States and accommo-
dation of American interests in the Indian
Ocean are two factors that the current gov-
ernment appears to have taken on board
with regard to the conceptualization and
implementation of Indian policy.
5. Panchasheela redux: An evolving
Indian doctrine?62
Almost six decades after Independence, the
state in India has come to its own. Both the
state and the "… the soul of a nation, long
suppressed" of Nehru's vision have found
an enduring home in the institutional infra-
structure of the Indian Republic, reinforced
during the past decade with unprecedented
growth and foreign exchange reserves, a
thriving Indian Diaspora whose links with
India have been institutionally established,
and at home, a dramatic democratic
transition in rule from the NDA to the
UPA, juxtaposed with spectacular policy
stability.
It is important here to note that the militant
Hindu nationalists took the initiatives to
send Prime Minister Vajpayee on the bus
diplomacy to Lahore, and invited General
Musharraf, for many the main architect of
the failure of Lahore and the betrayal of
Kargil. The Congress, long identified with
the firm India policy of Indira Gandhi and
Rajiv Gandhi might have turned of late to a
conciliatory tone out of political opportun-
ism, but in power, it has come back to
where the NDA government located itself.
Analysed critically, the statement by Prime
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the
Asian-African Conference,63 evocative of
the heady days of the Bandung spirit not
seen since the 1950s euphoria of pan-
chasheela and Afro-Asian solidarity, re-
veals an important, new and potentially
enduring step in the evolution of an Indian
doctrine. Once one gets past the familiar
litany of the "internationalism of visionary
leaders of Africa and Asia such as Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, President Su-
karno, Premir Zhou Enlai, President Gamal
Abdul Nasser, Prime Minister U Nu,
Prince Sihanouk, and Prime Minister Phan
van Dong", one finds a fine balance of
national self-interest and idealism. The
idea of Afro-Asian solidarity is pragmati-
cally adapted to the imperatives of our
times. The commitment to justice and soli-
darity is tempered with the imperative of
change. "Increased competition – internal
and external – helps those who are strong
enough to benefit from the new opportuni-
ties. However, it can hurt those who are ill-
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equipped to face the challenges of compe-
tition. We must adopt concerted measures,
both at the national and the international
level, for an equitable management of in-
creased global interdependence of nations.
At the national level, the state must be
modernized to create an environment con-
ducive to creativity and growth and also to
ensure that the fruits of growth are fairly
and equitably distributed."
The difference in tone and content of the
new Panchasheela from the old is remark-
able. Whereas its invocation during the
earlier phases started, continued and ended
with idealistic evocations of Afro-Asian
solidarity and abstract goals of peace, an
instrumental approach to abstract goals
triumphs in the current form.
At the global level India must devise in-
strumentalities to deal with imbalances
built into the functioning of the interna-
tional political and economic order. We
should aim to expand the constituency that
supports processes of globalization…. To
meet these challenges and constraints, we
must respond in a manner worthy of the
Bandung spirit. Just as that historic meet-
ing redefined the agenda for its time, we
must do so once again here today. The
declaration on a new Asian African Strate-
gic Partnership outlines guiding principles
for joint action to achieve our goals in a
changed global environment." With his
insuperable command over the technical
aspects of the international political econ-
omy and the newly acquired aura of confi-
dent actor in international politics, the
Prime Minister outlines a series of specific
measures that should be at the top of the
international agenda. These measures are
to include the demands to phase out trade-
distorting agricultural subsidies in devel-
oped countries and to remove barriers to
'our' agricultural exports; lowering of tariff
barriers to 'our' other exports; to balance
the protection of the environment with the
development aspirations of the developing
nations; urgent measures to generate addi-
tional financial resources for development
especially for the least developed countries
and the highly indebted poor countries.
Towards the end of the speech, the Prime
Minister made a thinly disguised demand
for India's fair share in the UN system in
the name of democratization of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies.
Jawaharlal Nehru has said that when we
march step in step with history, success
will be ours. The breathtaking pace of
change in our times gives an opportunity
and a responsibility to act decisively. We
can transcend past rancour and take new
initiatives to create new cooperative
mechanisms and regional partnership. In
this spirit, in cooperation with our neigh-
bour Pakistan, we have embarked upon a
journey of peace and good neighbourly
ties. I appreciate the positive sentiments
expressed by President Musharraf yester-
day which I fully reciprocate. We are sin-
cere in our desire to resolve all issues in a
mutually acceptable manner. This will
surely bring benefit to our people and to
our region. The Bandung conference of
1955 followed the awakening of Asia and
Africa. We meet today in similarly historic
circumstances, at the threshold of change
that place us centre-stage-globally.
These elements have remarkable com-
monalities with the Joint Statement, India-
Pakistan, of 18.4.2005.64 Among other
measures, the two countries agreed to
"pursue further measures to enhance inter-
action and cooperation across the LoC in-
cluding agreed meeting points for divided
families, trade, pilgrimages and cultural
interactions", "condemned attempts to dis-
rupt the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service
and welcomed its successful operationali-
sation", "pledged that they would not allow
terrorism to impede the peace process"
"decided to increase the frequency of the
bus service and also decided that trucks
would be allowed to use this route to pro-
mote trade", "agreed to operationalise ad-
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ditional routes including that between
Poonch and Rwalakot" and "to re-establish
the Khokhrapar-Munnabao route by 1st
January 2006" and to open "the Consulates
General of the two countries in Mumbai
and Karachi respectively… before the end
of the current year." The same robust,
pragmatic, instrumental approach was re-
flected in the PM's address at the meeting
of PM's Council on Trade and Industry,
Dec 4, 2004 which announced clear steps
for India's steady integration with the
"evolving world economy."65
India's new posture reflects what Cohen
has described as the "three major lobbies in
the Indian strategic policy community".
The first are the advocates of 'firm India'
who argue that India should project itself
as a firm, powerful state and be able to use
force freely. This was the dominant
strategic theme in Indian policy. The line
of thinking, powerfully introduced into
Indian politics by Indira Gandhi, continues
to be actively represented by those who
advocate the bomb as a symbol of national
power.66 They hold that "India has evolved
a 'will to act' to preserve its vital national
interests."67 With regard to the crisis in
Nepal caused by the King's dismissal of
multi-party democracy in the backdrop of
the Maoist onslaught on the state, India has
shown both the capacity and will to act in
concert with other major powers of the
world, to restore democracy but
simultaneously preserve the integrity of the
state. The second major voice in India's
strategic community is the peace-
mongering 'conciliatory India' lobby.
These leaders and specialists "question the
strategies of defence-led economic
development, a boastful military profile,
and too quick intervention in the affairs of
neighbours. They would prefer to deal with
Pakistan and China by territorial
compromise and negotiation, displaying
military power only to supplement
diplomacy."68 The third trend advocates the
projection of a 'Didactic India', of India as
a 'civilizational' state who see India's
culture as a resource, a part of her inherent
greatness, a valuable diplomatic asset, and
that others must become cognizant of the
moral quality of Indian foreign and
strategic policy. The efforts to tie in the
Indian diaspora for the promotion of Indian
culture abroad is part of this strategy.69 As
we have already seen in the analysis of the
public opinion, the Indian electorate itself
speaks in many voices. It is therefore quite
likely that India will continue to look in all
three directions at the same time, giving
India's efforts at evolving a doctrine a
character of contradictions and anomalies.
A coherent Indian security doctrine will
need to achieve nothing less than two
paradigm shifts simultaneously, the first, as
argued in the previous section, to eschew
the verbiage and institutional relics of the
Cold War such as the 'non-aligned move-
ment' and 'Afro-Asian solidarity' as goals
by themselves, and the second, to take
stock of the burdens of globalization which
entail both the vision and will power to
accept a necessary shrinking of sover-
eignty, and the vision to engage with
situations that do not have any apparent
links to national interest. In addition, India
will need to provide for the imponderables
of national, regional and international
politics such as another vicious communal
riot on the same scale as in Gujarat with
the BJP in opposition, a revival of Paki-
stan-Bangladesh-Saudi Arabia ties on an
anti-India Islamic front, or the impact of
the next energy crisis on India's liquidity,
or, for that matter, another natural catas-
trophe in the league of the Tsunami.
In sum, when compared to the final years
of the NDA, under the new management,
India exudes remarkable policy stability
with regard to the international political
economy, and a new confidence with re-
gard to international diplomacy. Not hob-
bled by the taint of communal violence
(anti-Sikh riots under Rajiv Gandhi,
Ayodhya under Rao and Godhra under
Vajpayee), Manmohan Singh's regime has
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boldly charted out a new course, and found
in the global campaign against terrorism a
useful political base.
Virtually every major issue that we face as
nation states has both a domestic as well as
a trans-national dimension. It is becoming
increasingly apparent as never before that
unless we fashion a global response, based
on a meaningful consensus, to these chal-
lenges, we would not succeed in creating a
world that truly manifests the ideal of the
United Nations. Terrorism is one such
challenge for which many of us have paid
an unacceptable price. We shall not forget
that three years ago, it was a great city that
witnessed the single most horrendous ter-
rorist act in human history. The world saw
another brutal act of terror in Russia which
took the lives of hundreds of innocent ci-
vilians, including a large number of young
children. Terrorism exploits the technolo-
gies spawned by globalization, recruits its
foot soldiers on ideologies of bigotry and
hatred, and directly targets democracies.
And yet it is a sad reality that international
networks of terror appear to co-operate
more effectively among themselves than
the democratic nations that they target. We
speak about co-operation, but seem often
hesitant to commit ourselves to a truly
global offensive to root out terrorism, with
the pooling of resources, exchange of in-
formation, sharing of intelligence, and the
unambiguous unity of purpose that is re-
quired. This must change. We do have a
global coalition against terrorism. We must
now give it substance and credibility,
avoiding selective approaches and political
expediency.70
Seen in the context of its second coming,
Panchasheela holds the potential to draw
the three strands of India's doctrinal think-
ing together and produce an internally con-
sistent and effective basis on which to en-
gage the world.
6. Conclusion: plus ça change…?
With Manmohan Singh holding forth on
the Bandung spirit very much in the Ne-
hruvian mode, and the stream of interna-
tional visitors calling by, those with long
memories of the early years after inde-
pendence might ask if Indian diplomacy is
back to its well worn, noble-minded but
effete grooves. The paper has argued
against drawing such hasty generalizations
from broad similarities. Beyond the con-
stants of Indian politics such as familiar
faces in high places, and familiar rhetoric,
Indian diplomacy has acquired a new
pragmatism and a tone of confidence that
distinguish it from its earlier avatars. The
1998 tests which brought India opprobrium
from all possible quarters, deftly handled
in its conceptualization, implementation
and subsequent damage-limitation diplo-
macy have produced an environment con-
ducive to a new sense of realism in Indo-
US strategic relations, which, in turn, has
become a leading element in similar ar-
rangements with the EU, Russia, China,
and Pakistan.71
This pragmatic shift in Indian diplomacy,
riding high on the performance of the
economy, has been noticed by Bertsch et
al.: the recent Indian foreign-policy shift
that emphasizes explicit enunciation of its
threat assessments and resultant national
proclivities and priorities. This pragmatism
in Indian foreign and defence policies is a
natural outgrowth of the recent approach to
integrate the domestic economy into the
global economic matrix. The result has
been that practical issues are vying with
larger issues of morality for autonomous
space on the national agenda. The new
generation of Indians is more concerned
about completing the second stage of na-
tion-building, what Samir Amin referred to
as the process of 'national consolidation'.
This second stage requires allocation of
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national resources and values toward an
optimal utilization of national capabilities
and potential. While moral considerations
would continue to under-gird the conduct
of its nuclear policy, practical considera-
tions are also not to be lost sight of.
However, laudable as it is, pragmatism on
its own does not constitute a doctrine.
Keeping one's options always open, riding
on a bandwagon when it suits one's con-
venience and getting off at the slightest
sign of trouble (Republican circles in the
United States see India's position on Iraq
exactly in this light, as indeed they do of
France and Germany) can invite the charge
of cynical opportunism masquerading as
high principle. These reservations continue
to hobble transactions such as the purchase
of dual use technology72 or the oil pipeline
issue with regard to Iran that could, other-
wise, be smooth. In consequence, though
there is some recognition of mutual com-
patibility, US-Indian relations continue to
be an uncertain pas-de-deux.
Our conference on India's role in world
politics is taking place in an international
context when "rules of international con-
duct on issues of technology and multilat-
eralism are being re-written"73, roles have
reversed as superpowers and supplicants of
an earlier period reverse roles and a new
coalition of major powers is at the fore-
front of efforts to reorganize the Security
Council. Once again, like at the height of
the Cold War, fortuitously, Indian policy
has gravitated towards placing her interests
in the international arena with the right
combination of structural realism and na-
tional identity. Rather than being self-
consciously unique and aloof, this policy is
drawing on national identity (culture and
ideology), and liberal values of peace and
plurality. But, to the extent Indian diplo-
macy fails to articulate itself in terms of a
self-contained and cohesive doctrine, it
will be portrayed merely as noble-minded
poker with a touch of the begging bowl
about it and to that extent render it both
illegitimate and therefore ineffective in the
eyes of the key players.
This particular agony is not new for Indian
diplomacy. "The search for this 'golden
mean' between the vision of an eventual
peaceful world and possession of the
wherewithal to defend itself in the interim,
has troubled [India's] conscience for
decades."74 Perhaps the time has now come
for Indian diplomacy to play a trump card
in their possession, the implications of
which they have not yet thought through.
India is alone among the main powers in
the international arena today to have not
been a party to the Second World War, and
as such, to have not been traumatized by
the devastating power of ideologies. That
describes the other face of Indian prag-
matism which gives Indian thinking a
heuristic capacity to understand ideology –
both their own and those of other societies
– and the intellectual resources to negotiate
across cultures. European pacifism of the
1930s stood for something similar, before
the rise of the Third Reich gave ideology a
bad name, and the victorious allies an
enduring right to suppress everybody else's
ideology except their own, which gradually
acquired the aura of an inexorable transi-
tion to development, modernity and
democracy. The forces arrayed for and
against the America-led invasion of Iraq
helped reveal the interests that underpin
this unproblematic view of the world. In its
second coming, Panchasheela as a doc-
trine should be able to build heuristically
on the innate, universal desire for peace,
understanding of difference and respect for
the dignity of man. The Indian search for
a doctrine can then join those of others
who are also engaged in looking for a
third way beyond the triumphalist self-
profiling of the world's only superpower
and the effete bickering of those opposed
to it.
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hegemony in Asia?" In: Bertsch et al., Engag-
ing India, p.268.
5 Bertsch et al., Engaging India and Talbott,
Strobe: Engaging India: Diplomacy,
Democracy and the Bomb – A Memoir,
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India in South Asia: Cooperation amidst Tensions
Partha S. Ghosh
1. Conflicting perceptions
There are two ways of viewing South Asia,
one, through the prism of India, and the
other, through the prisms of the rest. Of
course, as it happens with all prisms where
each ray is broken into seven colours (co-
incidentally, SAARC = South Asian Asso-
ciation for Regional Cooperation, till Af-
ghanistan joins it, has seven members) so it
happens to this overview. Essentially, the
divide springs from two different perspec-
tives of security – India traditionally
viewing it in extra-regional terms where
most of its regional neighbours serve more
as detractors than partners, while the re-
gional neighbours view theirs in intra-
regional terms where India itself poses the
threat making them look for extra-regional
cover to compensate for their weakness.
The complexities of the situation emanate
from diverse nation-building strategies that
have their origin in differing circumstances
of decolonization in the 1940s. The Cold
War had widened these cleavages. By and
large India was seen as belonging to the
Soviet camp while the rest in the Ameri-
can. As a protectorate of India, Bhutan had
little choice. With the end of the Cold War
and the emergence of the United States as
virtually the sole superpower in the world
these equations have considerably
changed. The process of globalization and
India's fast track economic growth are also
forcing amendments in national and re-
gional attitudes.
2. South Asia: a mixed bag
South Asian states are a mixed bag. In
terms of government forms they fall under
four categories – India and Sri Lanka as
democratic; Bangladesh and Pakistan as
clouds and sunshine states, meaning, alter-
nately democratic and military dictator-
ships; Bhutan as monarchical and so also
Nepal in the real sense; and Maldives as a
single-party authoritarianism. In terms of
religious orientation, India is a secular
Hindu majority state, Bangladesh, Pakistan
and Maldives are Islam-oriented Muslim
majority states, Sri Lanka and Bhutan are
Buddhist majority states with emphasis on
Buddhism, and Nepal is a Hindu constitu-
tional kingdom. GDP, population and area-
wise India accounts for two-thirds of the
region, which is not an ideal situation for
regional cooperation. No other regional
grouping in the world has a comparable
one-state-dominant profile.
3. India-Pakistan: the 'K' factor
The most difficult of all the relationships
that India has to handle in the region is its
relations with Pakistan. This relationship
has remained the most intractable, at the
core of which is the question of Kashmir.
Of late, two developments – one, the
growth of militancy in the valley with the
support of Pakistan and 'international Is-
lam', and two, the nuclearization of India
and Pakistan – have exacerbated the con-
flict.
Terrorism in Kashmir, which started in the
late 1980s, became internationalized by the
middle of the 1990s as was evident from
the sophistication of the operations, the un-
ending source of their funding and the ac-
tual arrest of terrorists belonging to other
nationalities. Even Chechens were killed in
encounters. The 'Islamists' thus hijacked
Kashmir's struggle for self-determination
and turned it into a Jihad. Al-Qaeda and
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Taliban with many faces like Lashkar-e-
Tayba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-
Muhmmad and Sepah-e-Sahaba converted
the valley into a war zone. In the aftermath
of 9/11 they paralysed the valley by ob-
serving a strike in support of Osama bin
Laden although the All Party Huriyat Con-
ference (APHC), which supports Kashmir's
merger with Pakistan, had passed a resolu-
tion in favour of Pervez Musharraf's stand
against al-Qaeda.
In May 1998, India and Pakistan conducted
nuclear tests, which in effect made them
nuclear powers. It shook the world com-
munity according to which Kashmir being
the flashpoint the danger was now of a nu-
clear showdown. The process of dialogue
between India and Pakistan, however, con-
tinued. India prioritized its agenda based
on the so-called '2+6' formula. The two
issues were: (1) peace and security, in-
cluding confidence building measures, and
(2) Jammu and Kashmir. The other six is-
sues were: (1) Siachin, (2) Wullar barrage
project and Tulbul navigation project, (3)
Sir Creek, (4) terrorism and drug traffick-
ing, (5) economic and commercial coop-
eration, and (6) promotion of friendly ex-
changes in various fields. The Lahore
Declaration of 21 February 1999 signed by
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Va-
jpayee and his Pakistani counterpart
Nawaz Sharif underwrote this mechanism.
But even before the ink of the declaration
could dry Pakistan unleashed its Kargil
adventure in May 1999 resulting in an
armed confrontation between the two
countries.
It is difficult to explain why Pakistan went
for this adventure when things were im-
proving. Did Nawaz Sharif know about the
Kargil plan when he met Vajpayee? Or is it
that the Pakistan army kept him in the dark
about the adventure to sabotage the peace
process which was not going to help the
army? Evidently, the Kargil adventure was
a part of the power struggle between Sharif
and the army. Later, in an interview to In-
dia Today of 26 July 2004, Nawaz Sharif
confessed that it was engineered by Gen-
eral Musharraf to embarrass him and that
he was kept completely in the dark. Kargil
reversed the peace process. India realized
that as long as the Pakistan army called the
shots no negotiated settlement on Kashmir
was to be expected.
India, however, had to reconcile itself to
the fact that since the Pakistan army's po-
litical power was a reality, there was no
escape from dealing with Musharraf. In
early 2001, more than a year after Mushar-
raf took over in October 1999, Vajpayee
decided to invite him to India for a dia-
logue. In July 2001, a summit took place in
Agra but it achieved little. The gap be-
tween the two countries was on predictable
lines, with Musharraf harping on the cen-
trality of Kashmir, which he said was not
addressed in the Lahore Declaration, and
India asking for a comprehensive dialogue.
Following the failure of the Agra summit
India's position hardened. For India the
first item on its agenda would now be
cross-border terrorism followed by discus-
sion on Kashmir's future. While the two
nations were caught in this quagmire, the
momentous 9/11 rocked the world. It pro-
vided an opportunity to India to tell the
international community: 'I said so.'
India's advantage was Pakistan's disad-
vantage. The latter was under tremendous
pressure from the United States to mend its
ways and come out with concrete policies
to leash the jehadis on its soil. Jehadi ac-
tivities, however, went unabated in Kash-
mir and on 13 December 2001 the most
sensational attack on the parliament of In-
dia took place. India raised its noise level
and as a result international pressure on
Musharraf mounted. On 12 January 2002,
General Musharraf delivered his historic
address to the nation in which he promised
to tackle the problem of Islamic funda-
mentalism with an iron hand and did in-
deed take some effective steps. But on the
Indian charge of cross-border terrorism
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there was no commitment, nor was there
any let-up in the rhetoric about Kashmir.
He even ridiculed the expression 'cross-
border'. In an interview to The Hindu on
31 March 2002, he claimed to have made it
clear to Vajpayee that 'there is nothing
going on across the border and it is not a
border, it is a line of control and there is no
terrorism, there is a freedom struggle going
on there.'
Out of exasperation and taking advantage
of 9/11 and the consequent American
mood, India decided to escalate tension by
amassing its troops along the Indo-Pak
border to draw global attention to the
problem that terrorism in Kashmir posed
and that it could not be tolerated any more.
As expected, global concern went beyond
all limits and there was a flurry of diplo-
matic activity between New Delhi and
Washington on the one hand and between
Islamabad and Washington on the other.
Other Western countries too contributed to
the process. The concern was not only
about the death and destruction caused by
the possible nuclear showdown, however
limited, the real anxiety was that it could
hit at the core of non-proliferation and at
the unwritten commitment of all nuclear
nations not to use the weapon.
By 2003, there was evidence that the
United States was tilting somewhat in fa-
vour of the Indian position that cross-
border terrorism was continuing unabated.
The U.S. ambassador Robert D. Blackwill,
who was considered to be a friend of India
in the tradition of John Kenneth Galbraith,
was categorical that 'terrorism emanating
from Pakistan is not over. Global terrorism
will not end until cross-border terrorism
against India ends permanently.' He said
that 'the extraordinary statesmanship
shown by Prime Minister Vajpayee in ex-
tending his hand of friendship to Pakistan
hopefully will create enough political
space for the two countries to move for-
ward towards normalization.' Whether or
not there was coordination between
Washington and New Delhi, almost during
the same time Vajpayee, in April 2003,
extended a 'hand of friendship' to Pakistan
and stated his willingness to resume the
dialogue. Behind-the-scene negotiations
were undertaken culminating in the signifi-
cant declaration by Pakistan in November
2003 of a ceasefire along the Line of Con-
trol (LOC). Against this background when
the 12th SAARC Summit was held in Is-
lamabad in January 4-6, 2004, the stage
was set to resume a 'composite dialogue' at
the official level, an idea that was there in
circulation since 1997. The 'composite
dialogue' was supposed to address, among
other issues, 'the Kashmir dispute, to the
satisfaction of both sides'. More impor-
tantly, Pakistan met the Indian precondi-
tion by promising in writing that it would
not allow its territory to be used for terror-
ist acts. The contributing factors that were
responsible for this change in mood were
many and included international pressure
as well as compulsions of domestic politics
in both the countries. By the time the In-
dian and Pakistani foreign secretaries met
in Islamabad on 27 and 28 December 2004
several important CBMs (Confidence
Building Measures) were in place like the
joint survey of the boundary pillars in the
horizontal segment in the Sir Creek area,
the second round of expert level talks on
nuclear CBMs, the expert level meeting on
conventional CBMs, the high level talks on
narcotics control, the discussions to com-
mence the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus
service, and the meetings to start the
Khokhrapar-Munnabao rail link. The joint
statement issued by the foreign secretaries
on 28 December 2004 at the end of their
two days of parley reflected a positive
mood and the promise to carry the process
of confidence building forward in their
next meeting scheduled for July-August
2005.
The massive earthquake that severely hit
the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) in
early October 2005 in which more than
50,000 lives were lost provided a huge op-
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portunity to both countries to carry forward
the peace process. India sent substantial
relief assistance to the quake-hit across the
LOC, specific sectors of which were
opened for the purpose. In spite of all these
positive indications, the Pakistan-
sponsored terrorism continued to mar prog-
ress towards normalization. Barely a week
after the earthquake, terrorists in Srinagar
killed Ghulam Nabi Lone, a minister of the
Jammu and Kashmir government, and nar-
rowly failed to do so with the CPM leader
Yusuf Ali Tarigami. Soon thereafter, on
the eve of the Diwali festival, a popular
marketplace in Delhi fell victim to a mas-
sive terrorist attack in which several lives
were lost. India still decided to remain as
cool and circumspect as possible so as not
to derail the peace process. While ad-
dressing a press conference in Dhaka on 13
November 2005 after attending the 13th
SAARC Summit Prime Minister Manmo-
han Singh replied with utmost care to a
directly suggestive question that the Paki-
stani military rulers were behind the ter-
rorist attacks in India and that they could
not be trusted. His measured words were: 'I
think I have said more than once that we
can choose our friends but we cannot
choose our neighbours. We have to do
business with governments which are in
power in our neighbourhood. Therefore,
using harsh language in public is not the
best way to promote dialogue and under-
standing. If we have any concerns, we do
discuss with the governments concerned.
Therefore, I do not believe that anything
great is achieved by conducting this dia-
logue in full glare of public gaze.'
The high-profile visit of President George
W. Bush to India and Pakistan in the first
week of March 2006 was a clear indication
that the peace process was not in jeopardy
though the United States tended to treat the
nuclear status of these two countries dif-
ferently. While the United States recog-
nized India as a nuclear power in lieu of
which the latter de facto agreed to abide by
the NPT, nothing of that sort happened in
the case of Pakistan. Indeed Pakistan's po-
sition as a 'non-NATO ally' remained in
place and in spite of Bush's advice to Gen-
eral Musharraf to restore democracy in his
country by the end of 2007, the fact re-
mained that in America's war against inter-
national terrorism Pakistan's role as a
frontline state was not to be diluted. This
was the same position that the 9/11 Report
(2004) had recommended even after
reaching the conclusion that Pakistan had
been a conduit in the spread of Islamic ter-
rorism globally. The Report had made the
following recommendation in categorical
terms: 'If Musharraf stands for enlightened
moderation in a fight for his life and for the
life of his country, the United States should
be willing to make hard choices too, and
make the difficult long-term commitment
to the future of Pakistan. Sustaining the
current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United
States should support Pakistan's govern-
ment in its struggle against extremists with
a comprehensive effort that extends from
military aid to support for better education,
so long as Pakistan's leaders remain willing
to make difficult choices of their own.' Im-
portantly, in the Bush-Manmohan parleys
that resulted in the India-US nuclear deal
with far-reaching global strategic implica-
tions, any reference to the solution of the
Kashmir problem was conspicuous by its
absence.
4. India-Bangladesh: a troubled
legacy
The India-Bangladesh relationship has a
chequered history. The bonhomie that de-
veloped between the two countries after
the Bangladesh war turned out to be a nine
days' wonder. The assassination of Mujib-
ur Rehman and his family members in
August 1975 and the return of pro-Islamic
forces to the fore of Bangladesh politics
resulted in a strange relationship in which
India's image got split. To those who stood
for the ethos of the liberation struggle, In-
dia remained a friend but to those who had
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distanced themselves from that ethos in the
name of Islam, India earned the enemy im-
age. India got trapped in the contentious
nation-building discourse of Bengali ver-
sus Bangladeshi nationalisms. In the large
part of Bangladesh's history since 1975 it
is the Bangladeshi nationalism that has
dominated the scene forcing India to walk
the difficult tightrope. At present the pro-
Islamic forces are once again ascendant as
never before.
The Islamic ascendancy in Bangladesh af-
fects India-Bangladesh relations in two
ways. On the one hand, it makes Indian
Hindus feel sympathetic to their Bangla-
deshi counterparts and if they fall in the
category of Hindu fanatics then it can lead
to communal conflicts in India. Mercifully,
since the hotbed of Hindutva politics is lo-
cated in the Hindi belt the impact of this
connection is still limited. On the other
hand, since Islamic ascendancy in Bangla-
desh is closely linked to 'international Is-
lam' in which the involvement of ISI, Paki-
stan's intelligence agency, is ever sus-
pected, in India the latter is concerned
about its eastern and North Eastern regions
where Muslims are in fairly large numbers.
In the wake of anti-Hindu atrocities in
Bangladesh in the aftermath of the 2001
elections, even the people of an otherwise
staunchly secular West Bengal protested.
The growing number of madrassas in the
districts bordering Bangladesh is ever con-
troversial. Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, the
Marxist Chief Minister of West Bengal,
alleges that these madrassas are the hotbed
of ISI activity. In January 2002 when Kol-
kata's (Calcutta) American Center was at-
tacked by Muslim terrorists, he underlined
this connection. Although for political rea-
sons (Left Front's dependence on Muslim
electoral support) he subsequently watered
down his allegation, the madrassa issue
continued to worry his government. An
intelligence report of the Government of
India identified 208 madrassas and 458
mosques in ten districts on the Indo-Nepal
and India-Bangladesh borders. The growth
was highest in Malda district, where 172
mosques and 55 madrassas were identified,
followed by Cooch Behar (55/12), North
Dinajpur (33/34), South Dinajpur (45/19),
Murshidabad (40/20), Jalpaiguri 35/23),
Darjeeling (15/11), and South 24 Parganas
(10/4). In nearly all the cases, the mosques
and the madrassas had come up with funds
from the Jeddah-based Islamic Develop-
ment Bank. In May 2002, a political con-
troversy was kicked off in West Bengal
when three officials from the U.S. Consu-
late in Kolkata visited some of these ma-
drassas to gather information about the
way they were run.
There are several Islamic militant outfits
that are operative in Bangladesh. The most
important amongst them are the Harkat-ul-
Jehad-e-Islami Bangladesh, which has
connections with Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami
and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin of Pakistan, Is-
lami Chhartro Shibir (the youth front of
Jamaat-e-Islami), Samjukta (joint) Islamic
Jehad Committee, Islamic Oikyo Jote, a
conglomeration of eight Islamic organiza-
tions that emphasize a Taliban-type
movement in the country, and Islamic
Markaz Party, which aims at wiping out all
enemies of Islam including India and the
United States.
The Bangladesh government tries to side-
track the issue of Islamic militancy by re-
ferring to India's objectionable conduct in
its national politics. Its Home Ministry has
said: 'Some anti-Bangladesh organizations
based in different parts of India are ac-
tively working on spreading chaos and cre-
ating a crisis in Bangladesh to damage its
image internationally. In such a situation,
the country should make maximum efforts
to improve law and order and curb the ac-
tivities of the hard-line fundamentalist
groups.' It further said: 'An intelligence
agency informed this Ministry that the
anti-terrorism drive in Afghanistan which
strengthened the strategic presence of the
United States of America in this region,
40 Partha S. Ghosh                                                                                                                                                                     
India's stand against the militants in Kash-
mir and the current situation in Central
Asia are having a negative impact on
Bangladesh.' Such allegations, however,
have snowballed, and India in its turn has
accused Bangladesh of allowing the ISI
and the Taliban in the garb of Harkat-ul-
Jihad-al-Islami to spread their nets in the
country and instigating anti-Indian and
pro-Islamic activities. Opposition leader
Sheikh Hasina's visit to India in November
2002 affected India-Bangladesh relations,
as Dhaka tended to suggest that she was in
league with India in spreading confusion in
Bangladesh. In December 2002 there was a
series of bomb blasts in Mymensingh dis-
trict, which Reuters reported as the handi-
work of al-Qaeda.
The vulnerability of Bangladesh in dealing
with international terrorism came to light
in April 2004 when one of the largest ever
seizures of illicit weaponry in South Asia
was reported from the port of Chittagong
following a tip-off reportedly from Indian
intelligence sources. The shipment was
estimated to be worth 4.5 to 7 million
American dollars. It included around 2,000
automatic and semi-automatic weapons,
among them 1,290 Type 56-1/Type 56-2
Kalashnikov-type assault rifles; 150 T-69
RPG (rocket propelled grenade) launchers;
quantities of 40mm RPG ammunition;
25,000 hand grenades; and 1.8m rounds of
small-arms ammunition. What was par-
ticularly disturbing for India was the luke-
warm efforts on the part of the Bangladesh
government to launch a proper investiga-
tion aimed at nabbing the culprits. All that
Bangladesh did was to arrest a truck driver,
a coolie and a boatman.
In India's North Eastern region the role
played by ISI and Bangladesh's Directorate
General of Field Intelligence (DGFI) in
trying to foment Islamic militancy is a con-
stant concern for Indian intelligence. The
Nellie (Assam) massacre of Muslims in
February 1983 and the demolition of Babri
mosque in December 1992 did indeed
contribute to creating a favourable ground.
Since Assam (the largest state in the North
East with a population of 26.6 million) has
a large concentration of Muslim population
(about 30 per cent compared to India's av-
erage of 14 per cent) and the region in gen-
eral is a battleground of various insurgent
groups—at least 130 in number—many of
which have their hideouts and training
camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar, the
fear is not misplaced. The porous border
between Bangladesh and India in the re-
gion makes things even more difficult for
India's counter-insurgency agencies. Curi-
ously, the most powerful insurgent group
of the North East, the United Liberation
Front of Assam (ULFA), is Hindu-
dominated yet according to its charter,
non-Assamese Indians cannot become its
members while non-Indians can.
The fundamentalist Islamic outfits in the
North Eastern region, however, are still
small and how much they are indoctrinated
by hardcore Pakistani agents is a moot
point. Surrendered Muslim militants of As-
sam have reportedly confessed that they
were disillusioned with Pakistani and
Bangladeshi training because their agenda
emphasized the killing of Hindus and In-
dian leaders whereas Assamese Muslim
fundamentalists were more concerned
about how to improve the condition of
their community in the region. Besides, the
Pathan and Punjabi trainers often ridiculed
the Assamese Muslim trainees for their
being of small build.
5. India-Sri Lanka: the ethnic
muddle
India's policy towards Sri Lanka from the
time of their independence to the present
can be broadly divided into two phases.
The first phase lasted virtually three dec-
ades, from the 1950s through to the 1970s,
when India was primarily concerned with
the problem of Indian Tamils. In the 1980s
the ethnic conflict between the majority
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Sinhalese community and the minority Sri
Lanka Tamil community overshadowed
the earlier concern. The flashpoint of this
conflict was the violent anti-Tamil riot of
1983 and the entry of India into the politics
of the island as never before. The Indo-Sri
Lanka Accord of 1987, followed by the
despatch of the Indian Peace Keeping
Force (IPKF) to the strife-torn northern
region of Sri Lanka, and the assassination
of Rajiv Gandhi by the suicide squad of the
Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) in 1991 were the two significant
milestones of this involvement.
In February 2002 the Government of Sri
Lanka and the LTTE signed a Memorandum
of Understanding under which they agreed
to cease hostilities. Ever since, the ceasefire
has been in force. But allegations and
counter-allegations of violation of the
agreement as well as the turf war within the
LTTE have raised serious doubts about the
prospect of peace. The peace talks, which
were suspended in April 2003, have been
resumed in February 2006, in Geneva, but
they show little promise. There have been
serious differences between the two sides
over the question of the Interim Self-
Governing Authority (ISGA), announced by
the LTTE on 31 October 2003. Far from
showing its inclination to be a democratic
organization, LTTE has consolidated its
military hold over the North-Eastern
Province at the cost of all democratic
norms. They have established a virtual
Eelam with all administrative and judicial
paraphernalia. So much so that LTTE has
talked of referring the disputes between the
ISGA and the government to the
International Court of Justice and not to the
Supreme Court of Sri Lanka.
If the talks ultimately fail, Eelam War IV
would be a distinct possibility. All earlier
Eelam Wars had followed failed peace talks.
An offshoot of Eelam War IV would be a
bitter fratricidal conflict between LTTE su-
premo Vellupillai Prabhakaran and his erst-
while eastern commander Colonel Karuna
(real name: Vinayanamoorthi Muralitharan),
who revolted against Prabhakarn in March
2004. Karuna told Prabhakaran: 'I do not
want to commit the blunder of not pointing
out to you the aspirations of our people in
disregard of their feelings and those of our
fighters here…. I want to do my duty by the
people of Southern Thamil Eelam.' It was a
significant statement for it used for the first
time the phrase 'Southern Thamil Eelam'
thereby driving a wedge into the central
theme of Sri Lanka Tamil nationalism –
demand for the 'historical' 'Tamil Homeland'
consisting of Northern and Eastern
provinces.
The complexity of the situation poses a
serious challenge to India, which has to
balance between its commitment to main-
tain the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka on
the one hand and find an honourable set-
tlement of the Tamil problem on the other.
It is with this twin objective in mind that
India is all for the peace dialogue between
the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE
although it knows that the latter does not
represent the majority Tamil opinion of Sri
Lanka. India cannot ignore the fact either
that the LTTE effectively controls large
parts of the North-Eastern Province where
any opposition to the LTTE is met with
death. But since Prabhakaran is the princi-
pal accused in the Rajiv Gandhi assassina-
tion case against whom a warrant of arrest
has been issued and the Sri Lanka Gov-
ernment has been approached for his ex-
tradition, India naturally cannot directly
involve itself in any mediation involving
the LTTE. The Norwegian government
facilitators have undertaken the exercise
with the tacit or otherwise approval of In-
dia.
Compared to the previous period there is a
marked change in Sri Lanka's approach
towards India as well. There is no domi-
nant faction in Sri Lankan politics any
more that considers India as a bully and
hostile to Sinhala interests in preference to
those of the Sri Lanka Tamils. Even the
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hardcore pro-Buddhist elements like the
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the
Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) know for
certain that it is only because of India's
avowed commitment to uphold Sri Lanka's
territorial integrity that the country is still
one. Economic cooperation between the
two countries has grown rapidly, which
also underlines this changed context. New
projects have emerged out of SAARC de-
liberations and the signing of the bilateral
free agreement in 1998. Indian companies
are active in the reconstruction of North
Eastern Province, ravaged by decades of
war and the recent Tsunami. A Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership Agreement
involving cooperation in the field of rail-
ways, civil aviation, information technol-
ogy and energy is in the offing.
The real issue, however, is how long could
India remain satisfied with its present pas-
sive role in the peace process. The gov-
ernment of Sri Lanka is pressing upon it to
at least become a co-chair in the peace ne-
gotiation along with Norway, the United
States, Japan and the European Union. So
far, India has not taken any position on the
matter but considering the systematic
growth in the military capability of the
LTTE, such a neutrality may not be main-
tained for long. The problem is that with
the bitter experience of the IPKF still fresh
in its memory India suffers from the syn-
drome of once bitten, twice shy.
LTTE has its own so-called navy (the Sea
Tigers) and of late it has been trying to ac-
quire its own so-called air force (Air Ti-
gers), which at present is skeletal. If that
happens then it would earn the LTTE the
honour of being the only terrorist outfit in
the world having its own army, navy and
air force. These developments worry In-
dia's defence planners for they enhance the
nuisance value of the Tigers. Besides
making the Indian coastal areas more vul-
nerable to terrorist strikes there is also the
potential danger of direct confrontation
with the Indian security forces as Indian
naval interests in the region are going to
increase in the near future. One may men-
tion in this context India's hugely ambi-
tious Sethusamudram project, the so-called
'Suez Canal of India'. Conceived at an es-
timated cost of Rs. 24.3 billion the canal
envisages the creation of a navigable chan-
nel from the Gulf of Mannar to the Bay of
Bengal through Palk Strait so that ships
moving between the east and west coasts
of India do not have to go around Sri
Lanka. This will save up to 424 nautical
miles and 30 hours of sailing time between
the east and west coasts of India. Naturally,
the Indian navy's involvement in the region
would have to be more to ensure security
to this 300-meter-wide canal. Equally natu-
rally, that would come in the way of the
smuggling and drug trafficking interests of
LTTE in the area, resulting in direct con-
frontation between the two sides.
Had the LTTE concerned India's security
in the conventional sense alone, the matter
would probably have been simpler. The
fact that it has a constituency in Tamil
Nadu forces the Indian government to be
extremely circumspect while dealing with
the organization. There are political parties
in Tamil Nadu that openly support the
LTTE. Some of these parties are important
constituents of the present ruling coalition,
United Progressive Alliance (UPA), led by
Dr. Manmohan Singh. This restricts the
manoeuvrability of the Indian government.
It is under political pressure that Manmo-
han Singh has committed that India would
not go for a defence treaty with Sri Lanka.
Mercifully, however, unlike the earlier pe-
riod, there is no more any conflict of inter-
est between India and the West. The
United States, which has branded LTTE as
a terrorist organization, is equally appre-
hensive of LTTE's designs in the region.
Its ambassador to Sri Lanka, Jeffrey Lun-
stead, cautioned the LTTE in no unmistak-
able terms, on 11 January 2006, that if 'the
LTTE chooses to abandon peace … we
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want it to be clear, they will face a
stronger, more capable and more deter-
mined Sri Lankan military.'
6. India-Nepal: democracy versus
monarchy
India-Nepal relations are characterized by
two closely interrelated phenomena: the
military-strategic and the domestic-
political. The strategic location of Nepal
between two big powers, China and India,
not only provides the latter with an oppor-
tunity to influence the politics of Nepal to
suit their respective interests, it gives the
same opportunity to the Nepali ruling cir-
cles to play one against the other to their
best political advantage. Since for socio-
economic and geo-political reasons India is
more relevant to Nepal than China, India
becomes the bogey of external interfer-
ence, not China.
In Nepal's struggle for democracy vis-à-vis
the monarchical (earlier the prime ministe-
rial dynasty of the Ranas) forces, India
sides with the former. Since the monarchi-
cal forces have controlled the political
situation in their favour for large parts of
Nepal's history, relations between India
and Nepal have remained problematic.
Four ground realities, however, have made
Nepal not play with India's sensitivities
beyond a limit. These realities are: one, the
existence of a treaty between the two
countries (1950) that underwrites the open
border between them; two, the landlocked
geographical situation of Nepal and the
resultant dependence of the latter on India
for trade and transit facility; three, the
dominance of the Indian economy over
that of Nepal; and four, the existence in
Nepal's Terai region of millions of ethnic
Indians largely from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh
and Uttaranchal who constitute about 30 to
40 per cent of Nepal's population. These
are the handicaps Nepal has to live with
yet is un-reconciled to accept as given and
therein lies the core of the tension between
the two countries. To neutralize the India
factor the ruling monarchical clique has
time and again in the past tried to hobnob
with the Chinese and float the idea of 'Ne-
pal as a zone of peace' but the hard geopo-
litical realities of the region have yielded
little results. Of late, since China and India
are no longer seen as contenders for politi-
cal space and influence in Nepal in equal
terms, Nepal is forced to deal virtually
with India alone. It is against this back-
ground that the current situation in Nepal
and its implications for India-Nepal rela-
tions are to be understood.
Just to recapitulate the past, India sup-
ported the democratic forces in the late
1940s to oust the Rana regime and install
in its place a constitutional monarchy
headed by King Tribhuvan. Trouble started
when King Mahendra succeeded his father
Tribhuvan in 1955. Unlike his father, Ma-
hendra wanted to assert his monarchical
authority. The matter came to a head in
1959 when the Nepali Congress won a
massive majority in the country's parlia-
mentary elections. In a dramatic move in
1960 King Mahendra dismissed the Nepali
Congress government, arrested Prime
Minister B.P. Koirala together with other
ministers and banned all political parties.
Soon he introduced a new constitution
(1962) that provided for a party-less pan-
chayat system, which was a euphemism for
democracy. Indian Prime Minster Nehru
reacted sharply to the developments and
unequivocally stood behind the democratic
forces. The divergence between India and
the King of Nepal came to the surface
during the Bangladesh war when King
Mahendra indirectly opposed India by de-
claring the problem as Pakistan's internal
affair. But Nepal could not go beyond that
and on 15 January 1972, a fortnight before
the death of Mahendra, Nepal recognized
independent Bangladesh in disregard of
China's conspicuously negative approach.
King Birendra as the new king was in no
mood either to restore a constitutional
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monarchy and it was during his time that
the idea of 'Nepal as a zone of peace' was
floated with all fanfare aimed at neutraliz-
ing India's influence on Nepal politics. The
strategy was to treat India and China at par,
which irked New Delhi but the latter did
not have to overreact as the ground reali-
ties were in its favour. India held firm to its
theory that while Nepal's security was ir-
relevant for China's security, India's de-
fence could not be restricted to Nepal's
southern frontiers in the plains. Later, India
tended to see this zone of peace proposal
and the subsequent Pakistani proposal to
declare South Asia as a nuclear free zone
in the same light – ganging up against In-
dia to China's advantage.
The late 1980s witnessed a massive do-
mestic uprising for the restoration of a con-
stitutional monarchy. India's economic
blockade of Nepal in 1989 was probably
also aimed at embarrassing the Palace as
the prices of all commodities shot up con-
tributing to his unpopularity. The move-
ment culminated in the promulgation of a
new constitution in 1990, which declared
Nepal as a Hindu constitutional monarchy
giving full scope to political parties to op-
erate freely. In the next nine years three
parliamentary elections were held, in 1991,
1994 and 1999. But governmental stability
remained a far cry. From 1991 to 2000
nine governments came to power under-
lining the immaturity of the political class.
Gross regional disparity and massive cor-
ruption in public life brought disgrace to
the parties. Taking advantage of the situa-
tion the Communist Party of Nepal (Mao-
ist) – CPN (M) – rebels operating in the
countryside stepped up their activities
making the state machinery virtually help-
less. On 13 February 1996 the CPN (M)
formally declared its People's War.
In 2001, three important events took place
which had far-reaching implications for
India-Nepal relations. On 4 June 2001
King Birendra and his entire family were
gunned down by the Crown Prince (who
committed suicide after the assault) leading
to the unexpected coronation of Birendra's
brother Gyanendra. In the next month, in
July, nine South Asian Maoist parties met
in West Bengal and formed a Coordination
Committee of Maoist Parties and Organi-
zations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). The
lone representation from Nepal was that of
CPN (M). From India the parties were: the
Andhra Pradesh-based 'People's War
Group (PWG), the Bihar-based Maoist
Communist Centre (MCC), the Revolu-
tionary Communist Centre of India (Mao-
ist), and the Revolutionary Communist
Centre of India (Marxist-Leninist). The
remaining four consisted of three from
Bangladesh and one from Sri Lanka. The
third seminal event was 9/11. Given the
background of Gyanendra who had taken a
keen interest in the country's military af-
fairs during Birendra's regime, particularly
in respect of postings of army and security
officers, it was clear that he would take
recourse to a military solution to the Mao-
ist insurgency in which he would find the
political parties nothing but a nuisance.
An uneasy relationship between the Palace
and the political parties continued for a few
years with the King first declaring an
emergency in November 2001, then sus-
pending the parliament in October 2002,
frequently changing his prime ministers
and then finally, on 1 February 2005, dis-
solving the parliament and assuming all
powers. He frontally attacked democratic
and civil liberties and decided to fight the
Maoists head on with the help of an en-
larged Royal Nepal Army, which owed its
traditional loyalty to the Palace. But it was
not an easy task to deal with the Maoists
who controlled virtually 90 per cent of Ne-
pal, and almost entire rural Nepal, and
whose tactics was hit and run. The 72 dis-
tricts of Nepal needed a force much larger
than just 100,000, most of which was en-
gaged in the security of the Kathmandu
valley. As this helplessness dawned on him
he looked for an honourable way out,
which found expression in his decision to
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hold the Kathmandu municipal elections in
February 2006. But the overall boycott of
the election by all democratic forces made
it a mockery, which India and the West,
importantly the United States, declared as
inconsequential and lacking in political
legitimacy.
India has a massive predicament in the cur-
rent situation in Nepal. There are three
forces at work in Nepal – first, the King
who has the support of the army; second,
the democratic forces, which have only
worked out a semblance of unity (the seven
party alliance) of late; and the third, the
Maoists, who control the entire countryside
of Nepal. India favours neither the king nor
the Maoists but it is not sure about the effi-
cacy of the democratic forces to rule effec-
tively and contain the Maoists. Its best bet,
therefore, is the constitutional monarchy in
which both the king together with the
Royal Nepal Army and the democratic
forces should share power. In the mean-
time there has been a ceasefire, and the
King, the army, democratic parties and the
Maoists have reached agreement on in-
stalling an interim government. Although
this is in itself a positive and hopeful de-
velopment, it remains an open question for
India (and not only India) as to how far the
Maoists can be disciplined. This will de-
pend not only on their own intentions but
also on how they will be treated in the im-
mediate future by the monarchy, the army
and the political parties. These are all fac-
tors over which India does not have
enough direct influence.
India cannot ignore the fact that the Mao-
ists are critical of India and want the abro-
gation of the Indo-Nepal treaty of 1950.
Besides, the Maoists of Nepal have close
links with their Indian counterparts and
other extremists belonging to the Leftist
ideology. Left insurgency is a huge menace
in India where 175 districts are affected by
this insurgency. Since the United States is
concerned about global terrorism it sees
the Maoist upsurge in Nepal and India
from the terrorist perspective. They
branded the Nepali Maoists as terrorists.
Thus both India and America share a
common concern in Nepal.
7. India-Bhutan: exemplary
partnership
Bhutan is a protectorate of India and as
such its foreign policy is primarily guided
by India. In the relationship between the
two countries both economic and security
collaborations figure prominently. India
financed almost entirely Bhutan's first two
Five Year Plans (1961-71). Although
Bhutan began to receive development as-
sistance from UN agencies and third coun-
tries from the 1970s, India has remained its
main aid partner as can be seen from its
present commitment of Rs. 7 billion for the
Ninth Five Year Plan (2002-07). In the
seventies India set up the Penden Cement
Project and the Chukha Hydroelectric
Project. The Penden Plant, which com-
menced production in 1981, did not only
meet Bhutan's domestic needs but also ex-
ported about 60,000 metric tonnes of ce-
ment annually to the neighbouring Indian
states of Assam, Sikkim and West Bengal.
Similarly, the Chukha Hydroelectric Proj-
ect, commissioned in 1986, has been ex-
porting electricity to India and this is a
major source of revenue for Bhutan. In
2000-2001, it accounted for 44.6 per cent
of the total revenue.
India and Bhutan have taken many other
steps as well to expand their cooperation
such as the Tala Hydroelectric and Wang-
chu Reservoir Scheme, popularly known as
Chukha II and Chukha III. The Sankosh
Multipurpose Project irrigates about half
a million hectares of land in West Bengal.
India also contributed to the construction
of Kurichu power project, Bunakha re-
servoir project and the Dungsum Cement
Plant. In the Eighth Five Year Plan
(1998-2002) of Bhutan, India's financial
contribution was of Rs. 9 billion with
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an additional Rs. 4 billion as development
subsidy.
India has been helping Bhutan in promot-
ing its foreign trade as well. Being a land-
locked country Bhutan suffers from a seri-
ous handicap in this regard. To facilitate
Bhutanese trade, India has not only pro-
vided free trade between the two countries
but also transit facilities in India for the
conduct of its trade with third countries.
Bhutan exports to India not only primary
commodities such as coal, dolomite and
gypsum but also industrial and manufac-
tured products like calcium carbide, ce-
ment, hydroelectric power, plywood, parti-
cle board and processed fruits and juices.
Indo-Bhutanese trade is closely linked with
the relations of both countries with Bang-
ladesh. In the 1980's India and Bangladesh
signed an MOU (Memorandum of Under-
standing) to facilitate the transfer of goods
between Bhutan and Bangladesh through
India, by rail and road. This was followed
by a Bangladesh-Bhutan trade protocol and
an agreement on economic and technical
cooperation. The 30-year treaty between
India and Bangladesh signed in December
1996 has been contributing to the further
expansion of trade between Bangladesh
and Bhutan through Indian territory. The
overall idea falls within the scheme of sub-
regional cooperation consisting of Bangla-
desh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. The idea
was mooted by Bangladesh at the SAARC
Foreign Ministers' Conference held in De-
cember 1996 in New Delhi, which received
support from the Maldives and Sri Lanka
also.
Traditionally, Bhutan is sceptical about
cultural influences from outside. It is on
account of this that although it has allowed
tourists to visit the country, it has not yet
gone the whole hog to encourage them in-
discriminately as many such small, poor
but otherwise beautiful countries have
done. Of late there is, however, a tendency
to open up a bit more, which would natu-
rally encourage tourism. Bhutan partici-
pated in a big way in the Expo 2000 held
in Hanover, Germany, where its pavilion
was placed among the top five exhibit
sites. Bhutan joined the Federation of the
International Football Association (FIFA)
and participated in the Sydney Olympics.
In May 2002, in a Thimpu seminar jointly
sponsored by the SAARC Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (SCCI), the Asso-
ciation of Bhutanese Tour Operators
(ABTO), the Bhutan Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry (BCCI) and the Minis-
try of Trade and Industry of the Govern-
ment of Bhutan, the Prime Minister of
Bhutan, Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk, said:
'We are guilty of overlooking the immense
potential of intra-regional tourism. SAARC
should take a very realistic approach in
identifying impediments to intra-regional
travel as well as travels from outside to our
region and propose ways and means of
overcoming them.'
Against this background, one may visual-
ize a larger role for the Bhutanese airlines,
Druk Air, in contributing to the sub-
regional tourism and overall economic co-
operation. An idea is being floated these
days that Guwahati airport can emerge
as an international airport having
direct flights to Bangkok–Paro–Guwahati–
Bangkok. If the idea materializes it would
not only change the character of Guwahati
from one of India's backwaters to an inter-
national tourist and passenger junction but
also boost trade and tourism. Bhutan also
would take advantage of this opening up. If
simultaneously the road links, many of
which are on the drawing board now, are
also made operative a real growth quad-
rangle would emerge.
Together with economic partnership, secu-
rity cooperation is an essential component
of the India-Bhutan relationship. There are
primarily two aspects of this security rela-
tionship. One pertains to the use of Bhu-
tanese soil by the insurgency groups oper-
ating in India's North East, and the other to
Bhutan's location between two Asian gi-
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ants, China and India. Insofar as the first is
concerned, the problem assumed serious
proportions after 1996. In that year, after
the Bangladesh government flushed out
from its soil the United Liberation Front of
Assam (ULFA), the National Democratic
Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Bodo-
land Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF), these
groups moved to Bhutan from where they
continued to conduct their activities. They
built their headquarters in Gubanagand
near the Assam border and established as
many as 33 camps with 15 to 500 militants
in each within a 600 km arc from near
Phuntsholing in the west to the Arunachal
Pradesh border beyond Samdruk Jongkhar
in the east. They moved freely within
Bhutan and purchased their daily needs
from the villagers at much higher prices,
thereby creating a vested interest in the
countryside in favour of their continued
presence. The threat thus posed to the se-
curity of both India and Bhutan became
obvious. But the problem was how to deal
with the situation. The Bhutanese army
was not big enough to face the challenge
militarily, yet Bhutan could not allow the
Indian army either to have a free hand
there for both nationalistic reasons as well
as provoking the insurgents further. Given
Bhutan's limitations as a small country and
its own vulnerabilities in terms of a poten-
tial Nepalese insurgency emanating from
the displaced southern Bhutan Nepalese, it
was careful not to go the whole hog in do-
ing whatever India wanted. Ultimately, in
December 2003, with India's cooperation
Bhutan flushed out the militants under the
operation codenamed Operation All Clear.
In respect of China both Bhutan and India
have coordinated their policies aimed at
keeping China at bay yet trying to develop
friendly relations bilaterally. In mid-1999
an official Chinese delegation which vis-
ited Bhutan resolved some of the out-
standing border issues between the two
countries. China also indicated, for the first
time, its interest in providing economic
assistance to Bhutan. In November 2000
the 14th Round of Sino-Bhutanese border
talks were held in Beijing at the ministerial
level. The talks were continued during the
visit of Bhutan's Foreign Secretary, Dasho
Ugyen Tshering, to China in July 2001
following which the 15th Round of annual
border talks was held in Thimpu in No-
vember 2001. The three sectors which
were discussed were Doglam, Sinchu-
lumba, and Dramana. Although no diplo-
matic move was afoot to establish formal
diplomatic relations between the two
countries, relations went apace smoothly.
Since Sino-Indian relations are on an even
keel these days, notwithstanding some tra-
ditional suspicions about each other's in-
tentions, there is less likelihood of the
China factor coming in the way of India-
Bhutan friendship. In any case, unlike Ne-
pal, it is the fear of China that has drawn
Bhutan closer to India. Although the re-
spective dreams of China and India about
their perceived spheres of interest continue
to overlap, it can be assumed that the eco-
nomic compulsions of both nations in this
globalized world would not allow those
dreams to lead them into a military con-
frontation. As such, the India-Bhutan rela-
tionship would have less tensions on that
count. There is, however, one potential ir-
ritant which may emerge in future. The
way Bhutan is materially developing, there
would be unauthorized migration of poor
job hunters from neighbouring Assam that
may cause anxieties to Bhutan's cultural
insularity-conscious elites and it may cause
the repeat of the Lhotshampa (ethnic Bhu-
tanese Nepalis) eviction with its attendant
problems for the India-Bhutan relationship.
8. On the fringe: India-Maldives
India's relations with totalitarian Maldives
is of peripheral importance but the fact that
Maldives can be trusted for a vote in the
United Nations or in the SAARC makes it
valuable for India. Relations between the
two countries are trouble free and during
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the 1980s when there was an attempted
coup to dislodge President Maumoon Ab-
dul Gayoom from power, prompt Indian
intervention foiled the bid. India has con-
tributed substantially to the Maldives' de-
velopment particularly in the fields of
health and human resource development,
the two notable projects being the Indira
Gandhi Memorial Hospital and the Mal-
dives Institute of Technical Education. The
construction of a Hospitality and Tourism
Faculty in the capital city of Male is in the
pipeline. Maldives on its part has extended
support to India's candidature as a Perma-
nent Member of the UN Security Council
and has co-sponsored the G-4 resolution
aimed at reforming the United Nations and
its organs.
It is to be seen what happens to the rela-
tionship if someone replaces President
Gayoom. Of late there are straws in the
wind pointing to serious opposition to
Gayoom's continuation in power. It is pos-
sible that such a change would not impact
India-Maldives relations but if some
staunchly pro-Islamic party comes to
power India may have to encounter some
unwarranted strains. There is a democratic
surge in the country in response to which
President Gayoom, who would complete
30 years in office in 2008 (six five-year
tenures), has agreed to allow political par-
ties to register themselves. In 2005 four
political parties were registered, namely,
the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP),
the Dhivehi Payyithunge Party (DRP, or
Maldivian People's Party, led by Gayoom),
an Islamist party called Adalat (meaning,
court of justice) and the Islamist Demo-
cratic Party (IDP). Although it is not yet
clear whether these parties would be al-
lowed to put up their candidates in the next
parliamentary elections or not, as they
were not allowed to do so in the three by-
elections that were held in December 2005,
the process of democratization once started
cannot be stalled for a long time. India
wants to be politically correct in this con-
text as could be seen in one of its official
statements issued in August 2005: 'As a
democracy ourselves, we welcome the
progress Maldives has made on the road to
democracy. A stable, prosperous and
democratic Maldives is in the interest of
the people of the Maldives, and of India.'
9. Regional cooperation: SAARC
(South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation)
India has been an active member of the
SAARC from the establishment of the lat-
ter in 1985. So far, thirteen SAARC Sum-
mits have taken place – Dhaka (1985),
Bangalore (1986), Kathmandu (1987), Is-
lamabad (1988), Male (1990), Colombo
(1991), Dhaka (1993), New Delhi (1995),
Male (1997), Colombo (1998), Kathmandu
(2002), Islamabad (2004) and Dhaka
(2005). In the economic sphere notable
success has been achieved under the aus-
pices of SAARC, although no concept of
cooperative security has developed be-
cause of certain inherent security contra-
dictions amongst the members (to which
reference has been made at the beginning
of this paper) and although there is little
scope for addressing the real problems of
the region because of the inherent handicap
of not allowing the members to discuss and
debate bilateral and contentious issues.
More importantly, on the sidelines of the
SAARC Summits, important bilateral talks
have sometimes been held, particularly
between India and Pakistan.
Amongst the important economic
achievements of SAARC one can mention
the signing of the SAARC Preferential
Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) at the Sev-
enth SAARC Summit. It was meant to
provide the member countries with the ba-
sic legal framework for step-by-step trade
liberalization amongst them through tariff,
para-tariff, non-tariff and direct trade deals.
SAPTA was formally launched at the fol-
lowing summit at New Delhi. As a follow-
up on SAPTA, at the tenth SAARC Sum-
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mit the members decided to set up a Com-
mittee of Experts to draft a treaty on South
Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). The
treaty was expected to lay down legally
binding schedules for freeing trade among
SAARC countries and provide a predict-
able and transparent time schedule for
achieving a free trade area in the region.
At the recently held 13th SAARC Summit
the members noted with satisfaction the
formal entry into force of SAFTA with ef-
fect from 1 January 2006. They reiterated
the need to strengthen transportation and
communication links across the region for
accelerated and balanced economic
growth. They also stressed the expansion
of the scope of SAFTA to include trade in
services, enhanced investment and harmo-
nized standards. During the Summit the
following agreements were signed:
− Agreement on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Customs Matters.
− Agreement on the Establishment of
SAARC Arbitration Council.
− Limited Agreement on Avoidance of
Double Taxation and Mutual Adminis-
trative Assistance in Tax Matters.
The members also encouraged further co-
operation in the fields of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT), en-
ergy security, environment protection and
health care, particularly in respect of the
drug and HIV menace.
10. Regional neighbours
No discussion on South Asia is complete
without reference to three regional neigh-
bours – Afghanistan, China and Myanmar.
For paucity of space no detailed discussion
on them is possible, still some broad points
could be mentioned in brief. Besides the
SAARC framework of regional coopera-
tion, there are BCIM (Bangladesh-China-
India-Myanmar) or the Kunming initiative
and BIMST-EC (Bangladesh, India,
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand – Economic
Cooperation) frameworks. Whatever hap-
pens to these frameworks in the long run at
least it is clear from these exercises that in
India's Look East policy, its North East is
conceived as the vital link. To see them
from strategic perspectives, although
China's economic connection with Myan-
mar far exceeds that of India the latter can
make use of Myanmar's anxiety about
China to its advantage. A friendly, open
and developing Myanmar is important for
India and for that engaging the country on
a regular basis is of critical importance.
With its current problems with the United
States and the European Union, Myanmar
may find it necessary to improve its ties
with India. On India's part it has to be
pragmatic without questioning much
Myanmar's regime character. An improved
relationship with Myanmar, besides con-
tributing to trade relations, would help In-
dian security forces to deal with some of
the North Eastern insurgent groups, more
particularly ULFA, which has used its jun-
gles for training and shelter. After their
eviction from Bhutan many ULFA cadres
have fled into Bangladesh and Myanmar.
It is important to engage Afghanistan also
because of its Taliban heritage and the lat-
ter's Kashmir connection. In the 13th
SAARC Summit Afghanistan's application
for membership was considered favourably
by the members and, subject to formalities,
it is soon going to join the SAARC.
Afghanistan's entry is particularly impor-
tant because earlier it was a contentious
issue between India and Pakistan as they
held different perspectives on the country.
With respect to China it is systematically
mending its fences with India and the latter
is reciprocating in equal measure. With
globalization high on their respective
agendas, neither China nor India would
risk any confrontation that could endanger
their rapid growth. This pragmatism is be-
ing shown in settling the boundary dispute
step by step. Bilateral trade is systemati-
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cally picking up and there are more and
more people to people contacts, particu-
larly in the cultural field.
11. Conclusion
There is no imminent danger to peace in
South Asia but certain domestic turmoil
emanating from religious fanaticism and
ethnic assertions may cause strains to inter-
state relations. India's security can be best
served if its internal problems are con-
tained, thereby giving no excuse or oppor-
tunity to its neighbours to take advantage
of them. At present, whatever the ruling
elites in India's neighbourhood may tell
their domestic constituencies, at the mass
level everywhere in the region India's
reputation as a thriving secular democracy
is systematically gaining ground. Bolly-
wood movies, Hindi songs and soap
operas, and through them the Hindi lan-
guage, are not only contributing remarka-
bly to India's own integration process but
they are also selling the positive image
of India in its neighbourhood, and beyond.
The role of India's civil society in safe-
guarding and buttressing the nation's
democratic institutions is being emulated
everywhere in the region, often to the
embarrassment of the regional ruling
classes. In South Asia the concept of peo-
ple's security is slowly and steadily occu-
pying the space traditionally held by that of
national security.
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Introduction
Over the past five decades, India's relation-
ship with the People's Republic of China
has traversed the entire spectrum: initial
camaraderie jolted by outright hostility,
followed by a protracted period of mutual
antagonism, gradually ushering a phase of
"uncomfortable co-existence." In the past
decade, both sides sought to identify and
build upon the domains of minimum con-
vergence, although their hesitant courtship
was rudely disrupted by the fall-outs of the
Indian nuclear tests of 1998.
The ensuing period has witnessed a new
phase of incremental rapprochement1, no-
tably underlined during Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao's April 2005 visit to India
when the two sides signed a historic
agreement identifying the core principles
and parameters within which their security
disputes would be resolved.2 The agree-
ment, elaborated within its 11 articles, is
based upon "Panchsheela", or Five Princi-
ples of Peaceful Coexistence. It states their
strong preference for a political solution to
the boundary dispute, "convinced that an
early settlement will advance their basic
interests ... and should therefore be pursued
as a strategic objective." Moreover, pend-
ing its "ultimate settlement," each side
should strictly respect and observe the Line
of Actual Control and cooperate to main-
tain peace and tranquillity in the border
areas.
To better appreciate the significance of this
and other recent developments, it is in-
structive to review the changed and
changing position of China in India's stra-
tegic calculus, and vice versa. Recent
scholarship has increasingly focused on
China and India as the world's two fastest
growing economies, their rapidly expand-
ing bilateral trade, and the vast potential
for closer cooperation. There is, however,
little attention devoted to what prevented
cooperation in the past, how economic en-
gagement factors influence their respective
"grand strategy," and how it influences the
scope, pace and context of bilateral eco-
nomic interaction.
This chapter addresses some of this deficit.
Section One examines the changing posi-
tion of each in the other's security calculus.
Section Two analyses domestic impera-
tives driving mutual economic cooperation.
Section Three discusses the specifics of
current and proposed engagement, includ-
ing areas of relative strengths and weak-
nesses. Section Four assesses elements of
current cooperation and competition, and
whether security considerations might in-
hibit or terminate future economic coop-
eration.
1. The long shadow of security
discord
Following its independence in 1947, and
the onset of the Cold War that pitted the
world in East v. West camps, India tried to
avoid joining either camp for that would
have narrowed its options for external as-
sistance to meet its pressing developmental
imperatives. As such, along with China,
Egypt, Indonesia and Yugoslavia, it led the
non-aligned movement (NAM) to promote
South-South cooperation and improve
North-South dialogue and policy coordi-
nation.
However, India's solidarity with China was
soon tested by a brief but intense border
war in 1962 along the British-designated
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McMahon Line that was not well deline-
ated on the ground. The war resulted in a
decisive military and psychological victory
for China. The new ceasefire line is desig-
nated as the Line of Actual Control (LAC),
with about 90,000 square km of disputed
territory between the two sides.
The war was soon followed by China's first
nuclear weapon test in October 1964, In-
dia's second war with Pakistan (1965),
Pakistan leasing to China (in 1966) parts of
the strategically-located Mount Karakoram
(K-2) Pass in Kashmir that it acquired
during the first Indo-Pak war of 1947-8,
and the start of a strong politico-military
partnership between China and Pakistan.
For the next two decades, Sino-Indian re-
lations went into a deep freeze, interrupted
by an occasional skirmish or frosty diplo-
matic exchanges. However, the end of the
Cold War provided both India and China
the space, and the need, to begin recali-
brating their strategic policies toward Asia
and toward each other.
1.1 Post-Cold War rapprochement
India and China signed a landmark Peace
and Tranquillity Agreement (PTA) on
September 9, 1993, which created a Joint
Working Group tasked to resolve the
boundary dispute. This was followed by
the creation of the India-China Diplomatic
and Military Expert Group on November
29, 1996, tasked to clarify respective posi-
tions regarding LAC and implementation
of confidence building measures, including
regular communications between their Di-
rectorate Generals of Military Operations
and relevant field offices.
Thirteen bilateral meetings within the
above auspices culminated in India recog-
nizing Chinese sovereign control over Ti-
bet, and China accepting Sikkim as an in-
alienable part of India. Both sides have ex-
changed maps of the least contentious
middle sector of their border, and reviewed
each other's claims regarding the eastern
and western sectors. In 2003, each side ap-
pointed a Special Representative to expe-
dite delineation of LAC, after which joint
cartographic and survey teams would begin
to pinpoint the boundary on the ground.
From India's perspective, the security dis-
pute with China has moved away from its
earlier hostility to one of greater pragma-
tism and mutual accommodation. How-
ever, at the September 2005 meeting of the
Special Representatives, China appears to
have reasserted its claims over Arunachal
Pradesh, causing New Delhi to reevaluate
its future negotiating posture and outlook.3
From China's standpoint, India remained
an important but relatively minor compo-
nent of its global strategic outlook until the
post-Cold War period. Beijing perceived
India as a second-rate player, lacking de-
termination and cohesive purpose to proj-
ect power beyond South Asia.4 Thus,
China conducted its first nuclear test in
October 1964, well within the January 1,
1967 deadline set by the Nuclear Nonpro-
liferation Treaty (NPT), with the result that
China is recognized, along with the United
States, Britain, France, and Russia, as the
Permanent Five (P-5) nuclear weapon
states (NWS), who coincidentally are also
the permanent five members of the UN Se-
curity Council.
By contrast, India missed the NPT deadline
by delaying its first nuclear weapons test
until May 1974, followed by a self-
imposed moratorium until May 1998.5 In
the interim, so much had changed in the
arms control landscape that ironically In-
dia, which had first proposed the Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as far
back as 1954, was forced to vote against its
adoption at the Conference on Disarma-
ment in Geneva in July 1996 and again at
the UN General Assembly in September
1996.6 The passage of CTBT precipitated
India's decision to conduct 5 subterranean
nuclear explosions on May 11 and 13,
1998, citing the threat from China's nuclear
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arsenal, and its assistance to Pakistan's nu-
clear and missile programmes, as the pri-
mary rationale for India's decision to
overtly weaponize its potential.7
While the Indian tests elicited a sharp
negative reaction from Beijing, its leader-
ship also began to note New Delhi's
growing resolve to improve its power po-
sition within the international system. It
should be stressed that concurrent changes
in US policy toward India also factored
heavily in Beijing's reassessment of its
policies toward India.
1.2 Changing US role
After imposing non-proliferation related
sanctions on India following the 1998 tests,
the Talbott-Singh intensive dialogue ulti-
mately led to the lifting of almost all sanc-
tions. The subsequent pursuit of a strong
multi-faceted US-India partnership has the
potential to alter the strategic landscape of
Asia, and has become an important factor
in US-China and India-China relations.8
For instance, on June 29, 2005 India and
the United States signed a 10-year defence
agreement that paves the way for Wash-
ington to supply state-of-the-art major
weapons systems, and engage in co-
production and collaboration with New
Delhi. Later, the Joint Statement of July
18, 2005 by President Bush and Prime
Minister Singh commits each side to a se-
ries of reciprocal steps that will eventually
permit US civilian nuclear assistance to
India. In return, India will separate its ci-
vilian nuclear facilities from the weapons-
dedicated ones and place the former under
safeguards of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA), strengthen its export
controls, and align its nuclear and missile
control lists with those of the Nuclear Sup-
pliers' Group and the Missile Technology
Control Regime.
While India will not sign the NPT as a
non-nuclear weapon state, this new agree-
ment provides a modus vivendi for US
(and international) nuclear cooperation
with India, and high-technology coopera-
tion in both civilian and military sectors.
The IAEA, UK, France, Russia and Can-
ada have supported the US-India agree-
ment, and efforts are underway for the
NSG to make "a substantive exception"
based on India's strong record of control-
ling WMD-relevant exports so that NSG
members can provide it civilian nuclear
assistance.9
Beyond this, United States and India share
a growing concern over the extent to which
the rise of China will indeed be "peace-
ful".10 As such, an unspoken objective of
their bilateral cooperation is to help India
develop the capability to assist the United
States in circumscribing possible Chinese
policy activism in the future that might un-
dermine Asian security and prosperity.11
The strategic undertones of the growing
US-India ties have factored heavily in Bei-
jing's calculations as it formulates its eco-
nomic and security policies toward India.
2. Domestic imperatives for
economic engagement
Beyond the influence of US policy, several
major factors have prompted India and
China to engage in economic cooperation,
modify their mutual relationship, and ad-
just their national aspirations within Asia
and beyond.
For China, three essential factors underlie
its motivation to pursue economic coop-
eration with India. First, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has identified
sustained economic growth as a national
security priority, for that alone would pro-
vide it the resources to pursue all other de-
velopmental and security imperatives, and
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maintain the legitimacy of its single-party
rule.12 The worsening income-gap between
the urban and rural populations, and re-
gional income disparities that fuelled
74,000 protests in 2004, have factored into
the priorities laid out by the Chinese
Communist Party at its October 2005 an-
nual planning session for the period 2006-
2010.13 In this context, while China has
substantially expanded trade ties with East
and Southeast Asia over the past decade, it
wants to tap the massive Indian market to
sustain its upward growth trajectory.
Second, China seeks to leverage improved
ties with India to penetrate the other
economies of South Asia.14 Aside from
Pakistan with which it has strong economic
and security ties, China's past attempts to
improve economic relations with Nepal,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have met with
limited success.15 Beijing recognizes that
improved ties with New Delhi would fa-
cilitate its goal of expanding economic re-
lations with the remaining countries of
South Asia – namely Maldives and Bhutan
– apart from the larger and more strategi-
cally-located Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka. Perhaps in recognition of these re-
alities, in early 2005 China expressed its
interest in getting an "observer status"
within the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC). While
this request has not been formally tabled
on the SAARC agenda, it is apparent that
in Beijing's reckoning this modified ap-
proach is less likely to arouse suspicions
regarding its intentions, and the lure of
sharing in its economic boom might out-
weigh concerns about China's low-cost
products upstaging indigenous manufac-
turers within these developing South Asian
economies.
A third factor propelling China's search for
closer economic ties with India stems from
Beijing's concerns over the rapidly im-
proving US-India relations, and the grow-
ing rift in Sino-US ties. Thus, on the one
side, as the May 2005 White House report
states, the Bush administration has publicly
welcomed India's rise as an emerging
global power, and wants to assist India in
reaching its potential. And on the other, the
Pentagon's July 2005 report to the US
Congress warns of the risks that China's
rapid military modernization and policies
pose for the United States in Asia.16 The
security concerns add to the growing range
of US economic disputes with China re-
lating to its large trade surplus, the valua-
tion of its currency (renminbi),17 under-
pricing of its commodities (notably, tex-
tiles), and the aggressive overseas pur-
chases of oil fields and exploration rights
by China's state-owned oil and natural gas
companies.18
While the import of the changing US ap-
proach toward India and China will be as-
sessed in the concluding section of this ar-
ticle, suffice it to say that China views ex-
panded economic ties with India as a
"hedge" against a future US-Indian coali-
tion to contain China's rise in Asian and
international affairs.
For India as well, three sets of factors an-
chor its decision to enhance economic co-
operation with China. First, it seeks to
penetrate and profit from the immense
market that China represents, with an aver-
age per capita income of over $1200 and a
rapidly growing middle class with a higher
disposition to consume since there are se-
vere curbs on investing abroad while in-
vestments in domestic state-owned banks
yield low returns. Given India's continued
success with its own version of the "ex-
port-led growth" approach, tapping China
as a destination for India's exports has be-
come a natural outgrowth of the new stra-
tegy.
The second Indian imperative is to lever-
age improved economic ties with China to
deepen engagement with the Asia-Pacific.
India's "Look East"19 policy has yielded
some positive dividends: membership of
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and
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of the influential "ASEAN+3+1" mecha-
nism (along with China, Japan and South
Korea), FTA with Thailand in May 2005
and a Comprehensive Economic Coopera-
tion Agreement with Singapore in June
2005. In February 2004, it concluded an
agreement to establish BIMST-EC, a re-
gional economic cooperation agreement
with Bhutan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and
Thailand (and Bangladesh if it chooses to
join). However, New Delhi recognizes that
the Southeast Asian capitals will look for
"signals" from Beijing in recalibrating their
economic and security ties with India.
A third Indian imperative stems from its
rapidly growing energy shortfall and the
need to reduce friction with China over
newer sources of supply. Despite increased
efforts to tap domestic reserves, India still
imports about 75% of its oil, most of it
from the volatile Middle East. The recent
hike in crude prices to over $60 a barrel
has meant that oil imports constitute the
largest item on India's import bill. This
untenable situation has underlined the need
for India to diversify its sources of supply.
India's public-owned Oil and Natural Gas
Commission (ONGC), is prospecting for
oil in Sakhalin and Tatarstan in Russia, and
bidding for natural gas reserves in Central
Asia, Caucasus, Iran, Bangladesh, Myan-
mar and even Sudan. In each case, China's
growing influence and resources suggest
that India's ability to access these energy
sources will in part depend on improving
ties with China. This was underlined in
August 2005 when the ONGC-Mittal com-
bine was out-bid and out-maneuvered by
China's National Petroleum Corporation in
clinching a deal with PetroKazakhstan, as
confirmed later by India's Petroleum Min-
ister.20
A broader Indian imperative is to enhance
its relative power position in Asia. India is
eager to break out of the South Asia "box"
and emerge as an Asian power. Its omni-
directional politico-economic diplomacy
has begun to yield positive results, but im-
proved ties with China would perforce re-
main a significant part of its strategic cal-
culus.
2.1 Growing bilateral economic ties
Sino-Indian economic engagement has a
short history but sharply rising trajectory.
Although the two signed an accord in 1984
granting most favoured nation (MFN)
status to each other, bilateral trade was
only about $332m in 1992. It has grown
steadily since then, except during 1998-99
following the Indian nuclear tests, reaching
$5b in 2002, and $13.6b in 2004, with a
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR)
of over 30% since 1999. China now ranks
as India's third largest trading partner, al-
though India remains a distant 12th in
China's foreign trade statistics. During
Premier Wen's April 2005 visit, the two
sides set the modest target of $20b by
2008, and $30b by 2010.
The foreign trade volume of $13.6b in
2004, with India's exports valued at $7.67b
and imports at $5.93b, is notable for two
reasons. First, China has typically permit-
ted Asia's smaller economies to enjoy a
trade surplus with it, whereas China's own
largest trade surplus is with the United
States. This approach, not unlike the US
practice while aiding Germany and later
Japan recover from their destruction during
World War II, helps China reinforce the
image of its "peaceful rise" (heping jueche)
and enhance interdependence with these
Asian economies. This is borne out in the
case of the Japanese and South Korean
economic revival, with China displacing
the United States as their largest trading
partner. This is significant given that for-
eign trade comprises around 40% of their
GDPs, and trade with China – especially
for Japan - has curbed adverse policies de-
spite their respective bitter memories of
World War II.
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The second and somewhat related aspect of
India's minor trade surplus is the "irrational
exuberance" that it generated about Indian
industries' capacity to compete with Chi-
nese counterparts. A simple review of In-
dian exports to China, however, reveals
that iron ore, slags, ash, and steel account
for about 60%, followed by plastics, or-
ganic chemicals and cotton yarn. Clearly,
India needs to add more value-added
manufacturing goods and diversify its ex-
port basket to sustain and increase its ex-
ports over the longer term. On the other
hand, India's imports from China are
dominated by electrical machinery and
equipment, organic chemicals, machine
tools and mineral fuels. The import basket
thus reveals the clear cost advantage en-
joyed by China in these higher value-added
items over India.
Table: Comparative Statistics of China and India
Index of Measurement Period    India      China
Exports as % of GDP 2000-2005    14.3      28.6
Imports as % of GDP 2000-2005    15.1      26.0
GDP growth rate 2000-2005      8.1        9.3
Savings as % of GDP 2000-2005    22.08      42.55
Consumption as % of GDP 2000-2005    77.92      57.45
Household Consumption as % of GDP 2000-2005    72.94      44.37
National Gross Savings Rate as
% of GDP
1997-2004    22.6      43.4
Investment as % of GDP 1997-2004    23.0      40.0
FDI as % of GDP 1997-2004      0.7        4.2
FDI (absolute figures)1 2005      5.6b      63.2b
CAGR2 of Labor productivity 1990-2003      3.3        7.3
ICOR3 2000-2005      2.9        4.2
US Exports 2005      7.4b      34.6b
US Imports 2005    20.2b    202.7b
US Trade Balance (exports – imports) 2005  - 12.8  - 168.1b
Notes: 1= According to the International Finance Corporation, an arm of the World Bank, China's official FDI
(Foreign Direct Investment) figures are about two times higher than their actual value, given the prac-
tice of "round-tripping" i.e. money that went out from the mainland returns disguised as foreign capital
via Hong Kong. India's FDI calculations, on the other hand, are too low, because it excludes reinvested
earnings, subordinated debt, and overseas commercial borrowings – all included in other countries' FDI
statistics. Even so, China's FDI is at least 3 times higher than India's, even if not 10 times greater as the
official figures indicate.
2 = compounded annual growth rate
3 = incremental capital output ratio
Sources: World Bank Development Indicators Online; Economy Watch; Center for Monitoring the Indian
               Economy; Economic Survey of India, and CII-McKinsey Analysis 2005.
The efforts by the two governments to
deepen and widen economic cooperation
became focused during 2000-01 as India
negotiated with China and then supported
its entry into the World Trade Organiza-
tion. From about the same time, Beijing
has displayed growing interest in harness-
ing Indian IT strengths for its broader
benefit. Thus, in mid-2000, the mayor of
Xin Jiang province invited Indian IT pro-
fessionals to help develop this backward
region.21 Similarly, greater IT cooperation
with China's armed forces (PLA) was first
discussed during the April 2001 visit by a
senior Indian delegation led by Lt. General
Kalkut, head of the Indian Eastern Com-
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mand.22 Further, the Indian Navy, in its an-
nual initiative called "Operation Milan" –
under which its ships make port calls in
most countries through Southeast Asia and
Japan – made its first-ever port call in
Shanghai in 2004, and the two countries
plan to conduct a joint naval exercise in the
near term.
Bilateral governmental efforts have gener-
ated a strong positive response from the
business community as well, and greater
synergy is beginning to emerge. The Con-
federation of Indian Industry (CII), India's
apex consortium of primarily high value-
added manufacturing companies, has part-
nered with Indian diplomatic missions in
Beijing and Shanghai to organize three
successful "Made in India" road shows
during 2003-2005. At the latest show in
Shanghai, India's Finance Minister stressed
the strategic parameters of India's eco-
nomic diplomacy in East Asia, stating that
"India's approach towards Asian integra-
tion and its relations with [China] are in-
creasingly an important element of our for-
eign policy."23 In addition, in recent years
numerous business delegations, seminars
and workshops at leading academic and
policy institutions on each side have gen-
erated optimism about expanding commer-
cial ties.
2.2 Growing Indian business presence
and opportunities in China
In tandem with growing governmental ef-
forts, a diverse range of prominent Indian
companies are expanding their operations
in China by setting up branch offices, joint
ventures or training facilities. In the phar-
maceutical and IT area, these include Ran-
baxy, Aptech, Aurobindo Pharmaceuticals,
Tata Consultancy Services, and Dr.
Reddy's Laboratories. Indian business
majors that have established Wholly For-
eign-Owned Enterprises (WFOEs) include
Infosys, NIIT, Orissa Industries Ltd., and
Essel Packaging.24 Indian businesses have
also established facilities in China to pro-
duce for third country exports and to sup-
ply to the domestic market. Both sides rec-
ognize the massive untapped potential for
broader cooperation, but these aggregate
figures do not reveal some of the inherent
problems and challenges. While more In-
dian businesses are expected to exploit the
price advantages by locating their produc-
tion in China, the "mixed" experience of
foreign MNCs entering into JVs and
WFOEs in China suggest that unless Bei-
jing strengthens the state of technology
security and provides WTO-compliant
product and process patent protection, full-
spectrum technology-embedded transfers
to China will remain inhibited.
The differing capacities of Chinese and
Indian private sectors might also create a
mis-match in partnerships and in exploiting
the opportunities for cooperation. China's
state-owned enterprises have abundant
capital and are more efficient than their
Indian counterparts. However, much of the
bilateral collaboration is led by the private
sectors whose capacities vary. India's pri-
vate sector, for instance, is much stronger
and more developed than China's, espe-
cially regarding access to capital and free-
dom to acquire assets and companies at
home and abroad.25 China has directed FDI
and domestic capital toward its inefficient
SOEs, such that most of its private firms
remain strapped for cash,26 and cannot
scale up production or consolidate opera-
tions. As a result, the share of China's pri-
vate sector in national exports is less than
20%.
Further, India's stock market and its bank-
ing and financial services sector are well
developed by international standards. With
over 20 million shareholders, India has the
third largest investor base in the world af-
ter the United States and Japan. India's
stock market capitalization of $41 trillion
as of March 2005 was the highest amongst
the emerging markets, compared to $450
billion in China. Clearly, India is in a posi-
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tion to assist in the development of China's
nascent stock market and its relatively
weak and non-transparent banking sector.
2.3 Growing Chinese business presence
and opportunities in India
India's economic reforms, started in July
1991, have over time simplified adminis-
trative procedures for economic transac-
tions at home and abroad, reduced struc-
tural barriers to the entry and operation of
domestic and external actors and investors,
and enhanced the overall export-
orientation of the economy.27 Robust pro-
ductivity gains have in turn enabled GOI to
reduce peak import tariff duties from 300%
in 1991 to 15% in 2005 (compared to
10.5% in China), and slated to reach 5%
(i.e. ASEAN-levels) by 2008. On the other
hand, high fiscal deficit, remaining rigidi-
ties in the labor market and chronically
weak infrastructure thwart foreign partici-
pation and productivity gains.28
Opportunities in infrastructure develop-
ment, coupled with India's 250m-strong
middle class and the rising disposable in-
come of the rural rich, are making India an
increasingly attractive market for China,
among others. Partly in recognition of
these opportunities, China has steadily ex-
panded its merchandise trade with India,
and a range of Chinese companies have
also begun to increase their presence in
India. These firms specialize in the manu-
facture and marketing of a range of engi-
neering, metallurgical and petroleum prod-
ucts.29 The focus of most of the other Chi-
nese companies is on infrastructure and
telecommunications projects.30
A notable exception to the above trend is
the presence of companies that produce
dual-use goods and technologies, i.e. those
with both civilian and military applica-
tions, which are also large vendors for the
Chinese armed forces. These include China
Precision Machinery Import and Export
Corporation (CPMIEC), Sinochem and
Huawei Technologies. CPMIEC is selling
technology for mini blast furnaces in India,
but is also the producer of critical compo-
nents for China's nuclear weapons and
missile complex. Sinochem is one of the
only two entities authorized by the Chinese
government to engage in export and import
of Schedule I chemicals and precursors. It
is currently supplying Schedule III dual-
use chemicals under export license to the
Indian commercial sector.  Huawei Tech-
nologies Inc., a major producer of defence-
related IT products for the Chinese armed
forces, has recently set up IT and BPO op-
erations in Bangalore through its Indian
subsidiary, Huawei Telecommunications
(India) Company Pvt Ltd.31
3. Assessment and conclusion
A spate of recent scholarship has focused
on China and India as the world's two most
populated countries with the two fastest
growing economies, comparing their
growth across myriad indices of develop-
ment. An indirect derivative of such cas-
cading international attention has been to
make both countries acutely sensitive to
each other's developmental trajectories. It
has also reinforced governmental decision
to identify the evolving template of mutual
cooperation and competition, and recali-
brate each other's position in their respec-
tive grand strategy.
3.1 Elements of bilateral cooperation
and competition
In addition to efforts to substantially im-
prove bilateral foreign trade and value
composition, in April 2005 the two gov-
ernments established a study group to ex-
amine the feasibility of a free trade area
(FTA). Entering into an FTA could result
in considerable trade diversion and welfare
loss for India.32 Nevertheless, the mere fact
that within six years of normalizing eco-
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nomic relations, the two sides are explor-
ing an FTA demonstrates the growing im-
portance that each side has begun to attach
to the other in their economic planning for
the future.
Another area of possible cooperation re-
lates to energy sourcing. Given that India's
ONGC and China's National Petroleum
Corp. are aggressively competing for oil
and gas fields in Central Asia, Africa and
Latin America, the two governments have
recently proposed signing an MoU to avoid
competitive bidding up of the procurement
prices and are exploring creating an Asian
Energy Grid so that China and India, and
some other Asian countries, could access
assured supply of oil and natural gas. India
has agreed to lay a 741 km pipeline and
expand the extraction capacity of a China-
owned oil refinery in Khartoum,33 and to
extend the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India
gas pipeline to southwestern China. While
these proposals will require considerable
capital and technology investments, and
the laying of overland pipelines has sig-
nificant security implications, it indicates
the scale of planning and coordination un-
derway in India and China to meet their
serious energy needs.
Moreover, as developing economies, they
will continue policy coordination within
WTO to secure their interests in the multi-
lateral trading system. This is evident in
the ongoing Doha round of negotiations
relating to tariffs, agricultural subsidies,
market access, and environmental safe-
guards. Finally, both are identifying com-
plementarities in their product and services
profiles to improve trade flows and mini-
mize trade diversion and consequent wel-
fare losses.
On the other hand, Sino-Indian export
competition is expected to intensify in tex-
tiles, including yarn and finished products.
With the phasing out of the GATT-era
multi-fibre agreement and import quotas,
both sides are aggressively competing for a
greater global market share. With both the
United States and the EU planning to im-
pose restrictions on China, Indian textile
exports to both markets have surged.34
A second area of competition relates to the
efforts by both countries to move up the
value-chain in the manufacturing sector.
With the skilful, and wilful, directing of
FDI and national savings into select public
enterprises, China has established itself as
the world's leading source for low-cost,
low-specialization, manufactured goods.
However, its policies to use JVs and other
measures to attract high technology have
met with limited success. By contrast, In-
dia's private sector in high technology
faces few regulatory constraints, and is
scaling up operations and establishing for-
eign collaboration to secure greater market
share at home and abroad.35 Further, with
less than a fifth of the FDI that China has
annually attracted, capacity utilization of
scarce capital resources in India has stead-
ily improved.36 It is likely then, that China
and India will compete aggressively in the
global hi-tech sector, with the advantage
on India's side in the near term.
3.2 Elements of grand strategy
India remained a peripheral consideration
in China's economic and security calcula-
tions until the end of the Cold War. Gi-
ven sustained Indo-Pakistani animosity,
China's robust politico-military relation-
ship with Pakistan was sufficient to keep
India "tied down" and prevent it from
emerging as a competitor on the Asian
stage. During the 1990s, however, with
India's economic reforms and growing
pragmatism in its security policies, China
visibly adjusted its overall approach, im-
proving ties with the Indian Ocean littoral
countries to neutralize the superiority of
the Indian Navy.37 It invested heavily in
building all-weather transportation links
with Myanmar, expanded runways at
military airports closer to the Indian bor-
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der, and established a signals listening post
in Myanmar's Coco Island barely 25 miles
from India's territory. Similarly, China
conducted a naval exercise with Bangla-
desh in 2003 and is expanding nuclear and
economic cooperation with a country that
remains deeply divided on the issue of im-
proving relations with India.
Regarding Pakistan, China appears to be
pursuing a two-pronged strategy. On the
one hand, it is collaborating to build a joint
strike fighter aircraft, additional civilian
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards,
and assisting with a range of advanced
conventional weapons platforms. Further,
it is helping build a deep-sea port in Gwa-
dar, in Pakistan's northwestern province,
and a transportation corridor via Mount K-
2 all the way to central China. With the
permission of Pakistan, China can station
its submarine and naval warships in Gwa-
dar, from where it can project power into
the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.
Moreover, given the limited "blue water"
capability of the PLA-Navy (PLAN),
Gwadar will obviate the constraints of
contending with the Indian naval presence
in the Indian Ocean for PLAN to influence
outcomes, including keeping the sea lanes
of communication (SLOC) open for eco-
nomic and security reasons.
On the other hand, China's recent public
comments reflect its growing concern over
the rise of Islamic militant groups in Cen-
tral Asia, many of whom have bases in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. China is taking
active steps to prevent militancy from
Central and Southeast Asia radicalizing its
own Muslim populations in Xinjiang,
Shandong, Hebei and Yunnan provinces. It
is notable that immediately following the
9/11 attacks on US soil, China closed its
land border via the K-2 Highway with
Pakistan, and re-opened it two days later
only to allow travel to Pakistan from
China, but not the other way around. This
suggests that despite all other forms of
support to Islamabad, Beijing is loath to
pursue policies that might endanger the
internal stability of China. This shared
sense of "vulnerability" has been discussed
in China's recent senior meetings with In-
dia, and counter-terrorism represents an
important avenue for bilateral cooperation.
But while China will continue expanding
economic ties with India, the most critical
variable for the future will be the evolution
of India's relations with the United States,38
which can directly influence China's goal
of becoming the decisive factor in Asian
economic and security affairs.39 This is not
to suggest that a worsening of Sino-US re-
lations is assured, at least in the near term
(i.e. 5-10 years).40
One measure that provides an insight into
Beijing's calculations is "Comprehensive
National Power" (CNP), developed by
Chinese government agencies and defined
as a sum of military, economic, scientific,
technological and political power.41 The
United States has the highest current CNP
score and will continue to do so into the
foreseeable future, but China sees its cur-
rent rank of 5, behind US, Japan, Germany
and Russia, improving to 2 by 2025. India
is ranked 13th and not expected to move
higher than 9th. 42
Beijing's strong aversion to interference in
its "sphere of influence" was underlined in
2003 when the Indian Navy escorted high-
value US cargo ships across the Straits of
Malacca, a strategic waterway shared by
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. In the
same year, US Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld visited Delhi, Seoul and Tokyo,
but not Beijing, to discuss cooperation re-
garding the US plans to build a National
Missile Defense (NMD) and possibly de-
ploy a theatre version in Tokyo and Seoul.
Indo-US cooperation on NMD is well un-
der way, including the possibility of inte-
grating US Patriot Advanced Capability
(PAC-3) systems into the open-architecture
Indian missile defence shield.43 This is an
area of serious disagreement between
China and India, and is expected to worsen
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with growing US-India defence collabora-
tion.
In sum, given that direct military conflict
ranks very low in the current strategic pri-
orities of both India and China, bilateral
economic ties are expected to grow and
diversify in the near term, along with slow
progress in resolving the border dispute.
Over the longer term, however, it is not
certain whether economic ties will provide
the necessary and sufficient conditions to
avert a crisis in the security arena, or
whether such a confrontational build-up
will severely constrain the pace and scope
of bilateral economic cooperation. Never-
theless, the likeliest scenario over the long
term is that India and China will avert a
direct conflict, and a more fluid "sphere of
mutual influence" will emerge whose
boundaries and dimensions would be a
function of the evolving economic and
military capabilities, and postures, of both
these Asian powers.
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India – View from the East
Urs Schoettli
1. India in the global context
At the beginning of the 21st century we are
witnessing four major shifts in the global
political architecture:
⎯ the last remnants of the collapsed Cold
War order are being removed;
⎯ the continental shift in the global econ-
omy from the industrialized West to
continental Asia is being accelerated;
⎯ the shift from the North Atlantic to the
Pacific as the economic and political
powerhouse of the world is being com-
pleted;
⎯ the process that puts a definitive end to
the era of a world shaped by super-
powers, is in full swing.
Unlike the Warswaw Pact and
COMECON, the United Nations, NATO
and the European Union did not collapse
with the end of the Cold War. Neverthe-
less, all these bodies were strongly affected
by the end of a bi-polar world order which
had come about with the demise of the
Soviet Union.  In its structure or in its mis-
sion and policies, none of the three bodies
is today the same it had been at the end of
the eighties. The UN is in need of profound
reform if it wants to survive as a global
body that is more than just an impotent talk
shop. However, the experiences of the last
years give reason to be pessimistic. One of
the main reform demands which touches
India directly, is the reform of the Security
Council. Without any doubt, today’s com-
position of this body does not reflect a re-
alistic picture of the actual balances of
power in the world. It is clear that the aspi-
ration of India to become a permanent
member of this exclusive club will have to
wait some time more. The fact that the
Indian request came together with a num-
ber of others did not help matters. Particu-
larly the Japanese demand (Japan by the
way is the biggest contributor to the UN
budget) did not go down well in Beijing.
Although the Chinese made it known to the
world that they were in favour of a perma-
nent Indian presence in the UN Security
Council, in the end their strained relations
with Japan weighed more.
Secondly, the world economy is returning
with giant steps to where it had been at the
end of the 18th century. There can be no
doubt that Asia (in particular India, China
and Japan) will be the powerhouse of the
global economy. The last two hundred
years which had brought the intrusion of
Western colonial empires into Asia, had
been an aberration caused by the self-
inflicted decline of major Asian civiliza-
tions. While the last two hundred years had
brought the enrichment of the West at the
expense of Asia, the crucial challenge of
the 21st century will be how the redistribu-
tion of economic power in the world will
be dealt with. If past mistakes of protec-
tionism and chauvinistic populism are not
repeated, it might be possible to avoid the
disruptions that in the past did not only
cause socio-economic upheaval but also
major wars and conflicts. One of the im-
minent litmus tests will be how the world
manages the secular shifts in the need for
and use of energy, raw materials and capi-
tal. In these fields there is enough potential
for major conflicts of interest.
Around 1800 India and China had a share
of some 50% of the global GDP. They
have begun to claim back a bigger share of
the world economy, but it will still take a
long time until they reach their past domi-
nance again. There are obvious synergies
between the economies of the world’s two
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most populous nations. However, trade
between the two emerging giants is still
very marginal. The potential is enormous
but there are a number of obstacles both of
political and geostrategic nature. India is
still suspicious of China’s policy towards
Pakistan, although in recent times Beijing
has given strong indications that it is about
to base its South Asian policies on the evi-
dent fact that India is the pre-eminent
power. This implies that Pakistan is of sec-
ondary interest and that China has a strong
interest in a peaceful resolution of the con-
tinuing Indo-Pakistani dispute. Although
the bilateral Indo-Chinese border dispute
has taken a back seat Beijing is still wor-
ried about India being a safe haven for
Tibetan irredentists.
Thirdly, since ages the world has been
subjected to the circles of emerging and
declining empires and superpowers. While
we will continue to have massive inequali-
ties in the military and political influence
as well as economic power between na-
tions, the age of great powers managing
world affairs either in concert or in conflict
is gone for good. Fears about how China
and the world will deal with the important
shift in regional power that is currently
happening in the Far East, are justified.
However, it is inconceivable that the new
Middle Kingdom will ever become a su-
perpower. The fact that after the foresee-
able demise of the American hegemony,
the world will lack major powers that can
act on a global scale, will have serious im-
plications both on a global and on a re-
gional level. The need for regional and
inter-regional security structures will,
therefore, grow considerably. There seems
to be a chance that the emerging big power
relations between India and China might
enter calmer waters. Beijing had been very
upset when during the BJP government
some cabinet ministers had made it clear
that India’s nuclear deterrence was not
only directed at Pakistan, but that one of its
major aims was to counterbalance
the nuclear armaments of China. In recent
times it seems that also in this field Chi-
nese attitudes have become more realistic.
There are even signs that China is not en-
tirely inimical to the emerging new atomic
relationship between the USA and India.
2. Security challenges in East Asia
There are four major security challenges in
East Asia, which must be of interest to
India, as their management has serious
implications for the whole security envi-
ronment in Asia.
⎯ The Korean Peninsula, as it bears a
nuclear dimension similar to South
Asia
⎯ since the explosion of the Indian and
Pakistani atomic bombs;
⎯ Sino-Japanese relations, as their dete-
rioration can impinge on India’s
⎯ interest in strong economic ties with
both countries;
⎯ The Taiwan question, as a descent into
military conflict would not only affect
the
⎯ immediate neighbourhood but would
also involve the United States, with
which
⎯ India is just starting to have more
normal and potentially very rewarding
relations;
⎯ The South China Sea, as India as a tra-
ditional seagoing nation has a vital
⎯ interest in open sea lanes and is herself,
in the Indian Ocean region, a custodian
of freely accessible international trade
routes.
The Korean Peninsula is one of the most
complex and dangerous crisis spots on the
globe. The facts are common knowledge
and shall not be repeated here. The situa-
tion is particularly difficult as the key
question about Beijing’s real influence on
Pyongyang can only be answered in a
highly speculative way. Further, the issue
of a united Korea is greatly confused by
ambivalent Japanese interests. A united
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Korea would be of a demographic and, in
the longer perspective, of an economic
dimension that must be worrying for To-
kyo, all the more so as Japan’s population
is aging rapidly. A united Korea would, in
its relation to Japan, no longer be the
clearly secondary power that South Korea
is today on its own.
The Taiwan question continues to mark
one of the major crisis spots in the world.
From the Chinese point of view, the situa-
tion is very clear: Taiwanese independence
is completely unacceptable to the mainland
government, while the options for a politi-
cal accommodation with what is from Bei-
jing’s point of view a “secessionist prov-
ince”, are very flexible. While no Chinese
government could survive the acceptance
of an independent Taiwan, the Chinese
leadership is fully aware that the formulas
that have been employed to facilitate the
return of Hong Kong and Macao, cannot
be employed in the case of Taiwan. Even-
tually, some compromise will be found,
since the political and economic stakes are
simply too high. Chinese pragmatism
should facilitate a solution, all the more so
as the tragic history of the civil war re-
cedes further into the past.
Nowhere is the ascent of China as a re-
gional hegemon more evident than in the
South China Sea. There are a number of
disputed islands and reefs. The disputes,
which involve China and practically all the
traditional members of ASEAN, have both
an economic and a geopolitical back-
ground. In the long run, the Chinese claim
to treat the South China Sea as a “mare
nostrum”, a Chinese sea, carries huge risks.
China’s South East Asian neighbours are
strongly concerned about the growing
military capacities of China, particularly its
systematic acquisition of naval power on
the high seas. No South East Asian country
is a military match for the newly emerged
Chinese power. The evolution of the South
China Sea into a Chinese sea must be of
concern to all participants in international
free trade and is a particular challenge to
major Asian trading nations such as India
and Japan.
Without any doubt, China has been the
Asian success story of the last two dec-
ades. The socio-economic development
that has been initiated through the reforms
that had been prepared by Zhao Ziyang and
implemented by Deng Xiaoping in the late
seventies and eighties of the 20th century is
of truly historical proportions. Twenty-five
years after it emerged from a status of ab-
solute poverty and from the Maoist diktat
of stone age socialism, China today has a
middle class population of some 260 mil-
lion people. Today, the health of the Chi-
nese economy is of global concern and
Chinese manufacturing has become a
challenge to the most advanced industrial-
ized countries.
It is self-evident that this massive expan-
sion of economic power and influence has
already caused a significant increase of the
political clout China can exercise in East
Asia and in the world at large. Everything
points to the fact that we have not yet wit-
nessed the end of this process. Past experi-
ence gives reason to worry about the geo-
political and security implications of this
development. Since the 18th century, the
emergence of every major new power has
led to war. Very early in the 21st century,
the world faces the challenge whether it
will be able to deal with the rise of China
in a constructive way or whether this rise
will lead to massive disruptions.
But in the field of longer term predictions
the case of India rests on much more solid
ground than the case of China. India’s po-
litical system makes for a rather limited
choice of options, based principally on the
constellations of the political parties and
alliances. In China’s case, no options can
or should be excluded, even such extreme
cases as social upheaval or a return to
Maoist or even more traditional values of
seclusion and state interference.
68 Urs Schöttli                                                                                                                                                                     
It is correct to be sceptical about the long
term prospect for the hegemonial policies
of the United States, because the world’s
only superpower rests, economically
speaking, on borrowed time. It is equally
correct to see China as a giant who stands
on feet of clay. The most dangerous chal-
lenge, with which the Chinese leadership is
confronted, is the overdue and drastic
modernization of the political system. In
political terms nothing significant has
changed since the days of Mao. China is
still a one-party state, ruled by a Commu-
nist Party that stands above the law, disre-
gards the most elementary rules of trans-
parency of its governance and is subject to
no outside control.
To publicly debate the power monopoly of
the party is still taboo, although the Chief
of the Supreme Court recently stated that
the party, too, should be subject to the le-
gal system.
Concerning Japan, it is necessary to re-
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the
Japanese economy and society. The most
outstanding features of Japanese society is
its cohesiveness and its extraordinary ca-
pacity for innovation. Of all major Asian
civilizations the Japanese has the greatest
capacity for adaptation.
In the first Gulf War, Japan had limited its
help to the US to financial assistance. In
fact Tokyo then paid a large part of the bill
of the American campaign. It got little rec-
ognition for that. Therefore, ten years later,
when the American campaign in Afghani-
stan and the second Gulf War offered new
opportunities for Tokyo to manifest its
solidarity with the American ally, the gov-
ernment went much further in its support
than had been the case at any time since
the Korean War. Tokyo’s current policy
towards America is motivated by three
goals: firstly, to secure Japan’s energy
supply (in terms of oil and natural gas Ja-
pan is entirely dependent on imports); sec-
ondly, to balance China’s growing influ-
ence in the region and on the world stage;
thirdly and most importantly, to stem the
tide towards a damaging isolationism
which could become particularly acute if
three trends come together: a disturbing
near abroad, a stable domestic economy
and a not too steep demographic decline.
3. East Asia’s perception of India
How is India perceived in the Far East,
namely by the countries of South East
Asia, members of ASEAN, by Japan and
by China? On the one side India can bene-
fit from the rivalries and suspicions that are
accelerated by the dynamics of change in
East Asia. On the other hand, these very
same challenges can cause the East Asian
powers to neglect or even ignore the op-
portunities that could lie in enhanced po-
litical, security and economic relations
with India. There is no doubt that the “law
of geographical distance” lowers the geo-
political and economic importance of India
for most of the East Asian nations. In fact
it is this “law of geographical distance”
which has prevented Asia from having the
kind of internecine wars that have shaped
Europe’s fate in the 19th and 20th century.
It was indicative that the European style of
national warfare and of modern imperial-
ism was copied only by Japan, the country
that in the 19th century had adopted West-
ern civilization on its own terms.
In the cultural field, East Asia has greatly
profited from Indian influences. However,
these tend to be downplayed or even ig-
nored by the local elites, be it for reasons
of national pride, be it for lack of historical
knowledge. The most important cultural
influence from India, Buddhism, has long
ago been indigenized both in China and
Japan. In China Buddhism accommodated
ancestor worship, in Japan it took on the
Japanese traditions of cultural and social
aesthetics. The Japanese might be more
willing to acknowledge the Indian roots of
one of their two national religions than is
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the case in China. At the same time Japan
downplays the religious and cultural influ-
ences from its immediate neighbours China
and Korea.
The Hindu kingdoms in South East Asia,
namely in Vietnam and Indonesia, that had
declined even before the arrival of the
European colonial powers, have left few
traces in current societies, the notable ex-
ception being the island of Bali. There are
without doubt Indian traces in sections of
the populations of Indonesia and Indo-
china, however, larger Indian migrations in
recent times were limited to Malaysia and
Singapore. Finally, the major Buddhist
nation in South East Asia, Thailand, seems
to have completely forgotten the Indian
roots of its religion.
East Asia’s perception of India is ham-
pered by a remarkably low academic inter-
est in South Asia. In Japan and China, be-
cause of the decisive influence of the
United States on academia in general and
on the study of international relations in
particular, the perception of India is to a
great extent a reflection of what is per-
ceived in the United States. The same is
true in the field of the media. The interest
in India is minimal, since India does not
belong to the Asia-Pacific region which is
being seen as the dynamo of the world
economy. Indeed financial, trade and eco-
nomic relations between East Asia and
India are negligible, when compared to the
commercial exchange that takes place
within the Asian Pacific region and be-
tween East Asia and the European Union.
Finally, there is still the legacy of the fact
that during the Cold War the Indian sub-
continent did not figure strongly in the
security perceptions of East Asia.
4. South East Asia
It is evident that South East Asian nations
are in need of a counterweight against the
overwhelming power of China. This is all
the more so, as China’s remarkable and
unprecedented economic renaissance tends
to accentuate the already existing imbal-
ances and suspicions. Before its enlarge-
ment in Indochina, ASEAN had been very
restrictive in its policies of expanding the
original membership. In fact, under Presi-
dent Jayawardene Sri Lanka had made
attempts at joining ASEAN, but had been
rebuffed. The main concern amongst the
members of ASEAN was that they did not
want to become embroiled in the regional
conflicts and tensions in South Asia. In this
sense Sri Lanka was clearly “out of area”
and it would have set a dangerous prece-
dent for possible other engagements in
South Asia. With ASEAN’s enlargement
in Indochina and particularly since the end
of the Cold War and the concomitant de-
mise of the Non-Aligned Movement,
ASEAN has become more flexible in its
external policies. ASEAN has also profited
from a change of mind in Chinese foreign
policy which in recent years has discarded
its earlier reluctance to join multilateral
initiatives. In fact, recently there has been a
pronounced increase in China’s multilat-
eral initiatives.
All these developments make it both pos-
sible and necessary for India to become a
factor in South East Asian multilateralism.
In fact there is a very important security
concern that brings India and China into a
rather direct conflict of interests, i.e.
Burma – Myanmar. China does not view
India as a threat to its landbased security.
However, it sees itself in the long term in a
serious rivalry with India on the high seas.
Obviously, key Chinese interests in the
safety of international waterways have
their origin in South East Asia, namely in
the Straits of Malacca and in the archipel-
ago of Indonesia. But further on, there is
the Indian Ocean through which important
trading routes and a significant portion of
China’s oil imports pass. Since many years
Beijing like Delhi has been actively en-
gaged in a strong rivalry for political influ-
ence in Myanmar and in Myanmar’s
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military regime. It seems that with the
granting of landing rights for Chinese na-
val ships in Rangoon, China has made
greater headway than India. However, the
tussle has not been settled for good, all the
more so as the Burmese regime is highly
instable.
Unlike in the case of SAARC, the mem-
bership of ASEAN is more balanced in
terms of the comparative size and weight
of the countries belonging to it. There is no
country which has the same domineering
position like India in South Asia. Looking
at the balance between its major members
ASEAN is similar to the EU, although of
course it lags far behind in the process of
integration. The internal balance of
ASEAN is also connected to the presence
of a significant overseas Chinese commu-
nity in a number of key ASEAN member
states, namely in Malaysia, Thailand, the
Philippines and Indonesia. The degree with
which these overseas Chinese communities
have been integrated into their host com-
munity, varies greatly from country to
country. There may be animosities and, in
some cases, even occasional violent con-
flicts, nevertheless these Chinese overseas
communities create links to the mainland
which because of the numerical and eco-
nomic weakness of the Indian overseas
communities do not exist between ASEAN
and India.
In their global trade and energy supply
links most ASEAN members do not de-
pend to the same degree on the freedom of
shipping in the Indian Ocean as for exam-
ple Japan does. Nevertheless there is con-
siderable interest in extending the com-
mercial links with an India that is seen by a
growing part of the South East Asian elites
as an emerging Asian powerhouse. An
important side effect of an increase in trade
and economic cooperation between India
and ASEAN would be a reduction in the
overbearing influence of the Chinese econ-
omy in South East Asia. China’s renais-
sance has, through the flow of investments
as well as through the flow of goods and
the interrelation in services and communi-
cation, created a very solid basis for the de
facto economic integration of the South
China Sea area. It would indeed be very
difficult, even impossible, for India to
break through these mutual dependencies.
Everything points to an even greater accel-
eration of this process in the near future.
This will certainly benefit the Chinese, but
in an indirect way it can also work in In-
dia’s favour. Once more the principal rea-
son would be the desire of South East
Asian countries for a less pronounced de-
pendence on China and a better usage of
the Indian option.
5. Japan
The support for the American campaign in
Afghanistan and the emergence of the
global terrorist threat by Islamic funda-
mentalists, many of whom are based in
Pakistan, has certainly increased Japan’s
interest in South Asia. For a long time the
attention Japan gave to South Asia  has
been focussed disproportionately on Paki-
stan. This had to do with a number of fac-
tors. During the Cold War the Japanese
saw India as subservient to the Soviet Un-
ion, while, with help of the American
world view, Pakistan was seen as a
friendly nation. While the “licence raj” was
booming, Pakistan offered better prospects
for Japanese economic cooperation. Fi-
nally, the preference of Pakistan by the
Japanese was a reflex action against a ma-
jor Asian culture, which one perceived not
only as strange but also as dangerous. It is
in this context important to recall that Ja-
pan traditionally does not see itself as an
Asian country, but rather as a special case
– a view that had been strengthened by the
Meiji Restoration.
Let us look at how India is perceived by
Japan through four major parameters: poli-
tics, the economy and technology, the
global context and geopolitics.
India – View from the East 71                                                                                                                                                                     
The Japanese elites have a rather limited
knowledge of the Indian political system.
The mainstream thinks of India as a highly
inefficient country, racked by corruption,
disease, backwardness and extreme pov-
erty. Against this background, the majority
believes that democracy is a luxury which
has not brought any benefits to India. In
fact the Japanese political elite considers
India’s political landscape all the more
confusing, as Japan itself, while not having
a one-party regime, has been very much
controlled by one party, the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party, which has been in power since
1955 for all but three years.
Japan considers India a country that has
missed the entry into modern times and is
desperately trying to catch up. One recog-
nizes that India may have succeeded in the
field of information technology and soft-
ware, but in the hardware of industrial de-
velopment India is seen as a basket case. In
fact some attempts to change this percep-
tion which emerged in the nineties have
been rolled back, since China has become
even more attractive to the Japanese econ-
omy. There is clearly the understanding
that between China and Japan there exists
and flourishes one of the most successful
and significant economic symbioses the
world has seen in modern times. As Japan
and China share not only a religious but
also a cultural background, for example in
the realm of the law, the fact that India
unlike China is a country under the rule of
law does not hold the same attraction for
the Japanese as it might for the Westerners.
In the global context Japan has little use
for India. The issue of a seat in the UN
security council as a permanent member
was not seen as enough of a reason for
more intense Indo-Japanese cooperation.
Tokyo knew from the start that on this is-
sue the co-aspirants Brasil, India and Ger-
many were of little importance and that the
key lies with the United States and with
China. It is highly likely that amongst the
Japanese leadership nobody was surprised
about the Chinese opposition against Japan
becoming a permanent member of the UN
Security Council. Furthermore, looking at
the voting record of India, Japan which on
most issues fulfills its role as a loyal ally of
the United States, could not but see India
as inimical to its own interests. Until the
end of the Cold War, India’s foreign policy
had been seen by Japan as ineffectual at
best and inimical at worst. Although 15
years have passed, this perception has not
yet been totally removed.
Finally, in geopolitical terms India is, apart
from the waterways that lead through the
Indian Ocean, of marginal importance to
Japan. Tokyo does not believe that India is
a creditable counterweight to China. It
rather sees Russia taking on this role. In
this context one has to take into considera-
tion that Japan’s foreign policy is strongly
linked to the security of its energy supply.
Japan has no domestic gas or oil produc-
tion and covers a large part of its energy
needs through imports from the Middle
East. It aspires to reduce this dependency
by tapping into rich resources in Russia’s
Far East. As mentioned earlier, the role of
India’s naval forces in protectiong water-
ways through the Indian Ocean could be a
major source for closer security and policy
cooperation between India and Japan.
However, this field is still unexplored,
most probably because of negligence on
both sides.
6. China
China sees itself as the dominant Asian
power. In the tradition of the Middle King-
dom it sees the outside world in concentric
circles around itself as the centre of the
world. The rapid economic modernization
and particularly China’s entry into the
world economy have had a profound
impact on Chinese foreign and security
policy. In a way one can say that Beijing
today follows the foreign policy principles
of the great Metternich. China, which
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under Mao was once a country that
claimed to be in the forefront of the world
revolution, is today a power that advocates
and defends the status quo. Changes,
particularly drastic upheavals can only
have a negative impact on China’s external
position and internal stability. Therefore,
Beijing will do everything to oppose what-
ever it sees as a threat to its the existing
world order (including the enlargement of
the UN Security Council). If one looks
beyond the war in Iraq one can even rec-
ognize a close communality of American
and Chinese security interests. In any case,
it is a little understood fact that tradition-
ally China feels much closer to the values
of the United States than to those of
Europe.
China sees, not unlike the US, India as a
second-rate power, a regional power. The
recent overtures by the Chinese leadership
towards India have nothing to do with di-
plomacy between equals. In Chinese eyes
India has been and will continue to be a
backward country, dragged down by su-
perstition and evil social practices such as
castes and idolatry. The reason why China
has recently shown more interest in India
has to do with the situation on its own land
borders and in South Asia. Beijing is wor-
ried that through a number of new coop-
eration agreements that have taken shape
since 9/11, the US is trying to encircle
China. US troops operate now in a number
of Central Asian countries, in Afghanistan
and in Pakistan. Any closer cooperation
between Delhi und Washington must be
seen with concern.
In its role as the Asian hegemon China
wishes to avoid that regional powers in its
neighbourhood create tensions amongst
themselves. In this way the China that had
been quite content about India and Paki-
stan creating troubles for each other and
even going at each other from time to time
in real wars, has been replaced by a China
that does not want instability in South
Asia. For this there are two reasons: firstly,
China is alarmed by the prospect that an
Indo-Pakistan war might go nuclear and
that the fall-out of a nuclear exchange may
affect parts of its own territory. Secondly,
China fears that a new war, even if held at
conventional levels, would further enhance
American influence on the subcontinent.
The latter concern has to be seen in the
light of the long-term Chinese expectations
about the decline of the US as a global
power. Beijing wants to make sure that
when this is going to happen it is firmly
positioned as Asia’s pre-eminent power
that is the sole arbiter about disputes in its
neighbourhood.
Bilateral border disputes with India have
been put on a back burner. China has
shown interest in enhancing bilateral trade
with India. That political disputes and eco-
nomic cooperation need not be mutually
exclusive has been shown by the recent
anti-Japanese protests in China. While po-
litical relations between the two neigh-
bours are in the deep freeze, the economic
relations are on the go. Political relations
with India are certainly not in the deep
freeze. But it would be foolish to believe
that the euphoria of Hindi-China Bhai Bhai
– which by the way was never shared by
the Chinese and which they saw rather as a
preposterous claim by the inferior Indians
– can be repeated. In economic terms Bei-
jing sees India as a rival, from a geopoliti-
cal perspective it sees India as a second-
rate power and politically it has never been
able to fathom what makes Indian democ-
racy tick and what keeps such diverse a
country together.
My conclusion is that a relationship where
each side looks carefully at its own inter-
ests and tries to come to a mutually profit-
able outcome is the best one can and
should hope for Indo-Chinese relations.
Everything else is wishful thinking and has
nothing to do with either the political
reality in Beijing or with the age-old tradi-
tions that shape the Chinese strategic and
geopolitical thinking.
India-Australia and the Indian Ocean
Kenneth McPherson ∗
Introduction
In the year 1996 the Indian Ocean Rim As-
sociation for Regional Cooperation (IOR-
ARC) was in the final stages of being
formed (as it was in Mauritius in 1997) and
the stage seemed set for the development of
a vigorous and positive regional dialogue.
India and Australia were the prime movers
behind this process but barely eight years on,
IOR-ARC is languishing and the concept of
regional cooperation seems dead. It has no
public profile, has apparently dropped down
the list of imperatives for the states of the
Indian Ocean region and the euphoria that
greeted its foundation has vanished. The
following paper attempts to capture the
views that India and Australia held of the
Indian Ocean region in 1996 in contrast to
their views and objectives in 2005.
1. A view of Indian Ocean regional
cooperation: 1996
In the early 1990s, the USSR collapsed and
in the process took with it the superstructure
of Great Power rivalry that had been played
out around the world. The Soviet navy, and
to a large extent the US navy, disappeared
from the Indian Ocean, leaving the French as
the only extra-regional power to maintain a
shadow presence at La Réunion. The end of
the Cold War re-shaped the play of interna-
tional politics. No longer were global poli-
tics played around a bi-polar Great Power
structure, but had apparently become multi-
polar as states sought security in new alli-
ances. In the wake of the collapse of the
USSR multilateralism had become a more
valued vehicle for international dialogue.
The United Nations is an obvious case in
point, but at the regional level the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), the North American Free Trade
Association (NAFTA) and the European
Union (EU) had become stronger and were
viewed as potentially more effective organi-
zations through which states could mediate
their aspirations and problems.
In the Indian Ocean region there were sev-
eral multilateral sub-regional organizations
that came into existence during the Cold
War. Apart from ASEAN, which encom-
passes Southeast Asia, there was the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), Southern African Development
Commission (SADC), Common Market for
Southern and Eastern Africa (COMESA)
and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).
Leaving aside ASEAN and the IOC, none of
these sub-regional organizations had been
marked by notable success before the end of
the Cold War. The reasons for this are out-
side the scope of this article, but suffice it to
say that in part at least sub-regional rivalries
and distrust, and the play of Great Power
politics, were major inhibiting factors.
The demise of the Cold War removed some
of the divisions that had undermined many
of these regional organizations. In addition,
the end of apartheid in South Africa, and
processes of economic liberalization in
South Asia and Australia in particular, re-
moved more impediments to expanding
multilateral dialogues around the Indian
Ocean region based on economic coopera-
tion. South Africa, for example, became a
major partner in SADC and COMESA,
whilst Australia and India sought closer
relationships with ASEAN1. But, the eco-
nomic challenges facing the region were
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viewed by India and Australia in particular
as too great to be addressed within sub-
regional organizations, particularly when
they were in some instances still bogged
down by old rivalries and hostilities. The
mantra of the post Cold War era was glob-
alism, as defined by organizations such as
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
agreements such as the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). But it was a
globalism underpinned by strong regional
organizations of states. The one major re-
gion lacking any dialogue for cooperation
was the Indian Ocean region.
The need to re-shape international relations
following the collapse of the USSR was
particularly pressing in the Indian Ocean
region. Many of the states in the region had
attempted to steer a middle path between the
Great Powers during the Cold War, even if
the economies of the majority of less devel-
oped countries tended to be based on inter-
pretations of socialism. By the early 1990s,
these economies were in crisis. The same
was true in post-apartheid South Africa
which was seeking total reconstruction of
the discriminatory capitalist economy of the
apartheid era. In Australia too, by the last
decade of the century there was a concerted
and steady move in the direction of eco-
nomic deregulation and the pursuit of a new
regionally based place in the world: a move
mirrored to an extent by a fundamental
change in economic course in India which
began a process of opening up its economy
to global competition. Like Australia, India
was also seeking to define its place in both
the regional and global order in the wake of
the collapse of the USSR.
All of these events and trends were the mid-
wives for regional cooperation. During the
period 1993 to 1994, the governments of
three of the largest economies in the region
– India, Australia and South Africa – were
each in their own way moving towards the
conclusion that the time was ripe for some
type of regional dialogue.2
For South Africa, the imperatives were a
desperate need to open up to a previously
closed world if investment and trade were to
be encouraged. For India, the imperatives
were historical, and also based on the need
to restructure the Indian economy in line
with emerging global trends. For Australia,
the imperatives were the need to find new
markets, new trading partners, and intrinsi-
cally to locate the nation in the Asia-Pacific
world as its links with Europe underwent
profound changes.
However, whilst the common imperative
was economic, there were different national
perceptions of the type of regional economic
cooperation needed. In general, there was
agreement that there was a need to increase
intra-regional trade and investment flows as
a means of boosting economic growth, but
there were different ideas about how this
should be accomplished and how vigorously
economic cooperation should be pursued.
The problem is that in economic terms the
Indian Ocean region of the last decade of the
twentieth century was something of a jigsaw
puzzle. A handful of the states – Singapore,
Malaysia, Australia, Indonesia, Thailand,
India and South Africa – possessed increas-
ingly sophisticated economies in global
terms. Yet other states – primarily the oil
producers – had enormous wealth, but lim-
ited economic infrastructure in terms of
industrial activity. The majority of states in
the region were, however, still locked in an
increasingly urgent struggle to maintain a
critical level of economic growth. Within
this latter category there are great differ-
ences: states such as Kenya, Sri Lanka,
Oman and Pakistan had made considerable
economic progress and must be considered
important economies within the region,
whereas the economies of other Indian
Ocean states in this category in Asia and
Africa remained bedevilled by crushing
debt, the legacies of colonial misrule and
civil war.
But differences exist too amongst the first
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category of states. Whilst Australia and the
ASEAN states had undergone considerable
economic restructuring to open their econo-
mies to global competition, the economies of
South Africa and India stood on the verge of
economic liberalization. For different rea-
sons both states had erected formidable tariff
barriers and developed other economic tech-
niques to bolster domestic economic activity
in an atmosphere of protectionism. The
problem they now both faced was how to
dismantle protectionism and to mitigate the
ill effects of such a process upon employ-
ment and domestic economic activity.
Given these economic differences, there
were basically two schools of thought con-
cerning the nature and pace of regional eco-
nomic cooperation. On the one hand, there
were states such as Australia and its ASEAN
neighbours which had undergone extensive
economic de-regulation and were advocates
of the WTO process of relatively rapid tariff
reduction and open regionalism. Proponents
of this view are in essence opposed to dis-
criminatory preferential trade agreements
and the formation of a regional trade bloc,
preferring instead open regionalism of a less
exclusive form based on the APEC model.
In contrast, there were other states whose
economies were only just beginning to open
up to international competition and remain
protected by formidable tariff barriers. For
these economies the challenge was to liber-
alize in a manner, and at a pace, which
would not lead to rapid surges in unem-
ployment and the wholesale destruction of
non-competitive industries.
Given these differences in approach to re-
gional cooperation, it was nevertheless based
on a general acceptance that existing pat-
terns of trade and investment flows within
the region revealed a low level of participa-
tion on the part of member states of the
region. At a rough approximation only 20%
of the trade of these states is intra-regional,
with probably a similar figure for invest-
ment: the states of the region attracted most
of their foreign investment, and the bulk of
their imports (leaving aside the oil trade),
from extra-regional sources. There was also
a considerable flow of investment from more
economically developed states in the region
to East Asia, Europe and the Americas. The
challenge was to develop an economic cli-
mate and to explore economic complemen-
tarities which would increase the propor-
tional value of intra-regional trade and in-
vestment. There were obvious difficulties.
Many of the regional economies remain
heavily reliant upon the export of raw mate-
rials and a very limited range of partially
processed goods and manufactures for the
industrialized North, and were often in com-
petition with one another. On the other hand,
there was a pressing need to seek ways to
bolster the limited manufacturing base of
many developing countries in the region by
opening potential markets within the region
which to date had been dominated by extra-
regional suppliers. In addition, the more
developed economies in the region were
potential sources of investment funds for
their less developed neighbours, as well as
being sources of sophisticated technology,
goods and services at the time supplied by
Northern economies.
During 1994, there were preliminary discus-
sions between India and South Africa con-
cerning the need for regional cooperation.
Initially, Australia was not included in their
equation, but some commentators were
formulating the idea of a more inclusive
cooperation process linking South Africa,
India, Australia and other Indian Ocean
states.3 At the same time in Australia, there
was increasing domestic discussion at the
level of the federal government and the state
government of Western Australia concerning
the need to develop new approaches to the
Indian Ocean.
Since the formation of the Commonwealth
of Australia in 1901, Australian foreign and
trade policy has been dominated by the
Pacific and East Asia. Following World War
II, Southeast Asia had been added to this
equation, but not until the 1980s was the
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Indian Ocean considered a national issue.
This neglect was in part due to the fact that
since 1901 Australia's Indian Ocean frontier
had been guarded first by the British and
then by the USA. Also, domestically West-
ern Australia was very much the "Cinder-
ella" state. It was sparsely populated, and
was of relatively marginal importance to the
national economy. All of this had changed
by the 1980s. In security terms, Australia –
under the federal Minister for Defence, Kim
Beazley, who was from Western Australia4
– moved to upgrade its almost non-existent
defence establishment on the west coast, and
formulated a "two oceans" naval defence
policy whereby 50% of the Australian navy
was to be located on the west coast by the
first decade of the 21st century. In economic
terms, a sustained mineral boom boosted the
west coast economy to the extent that West-
ern Australia (with less than 10% of Austra-
lia's population) currently generates ap-
proximately 25% of national export earn-
ings. Both these developments were indica-
tors of the growing awareness within Aus-
tralia that it was a country with two oceanic
frontiers, neither of which could be ne-
glected.
At the state level, successive governments in
Western Australia were concerned to project
the state as Australia's gateway to Southeast
Asia, and in time as the gateway to the In-
dian Ocean.5 The state authorities embarked
on an ambitious programme of trade and
investment promotion – first in East Asia
then in Southeast Asia and in 1995 in South
Asia – which helped broaden perceptions at
the state and national level of the challenges
and opportunities presented by engagement
with the Indian Ocean region.
The interests of centre and state came to-
gether as economic deregulation forced
Australia to look to new markets in Asia.
But there was more to the process than a
mechanistic knee-jerk reaction to changing
economic circumstances. Since the late
1960s, there had been a bipartisan political
movement which led to the abolition of the
so-called "White Australia" immigration
policy which had effectively kept Australia
98% European in ethnic composition. From
the 1970s, an increasing number of new
settlers in Australia came from Asia, most
particularly from East and Southeast Asia
and the Indian sub-continent. Australian
society began to change rapidly as a result of
this new migration. New attitudes towards
neighbouring states were formed, old ties
with Europe were reassessed, and in the
process many Australians began to look to
their immediate geographic neighbours in
Southeast Asia and further to the west.
India's interest in the Indian Ocean was both
similar in part and different in part to that of
Australia. Historically India had ancient
economic and cultural ties with many parts
of the Indian Ocean region and there were
large communities of Indian settlers in
southern and eastern Africa, Mauritius,
Malaysia and Singapore. Overall however
by the twentieth century, India – like Aus-
tralia – had largely turned its back on the
Indian Ocean. India's security concerns were
essentially land-based, its navy was small in
comparison to its army and air force, and the
bulk of its trade was extra-regional (with the
exception of energy supplies from the Mid-
dle East). After 1947 India's geopolitical
interests were different from those of Aus-
tralia. Whilst Australia was firmly commit-
ted to its alliances with Britain and the USA,
India strove to follow the path of non-
alignment treating both sides in the Cold
War with an even hand where possible.
Economic and political linkages between
India and Australia were weak and in the
decades after 1947, despite constant refer-
ence to a shared love of cricket and similar
political and judicial institutions, the India-
Australia relationship was one of benign
neglect.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however,
the relationship grew more complex. Ini-
tially the imperative for this was negative: a
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mutual and growing suspicion on both sides
prompted by their parallel strengthening of
their Indian Ocean naval forces. Fortuitously
this suspicion soon faded. In part this was
due to a rapid increase in trade between the
two countries that was encouraged by the
Indian process of economic liberalization, in
part it was due to the search for new rela-
tionships that occurred in the wake of the
collapse of the USSR.
It was this change in the tone and substance
of the India-Australia relationship that fa-
cilitated the establishment of IOR-ARC in
1997. Much of the groundwork was done in
the early 1990s by South Africa and Mauri-
tius, but it was the growing convergence of
interests between India and Australia that
gave substance to the move to form the
organization.
2. India-Australia and the Indian
Ocean in 2005
In the years immediately following the es-
tablishment of IOR-ARC there was a flurry
of meetings in Mozambique and Oman, but
by 2005 the organization was virtually mori-
bund.
For some, given the eloquent speeches made
between 1994 and 1997, what existed by
2000 bore little resemblance to what had
been anticipated in the first rush of enthusi-
asm for regional cooperation. The real
problem facing Indian Ocean regional coop-
eration has always been the absence of any
clear vision of what such cooperation could
and should entail, how it would be managed,
and the relatively weak commitment to the
concept of regional cooperation by the
member states of IOR-ARC.
Visions aplenty there were but what were
these visions? They ranged from the vision
of Australia's Foreign Minister in 1984,
Gareth Evans, of an inclusive regional or-
ganization on the lines of APEC that would
explore and promote a range of issues with
particular emphasis on economic coopera-
tion and "confidence building", to the more
sober visions of Indian and South African
spokesmen whose focus was almost entirely
upon economic cooperation amongst a select
group of Indian Ocean states. From the be-
ginning there was remarkably little debate
about mechanisms of government for any
proposed organization and the consensus
was for a de facto adoption of the tripartite
governance model of APEC.
There were from the beginning of negotia-
tions in 1994 obvious differences relating to
membership and the objectives of any pro-
posed Indian Ocean regional organization.
These were the core issues that consumed
time and energy in the debates from 1994
until IOR-ARC was formed in 1997. Here it
needs to be noted that neither the issue of
governance nor the relevance of the APEC
model were debated in any depth.
By 1997, broad agreement had been reached
on the scope of the organization’s activities,
a system of governance had been decided
upon and IOR-ARC was launched.
But what was this creature that had been
launched? Its objectives and raison d'être
were vague, and its system of governance
was not clearly spelled out.
Let me take the problem of governance. A
weak secretariat was established whose role
was far from clear and whose relationship
with the three governing groups was not
defined. Furthermore, there was no agree-
ment on how the tripartite governing system
was to work. There was no mechanism in
place for the establishment and maintenance
of either the academic or business groups,
and the only self-perpetuating part of the
tripartite governing system was the official
bloc.
For the first year or so the momentum of
IOR-ARC was sustained by the initial flush
of enthusiasm, but by 1998 the wheels began
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to fall off the cart. The problems for IOR-
ARC were twofold – internal and external.
Internally, the immediate problems con-
cerned the functions of the different groups:
business, academic and official. There was
no clear direction concerning either the
functions of the individual groups, or their
relationship with one another. To an extent
the role of the official group was self-
evident as this was the direct conduit to the
governments of the respective member
states. But the role of the other groups in
terms of function and how they were to be
constituted was far from clear and in the
absence of any common procedure they soon
became moribund.
Of the two, the business group was undoubt-
edly the most active, with strong support
from the Indian and Omani business com-
munities in particular. But the proactive role
of Indian business organizations such as
FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of
Commerce and Industry) and the CII (Con-
federation of Indian Industry) and their
counterpart in Oman was the exception
rather than the rule and business participa-
tion from Australia, Singapore and South
Africa remained disappointing with the
government in these countries eventually
providing the main input. Academic repre-
sentation was even more abysmal. A core of
countries provided some representation, but
most member states simply did not bother,
or were represented in this group by gov-
ernment officials. The end result was that
within a couple of years of the establishment
of IOR-ARC, governance of the organiza-
tion had in effect become the prerogative of
the official group with the academic and
business groups exercising minimal influ-
ence.
Certainly some member states of IOR-ARC
(most notably India, Australia, Oman, Sri
Lanka and Mauritius) attempted to honour
the terms of the Charter with respect to the
tripartite nature of the organization, but the
majority of member states appear to have
been content to leave their representation
solely in the hands of officials.
In part this appears to have been caused by
the failure of many member states to under-
stand the tripartite system of governance, but
it was also caused by the initial uncritical
acceptance of the APEC model. What was
not taken into account was that the APEC
structure was evolutionary in origin. Long
before the establishment of APEC, business
and academic groups in the Asia-Pacific
region had begun to form regional groupings
to discuss common interests. These groups
in turn influenced government policy and
were the foundations upon which officials
launched APEC. The situation in the Indian
Ocean region was quite different. There was
no background of regional business coop-
eration, and there was only marginally more
academic cooperation. Neither group had
produced a single regional pressure or inter-
est group. When officials in the region be-
came enamoured of the idea of regional
cooperation they created an institution from
above – an institution that lacked any roots
in the region. This meant that from its in-
ception IOR-ARC had a very limited con-
stituency and there was a pressing need to
foster an academic and business interest.
In the period from 1994 to 1997 and for a
few years after, some IOR-ARC member
states did attempt to foster a proactive busi-
ness and academic input, but most member
states honoured the concept more in the
breach than in the observance. By 2000, the
academic and business components of the
tripartite system were all but moribund apart
from some officially sponsored and irregular
input. Whilst official representation had a
continuity and substance, the same could not
be said of the academic and business groups
that were crudely cobbled together to meet
the immediate requirements of particular
IOR-ARC meetings.
If the international scene had remained static
or at least had not thrown up any unexpected
events then IOR-ARC may have had time to
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face and deal with its internal problems, but
unfortunately this was not to be the case.
In the world outside IOR-ARC several
events and developments undermined inter-
est in the organization, but before these
issues are addressed some attention needs to
be paid to the question of bilateral links
between countries of the region as it could
be argued that strong bilateral links provided
the potential foundations on which a suc-
cessful IOR-ARC could be established. In
comparison with the Pacific region, for ex-
ample, where a web of strong bilateral rela-
tionships existed between the players who
eventually formed APEC, bilateralism
within the Indian Ocean region was re-
stricted mainly to sub-regions where both
multilateral and bilateral arrangements of
various kinds existed, as already mentioned
above: Southeast Asia – the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); South
Asia – the South Asian Association for Re-
gional Cooperation (SAARC); the Middle
East – the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
and southern Africa – the Southern African
Development Community (SADC).
With the exception of ASEAN few of these
organizations had made much progress to-
wards their stated goals and there was only
marginal contact between the discrete
groups – there was no way that they could
provide the bedrock on which to build IOR-
ARC. If strong bilateral relations were
something of a chimera within these sub-
regional organizations, they were even less
substantial outside it and many of the 14
countries that signed the 1997 charter had
had little or no intimate contact with one
another in the international arena before
IOR-ARC was mooted. In practical terms
this meant that many of them came to the
negotiating table either in blissful ignorance
of one another or held views encumbered by
the baggage of the Cold War.
But apart from the weakness of bilateral
links across the region, interest in IOR-ARC
was undermined by several adverse global
events.
The first of these was the East Asian eco-
nomic crisis of 1997 which distracted IOR-
ARC's Southeast Asian members to the
extent that it even threatened ASEAN and
impacted negatively on APEC.
This event in itself may not have impacted
all that severely upon IOR-ARC if it had not
occurred at a time when there was a growing
trend within the international order away
from multilateralism towards bilateralism.
At this point might I suggest that the late
1990s will be marked by commentators in
the future as a period when the growing
hegemony of the USA ushered in some
fundamental changes in international rela-
tions. The most notable of these being a
discounting of multilateralism and multilat-
eral organizations in favour of bilateralism.
Such a development received further en-
couragement as the world economy hovered
on the brink of recession and individual
states moved to secure their economies. In
Southeast Asia individual states in part
turned from ASEAN in search of bilateral
free trade agreements elsewhere, and across
the Indian Ocean region there was a general
rush to establish free trade agreements with
major extra-regional economies.
None of this augured well for IOR-ARC and
by the end of the 1990s there was a clear
decline in interest in IOR-ARC on the part
of its three major protagonists: Australia,
India and South Africa.
Whilst both India and Australia have main-
tained an interest in, and support for IOR-
ARC, this interest and support has undenia-
bly declined. Both countries initially com-
mitted resources to support the tripartite
structure and actively campaigned to breathe
life into the concept of regional cooperation,
but the extent of that support waned rapidly
after 1997. Perhaps the single most impor-
tant reason for this has been the changing
global economic and security environment
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with the emergence of a single hegemonic
superpower and the decline in influence of
multilateral organizations.
Both Australia and India appear to have
moved away from their mid 1990s commit-
ment to multilateralism and have developed
a keener interest in reinforcing their bilateral
relationship with the USA: a process rein-
forced by the events of September 11, 2001,
and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan
and Iraq. As they have moved to develop
this bilateral relationship, there has been a
concomitant decline in their interest in IOR-
ARC. The same has been true for all the
member states of IOR-ARC and although
the number of member states has grown
since 1997, there has been ironically a rapid
decline in real commitment to making IOR-
ARC work.
In some ways the case of South Africa may
illustrate the real problems facing the major-
ity of Indian Ocean states with respect to
supporting IOR-ARC. Unlike the Asia-
Pacific region, the Indian Ocean region does
not include a large number of major world
economies. The degree of resource commit-
ment to any regional organization is con-
strained by the relative poverty of the Indian
Ocean region and the pressing urgency of its
economic and development problems.
Initially South Africa was a keen supporter
of the concept of regional cooperation and
indeed pushed the concept ahead of Austra-
lia and India. In part, the South African
initiative was driven by a general desire "to
come in from the cold" after the collapse of
the apartheid regime, in part it was driven by
a hard-headed assessment that South Africa
needed to explore new markets and sources
of capital investment, particularly in South-
east Asia and Australia. At the earliest
meetings held to explore the formation of a
regional organization there was strong gov-
ernment and business support from South
Africa but in subsequent years that interest
steadily waned.
In part this was due to a hard-headed reas-
sessment by government and business
groups in South Africa concerning limited
human resources and national priorities. The
result was that the Indian Ocean region
slipped down the list of national priorities
way below negotiations with the EU and the
USA, and certainly well below the perceived
urgency of establishing a new relationship
with its African neighbours through the
agency of a sub-regional organization:
SADC. By 1997, support may have lingered
for the creation of IOR-ARC but it was far
from being the main game in town and had
been overtaken by more pressing issues and
more promising bilateral relationships.
It has to be admitted that another factor that
led to the virtual demise of IOR-ARC was
the nature of the India-Australia relationship.
Perhaps naively, both sides underestimated
the impact of years of different political
alignment on the mindsets of politicians and
bureaucrats. India has undergone massive
economic and political changes since the
early 1990s but this has not involved a
wholesale abandonment of its right to pro-
tect its national interests, witness the nuclear
tests of 1998 and the strong and antipathetic
reaction of the USA and Australia. Austra-
lia's negative reaction and the strengthening
of its relationship with the US in this period
led to a cooling of the India-Australia rela-
tionship – ironically at a time when trade
between the two countries was growing at an
annual rate of about 20%. What this furore
did illustrate was a continuing mismatch
between Australia and India with respect to
the global geopolitical scene.
Whilst both India and Australia now have
close relationships with the US, the quality
of these relationships is very different. Aus-
tralia is a formal ally of the US, India is not.
I would argue that for some Australians this
vital difference has not been noted. India
may have a strong economic relationship
with the US and is an increasingly important
member of the world trading community but
it has vital national interests which do not
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necessarily coincide with those of Australia
or the US. There are in reality few major
differences that set Australia and India apart,
nevertheless there has been a tendency in
Australia to view India and its actions
through the Washington prism. However,
during the last few years there has been a
gradual change in Australia's foreign policy
that hints at a new global view that could
benefit the India-Australia relationship.
This change is centred upon a revival of
Australia's interest in Asia, and to an extent
in the Indian Ocean region. Since 1997
Australia in effect downgraded its interest in
both areas with the exception of countries of
immediate strategic or economic impor-
tance: most of which belonged to the
ASEAN group of nations. Recently there has
been a more adventurous spirit abroad in the
Australian government. In part this has been
driven by the continuing strong growth in
economic links with India and by India's
emergence on the world stage as a major
economic and political power to perhaps
balance China. Australia's self-interests –
economic, strategic and political – now to a
greater extent than ever match those of In-
dia. There remain differences of course but
economic ties, a growing view in Australia
that a unipolar world may be a temporary
aberration, and a realization that the Indian
Ocean region is a vital economic and politi-
cal arena shared with India has refocused
Australian attention on both India and the
Indian Ocean region with an intensity that
was lacking in the 1990s.
India's rapprochement with the US – sealed
by the 2005 "defense agreement" between
the two countries – has added greater impe-
tus to the expansion of relations between
India and Australia. It would be disingenu-
ous to deny that Australian foreign policy is
influenced by that of its closest ally, the US,
and to an extent the decision of the US to
promote India as the major state in South
Asia has helped consolidate arguments
within Australia that more attention should
now be paid to our relationship with India.
Indeed, in opposition to the US, Australia
has declared its support for India's attempt to
secure a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council. In Australian eyes, India is now
clearly an economic and political force to be
reckoned with both internationally and re-
gionally as the future economic powerhouse
of the Indian Ocean region. China still looms
larger in terms of Australian trade, but the
rapid growth of the Indian economy and
concerns about the political objectives of
Beijing are combining to make India an
increasingly attractive partner in Asia and
the Indian Ocean region.
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India and the European Union –
Building a Strategic Partnership∗
Rajendra K. Jain
The European Union has been and remains
India's largest trading partner and a leading
source of credit, technology, investment,
industrial collaborations. Since the 1990s,
India has prioritized improving relations
with the West and intensified its simulta-
neous engagement with all the major pow-
ers premised on the pursuit of pragmatism
by jettisoning moralpolitik in favour of re-
alpolitik. The end of the Cold War facili-
tated an improvement in Indo-EU relations
because the Europeans no longer looked at
India through the lens of Cold War equa-
tions. Trade and investment continued to
be the driving force behind the develop-
ment of EU-India relations.
1. The Europe Union and South
Asia
There were two dominant themes in Indian
foreign policy since its nuclear tests in
May 1998: refashioning of the interna-
tional nuclear control regime in a manner
more favourable to India and using the new
global norms being created by the war
against terrorism in the aftermath of the
events of 11 September 2001 to force an
end to the Pakistani sponsorship and suste-
nance of crossborder terrorism. In both
cases, Indian policymakers realized that
the key to success was to bring Washing-
ton around to the Indian point of view. The
rest of the world was "more or less unim-
portant".1
India's nuclear tests and its support for the
Bush Administration's policy of missile
defence were part of Indian efforts to end
what it viewed as a discriminatory nuclear
control regime reflected in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and technology re-
gimes like the Wassenaar Convention,
which had failed to curb proliferation. In-
dian efforts were concentrated on the
United States in order to persuade it to ac-
cept its overt nuclearization and remove
sanctions both before and after the tests.
Most Europeans neither adequately appre-
ciated nor shared India's security concerns
about its deteriorating external security en-
vironment. European policy responses to
India's 1998 nuclear tests coalesced with
those of the United States, except that
France did not impose sanctions after the
tests. Despite India's impeccable track rec-
ord as a non-proliferator, stringent export
control regulations, and responsible han-
dling of its nuclear and missile capabilities,
Indian policymakers realized that EU
member states were not likely to shed the
theology of their opposition to nuclear and
missile weaponization and easily relax the
stringent norms for the transfer of dual-use
technologies.
Both the European Union and its member
states recognized that the Kargil intrusions
(1999) were caused by cross-border infil-
tration and in violation of the Line of Con-
trol (LoC). There was broad appreciation
of India's restraint in not crossing the LoC
and dislike for Pakistani adventurism in
Kargil. However, neither the United States
nor Europe was yet ready to confront Paki-
stan on its sponsorship of crossborder ter-
rorism. During the first India-EU two
summits, Brussels resisted attempts by In-
dia to bring terrorism onto the agenda
making the specious excuse that it was an
issue best left to direct talks between India
and EU member states. However, after
84 Rajendra K. Jain                                                                                                                                                                     
9/11 the EU itself accepted that terrorism
had to be among the topics of discussion
and it has since then figured in each sum-
mit.
As India stepped up its diplomatic efforts
and mobilized troops after the attack on the
Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001,
the European Union became concerned
about the consequences of escalating ten-
sions leading to a military conflict.
Whereas the United Kingdom sought to
discourage Indian coercive diplomacy,
Continental Europe felt that Indian policy
was a continuation of the destabilizing
policy of the United States into other re-
gions of the world.2 Unlike the European
Union, the United States took the lead in
compelling Pakistan to ban terrorist groups
operating from Pakistani territory. India
realized that engaging Washington would
be more crucial and effective than lobby-
ing the EU's diverse members, most of
which had little stake in the region. It was
almost exclusively because of American
diplomatic initiatives that General Pervez
Musharraf was compelled to assure the in-
ternational community that he would
"permanently" end cross-border terrorism.
On the contrary, EU statements laid em-
phasis on "restraint", "rapid de-escalation"
and a "political solution to the contentious
issues".3 EU official declarations were
usually "extremely callibrated, as per dip-
lomatic craft" and seemed to be defined by
the search for "a delicate balance between
the two competing neighbours".4
After the events of 11 September 2001, the
European Union decided to "step up" the
political dialogue and offered a preferential
trade package and enhanced development
aid to Pakistan after it dissociated itself
from the Taliban and joined the interna-
tional coalition in the war on terrorism.
Many Indian stakeholders wondered how
EU espousal of human rights and promo-
tion of democracy reconciled with political
expediency to hug military rulers, respon-
sible for ousting democratically-elected
rulers. But Brussels did not wish to push
Islamabad into a corner and jeopardize the
substantial strategic and operational con-
tributions the latter could make in the fight
against terrorism and the ISAF in Afghani-
stan. The Union has not been willing to
accede to Indian requests to either exert
greater pressure and/or take punitive steps
against Pakistan in order to compel it to
translate General Musharraf's policy state-
ments to stop cross-border terrorism into
operational realities. Brussels also did not
share Indian characterizations of Pakistan
as either a failed state or the epicentre of
terrorism.
The European Union's position on Kashmir
has generally been more impartial rather
than pro-Pakistan. In the mid- and late
1990s, India felt that concerning European
insistence in bringing up human rights,
Brussels ignored the context in which these
human rights violations were occurring.
What infuriated India the most was the
seeming EU insistence on making the case
of human rights in isolation without recog-
nizing that restoring human rights could
only follow the defeat of militancy and that
this, in turn, was impossible without re-
straint by Pakistan.5
Pakistan has lobbied extensively in the
European Union, especially through the
handful of Members of the European
Parliament from the United Kingdom,
which have a substantial electorate of
Pakistani immigrants (especially those
from Azad Kashmir), to involve the Union
since it feels that it can play a useful role in
mediating and facilitating a resolution
of the conflict. Time and again Brussels
had offered to "facilitate and assist talks, if
all participants so wish". However, it has
been unable to do anything since "no
specific request" to that effect had been
made.6 In view of strong Indian sen-
sitivities, Brussels has no wish to play
mediator.
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2. Joining the elite club
Recognition of India's growing stature and
influence regionally and globally, growing
economic interest in a rapidly and consis-
tently growing economy of a billion-plus
people, acquisition of nuclear weapons,
steadily improving relations with the
United States, and the acceptance of India
as a potential global player in international
politics – all contributed to India's admis-
sion into the elite club of nations (others
being the United States, Canada, Japan,
Russia, and China) with which the EU has
an annual summit.
The Joint Declaration of the first India-EU
summit (Lisbon, 28 June 2000) resolved
that the EU and India shall build "a new
strategic partnership" in the 21st century,
founded on shared values and aspirations,
characterized by enhanced and multi-
faceted cooperation. The 22-point Agenda
for Action, appended to the Declaration,
committed both sides to enhance political
dialogue by "holding further regular Sum-
mits" apart from annual meetings of for-
eign ministers, and half-yearly meetings of
senior officials and experts to "address for-
eign policy and security issues of common
concern". The Agenda listed areas in
which the two sides resolved to enhance
cooperation in a comprehensive relation-
ship straddling political, economic, devel-
opment cooperation, trade as well as sci-
entific and technical cooperation. The in-
stitutionalization of summit level interac-
tion and the realization of the need for In-
dia and EU to build a "coalition of inter-
ests" to meet the challenges of the 21st
century was hailed as a significant devel-
opment.7 The inaugural summit was pre-
ceded by a business summit organized by
the Confederation of Indian Industry,
which brought together 30 Indian CEOs
face-to-face with 150 European entrepre-
neurs and other senior executives – a for-
mat which has been followed in subse-
quent summits.
The second summit (New Delhi, 23 No-
vember 2001) was held amidst Indian dis-
pleasure at mishandling of preparations of
the summit by the Belgian Presidency and
downgrading of the summit by the absence
of three key functionaries8 and the cancel-
lation of bilateral meetings in order to visit
Pakistan. There were some difficulties in
formulating the final joint statement on
terrorism. Apart from a Joint Declaration, a
Declaration against International Terror-
ism, a 23-point Agenda for Action were
issued at the end of the summit. Apart from
Joint Vision Statement on Development of
the Information Society and Information
and Communication Technology, a Scien-
tific and Technology Cooperation Agree-
ment was signed. The summit decided to
double bilateral trade to Euro 50 billion in
five years from the existing level of Euro
25 billion without outlining any concrete
steps other than expressing a general
commitment to smoothen the road for pri-
vate businesses to reach the goals.
The third summit (Copenhagen, 10 Octo-
ber 2002) under the Danish Presidency
demonstrated how one country's rotating
six-monthly presidency could inject acri-
mony into a relationship. The Danes ex-
hibited lack of diplomatic tact in the man-
ner they raised the Gujarat issue, which
was fresh at that time. The two sides failed
to agree on a joint formulation regarding
the crisis in South Asia. The Europeans
stressed the importance of an immediate
resumption of dialogue between India and
Pakistan and focused on measures to de-
escalate tensions like withdrawal of forces
deployed on the borders. The Indians in-
sisted on a mention of the need of Pakistan
to end support for crossborder terrorism.
Foreign Minster Yashwant Sinha con-
cluded that EU efforts to urge Pakistan to
end cross-border terrorism had no visible
impact even though, as Prime Minister
Vajpayee said, "we have been told repeat-
edly that pressure is being put on Pakistan
to stop cross-border terrorism that will
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clear the way for dialogue". New Delhi
was enraged at the efforts of the EU lead-
ership to pressurize India on talking to
Pakistan and exercising restraint through
aggressive public diplomacy by the strident
tone of Danish Prime Minister Anders
Rasmussen. The larger EU member states
pleaded ignorance while the Danes denied
this. EU officials subsequently acknowl-
edged the "less than adequate" handling of
the situation.9 The joint press statement
nevertheless went on to express "satisfac-
tion with the positive results of the Summit
and its contribution to consolidate our firm
and comprehensive relationship". Both
sides affirmed their "shared values" of de-
mocracy and pluralism and reiterated their
"determination to continue to combat ter-
rorism". They agreed to "reflect" on the
need for consultations between Europol
and Indian agencies.
At the fourth EU-India summit (New
Delhi, November 2003), the European
Union was represented in full strength
(apart from Commission President Ro-
mano Prodi, High Representative for
Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) Javier Solana and External Rela-
tions Commissioner Chris Patten also par-
ticipated). That the summit went ahead de-
spite the last minute cancellation by Italian
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi owing to
gastroenteritis demonstrated the maturity
of both sides. Unlike Denmark's "pro-
active" stand on Kashmir at Copenhagen,
the Commission's tone was not one of
hectoring, but suggesting as Prodi did that
India's "lingering tension" with Pakistan
remained one of the biggest obstacles to
the role that India could play in strength-
ening regional cooperation and peace in
Asia. The summit led to the signing of two
agreements on a trade and investment de-
velopment programme and customs coop-
eration. India and the EU referred to each
other as "global actors" in the multipolar
world committed to strengthening the role
of the United Nations in the maintenance
of international peace and security. India,
Solana said, shared with the EU the "same
ideas" on multilateralism and a common
vision of how to run the world.
3. Building a strategic partnership
The Lisbon Joint Declaration's (June 2000)
resolve to build "a new strategic partner-
ship" in the 21st century was reiterated in
the EU’s first-ever Security Strategy Paper
(12 December 2003), which urged that the
EU "should look to develop strategic part-
nership" with Japan, China, Canada and
India as well as with all those who share
our goals and values and are prepared to
act in their support".10
After working for over a year, the Euro-
pean Commission prepared a very compre-
hensive document, which updated the July
1996 Communication on the "EU-India
Enhanced Partnership". The June 2004
Communication "An EU-India Strategic
Partnership" proposed to develop a strate-
gic partnership with India in four key ar-
eas: (a) cooperation, especially in multilat-
eral fora, on conflict prevention, the fight
against terrorism, and non-proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction; (b)
strengthened economic partnership through
strategic policy and sectoral dialogues; (c)
development cooperation; and (d) fostering
intellectual and cultural exchanges.11 A key
objective of the Communication was to
streamline the complex structure of meet-
ings taking place at different levels in order
to enhance the effectiveness and optimize
results from summits (many of which were
not prepared well).
The 46-page Commission Services
"Working Document" annexed to the
Communication proposed over a hundred
actionable points. After a sector-by-sector
examination, it suggested how current ac-
tivities could be streamlined into a tighter
institutional architecture. In instances
where dialogues were episodic or on-
going, it urged that they be held on a
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regular basis. A key objective was to focus
on in-depth exchanges on substance in
each meeting, and adapt each level of in-
teraction to its specific objectives. The EU
sought to further intensify its political dia-
logue with India and widen its engagement
in a broad range of sector-specific dia-
logues and develop new instruments to in-
stitutionalize the cooperation.
A particularly jarring section on human
rights in the Commission's Working
Document suggested that the EU should
instruct EU Heads of Mission to produce
regular factual human rights reports with
recommendations for the preparation of the
EU-India human rights dialogue. India had
indicated clearly that an intrusive approach
regarding human rights was not welcome
and that it was "solely within the national
domain" and that "issues of interest to both
sides" be taken up "informally".
In a detailed 31-page response to the
Commission's Communication – the first
ever Indian strategy paper on relations with
the European Union – India envisaged "a
relationship of sovereign equality based on
comparative advantage and a mutuality of
interests and benefits" – a relationship
which would be "immune from the vicis-
situdes of either side's relationship with a
third party".12 India suggested regular prior
consultations on the eve of major multilat-
eral conferences, institutionalized dialogue
between India and EU for cooperation on
UN and UN-related matters, regular ex-
change of ideas, perceptions and informa-
tion on developments in South Asia, the
Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq. It con-
curred that the two sides ought to avert the
huge potential threats posed by weapons of
mass destruction and their nexus with ter-
rorism.13 Delhi urged the upgradation and
expansion of the mandate of the India-EU
Joint Working Group on Anti-Terrorism
(which had its first meeting before the
events of 9/11) to a Joint Working Group
on Security Cooperation with five sub-
groups on narco-terrorism, money laun-
dering, document security, cyber terrorism,
and institutionalized cooperation through
Europol. India also urged the early estab-
lishment of a "regular" channel between
Europol and India's Multi-Agency Task
Force. India shared the desire to intensify
dialogue on energy and environment in the
hope that it would lead to transfer of
cleaner technologies. Apart from proposing
a number of sectoral initiatives, Delhi sug-
gested the creation of a joint working
group to discuss the opportunities and dif-
ficulties arising from EU enlargement and
a structured dialogue on business process
outsourcing (BPO).
The strategic partnership was endorsed at
the fifth India-EU summit (The Hague,
November 2004) – described by almost
every observer as the best summit so far.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh de-
scribed India and the European Union as
"natural partners". The EU especially after
its enlargement to 25 member states, he
said, was emerging as "a politically influ-
ential, economically powerful and demog-
raphically diverse regional entity" in the
world. The strategic partnership symbol-
ized "a qualitative transformation in our
interactions based on trust and mutual con-
fidence".14
The sixth summit (7 September 2005)
adopted a new Political Declaration and an
Action Plan divided into four sections (po-
litical, trade and investment, economic
policy, and cultural and academic) on is-
sues of mutual concern. The Action Plan
seeks to promote effective multilateralism,
cooperate in UN peacekeeping and in post-
conflict political and economic rehabilita-
tion and reconstruction. Apart from a num-
ber of sectoral initiatives, a security dia-
logue at the level of senior officials and a
High Level Trade Group are being
launched to study and explore ways and
means to deepen and widen the bilateral
trade and investment relationship.
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4. Cooperation in high-tech:
Galileo, ITER
Intensive negotiations have been held since
January 2004 regarding Indian participa-
tion in the European Union's US$4.2 bil-
lion Galileo project – a 30-satellite EU
navigation system which is expected to be
operational by 2008 and is considered su-
perior to both the American Global Posi-
tioning System and the Russian Glonass
satellite systems. India had insisted on as-
surances of uninterrupted satellite signals
as a condition for cooperating in the proj-
ect as it was deemed strategically vital. In-
dia, Prime Minister Vajpayee asserted,
would participate in the project as an
"equal partner" and not as a "mere cus-
tomer".15 Hard bargainings have been held
since January 2004 because of initial
European reservations about involving In-
dian scientists and technocrats in actual
operations, differences over end use of
dual-use technologies, and the insistence of
several nuclear evangelist EU member
states that India sign a separate export
control agreement with the EU, something
which India refused outright. Some EU
member states continue to have reserva-
tions about providing access to the encryp-
tion codes for the military-grade high-end
Public Regulated Service signal architec-
ture – an issue which has also yet to be re-
solved with China. Since several issues
remain unresolved, only a "framework
agreement" was signed in September 2005.
In recent years, India-EU relations have
witnessed a significant increase in scien-
tific and technological cooperation. We are
likely to witness even more substantial
growth in greater cooperation between In-
dia and the EU in cutting-edge technolo-
gies. EU support for India's participation in
the International Thermonuclear Experi-
mental Reactor (ITER) project on fusion
energy has considerable potential in meet-
ing India's energy needs.
5. Conclusion
5.1 Definition of strategic
partnership
There does not seem to be much clarity
about what the term "strategic partnership"
exactly means. Javier Solana, High Repre-
sentative for the CFSP, acknowledged that
there is "no definition of what a strategic
partnership entails". The relationship of the
EU with each of the countries listed in the
EU Security Strategy (December 2003) are
"key international players with whom it
makes sense for the EU to co-operate ever
more closely in addressing the challenges
and objectives identified in the security
strategy, many of which are shared con-
cerns and objectives". Partnership with
each of them, he declared, "will develop in
different ways".16 A strategic partnership is
not an alliance, but more an attempt to in-
stitutionalize a process or a series of "stra-
tegic" dialogues considered important by
both sides on bilateral, regional, and global
issues. Intensive discussions, which nor-
mally precede summits, lead to the prepa-
ration of concrete deliverables for the
summit.
To the Europeans, a strategic partnership
seems to imply a global political relation-
ship, whereas the Chinese are probably
understanding the concept also in military
and security terms. For the Indians, a
strategic partnership signifies the mutual
recognition of both the advantages and
need for closer interaction and cooperation
between India and the European Union
on a collective basis as the Union widens
and deepens its scope of competences.
However, this will in no way dilute the
need and importance that India continues
to lay on key individual member states. It
sets in motion a process which will evolve
into an institutionalized, regular, and sys-
tematized dialogue on a broader spectrum
of issues.
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5.2 The United States factor
For many years, EU officials have com-
plained that while the EU takes India seri-
ously and recognizes it as a major actor in
world politics, they wondered whether In-
dia took the EU seriously enough and rec-
ognized it as a major partner as well. All of
them are unanimous in their belief that In-
dia considers the United States to be far
more important than the Union. For in-
stance, former Commission President Prodi
remarked that India was "too focused" on
the US in its foreign policy as well as its
economic policy. This focus, he asserted,
"came at the expense of the EU".17 Indians
"always seem to favour the U.S." This, he
mistakenly believed, was "partly because
of Hollywood movies".18
The obsession in Indian foreign policy
with the Americans is because the United
States is perceived as the hyperpower in a
unipolar world since 1991 in which no
conceivable combination can possibly
challenge the United States. As the princi-
pal foreign policy interlocutor, the US has
the biggest impact on our national security
environment. In the 1990s, it has been
willing to undertake political risks in
dealing with India whereas Europe has not
been willing to do so, and because there is
a societal bias between India and the
United States because the latter is more
open to migration.19 The bias is evident in
the importance given to Washington in the
Indian media and in both intellectual and
cultural ties with the United States. As a
rising power, India is more sympathetic to
the American effort to rework the rules of
the global game (the most recent example
being the July 2005 India-US agreement
on civilian nuclear technology) from which
it could benefit. Europe, on the other hand,
is "a staunch defender of the present or-
der".20 The Americans can at times make a
difference by restraining Pakistan, but the
EU has very limited leverage in the region.
The EU is widely acknowledged in India
as an economic superpower and a formida-
ble negotiator in multilateral trade negotia-
tions. The huge deficit in Eurospeak be-
tween a Common Foreign and Security
Policy and a single foreign policy will
continue. India's democratic policy or the
China card do not necessarily earn us very
high points in Europe, and the absence of
an NRI (Non-Resident Indians) lobby
makes it even more difficult to get atten-
tion.
India shared European aspirations for
forging a multipolar world as it would tend
to give it more freedom of manoevre, but it
did not view the European Union as a
credible pole given the structural difficul-
ties of making multipolarity work effec-
tively apart from the inherent constraints of
an evolving CFSP (Common Foreign and
Security Policy) in a more diverse and het-
erogeneous Union. India remains skeptical
about the EU's political and foreign policy
capabilities.
Unlike relations with the United States,
Europe is like "the dawdy old lady",
known for over four centuries, that there is
"no excitement, no passion" between India
and Europe.21 India, the Europeans often
complain, "likes" Europe, but "loves" the
United States, even though it is "tough
love". The problem is that Europe wants
"to be loved", and is disillusioned when it
finds that India is not willing to recipro-
cate. It is not really a question of either the
United States or the EU, but within the
web of relationships, some will naturally
be closer than others.
5.3 The China factor
Many stakeholders in India feel that there
is a degree of political discrimination in the
European Union's treatment of a demo-
cratic India and in favour of China, with
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which the Union has few common political
values. The strategic partnership, they feel,
is unlikely to be at the same level as China
even though India does not have the prob-
lems encountered in the relationship with
China (e.g. human rights, the arms em-
bargo, lack of status as a market economy,
Chinese military's growing capabilities vis-
à-vis Taiwan and the balance of power in
the western Pacific, the huge trade deficit,
etc.). The EU, on the other hand, has ar-
gued that India shed once and for all the
narrow "prism of Pakistan" and develop a
wider "world-view like that of China" in
order to create a more meaningful partner-
ship of ethnically diverse democracies.
Unlike the Chinese, most people in Brus-
sels felt that Indian policy-makers ap-
peared to need convincing that the EU is "a
player that matters".22 They feel that, un-
like China, India is neither proactive nor
entrepreneurial enough to avail itself of
existing opportunities. The Europeans also
do not share American perceptions of India
as a potential counterweight to China in
Asia. The economies of the EU and China
are largely complementary since Europe
has a strong industrial base, capital and
technology while China offers a huge mar-
ket and low-cost labour. China would con-
tinue to remain far more important in the
EU's Asia strategy because of its political
clout, its economic potential, the substan-
tially higher economic stakes and trade
which in many ways defines the degree of
political interest that the EU and its mem-
ber states take in other countries.
5.4 Differing security concerns in the
EU and India
Prospects of extensive or meaningful co-
operation in the realm of security do not
seem to be particularly bright because
though both India and Europe have shared
values, they face different security contexts
and do not have shared threats. Whereas
India confronts traditional security issues
that impinge on its territorial integrity,
border control, insurgencies and separatist
tendencies, the EU, more of a security
community, mainly confronts non-
traditional security threats such as organ-
ized crime, terrorism, etc. In fact, the more
distant a country or region, the more the
European Union lays stress on values and
less on geopolitics. Even though the Euro-
pean mindset has changed, India is at a
preliminary stage of discussions on terror-
ism. Given the mismatch of context, con-
cerns and goals, it is difficult to see more
substantial cooperation. Initial steps are
more likely to be in "soft" areas of coop-
eration such as money laundering, techni-
cal cooperation, exchange of information,
cooperation amongst security agencies and
police personnel, and sharing of intelli-
gence cooperation.
5.5 Differing perceptions of the
EU and India
Though India and Europe have known
each other for over 400 years, there con-
tinues to be a wide gap between peoples
partly as a result of mutual indifference
and an information deficit despite growing
civil society dialogue, which for the most
part is government-driven. It is, however,
uncertain how long these linkages will ex-
ist and can be sustained. The Indian elite's
perceptions of the European Union con-
tinue to be essentially conditioned by the
Anglo-Saxon media. This precludes a more
nuanced understanding of both the proc-
esses and dynamics of European integra-
tion as well as the intricacies and roles of
EU institutions.
Even though European political and busi-
ness elites tend to display a political and
economic preoccupation with the East
Asian "tigers", economic reforms have
made India economically more interesting,
with its large population and with one of
fastest growing economies. For the most
part, Indian business continues to perceive
the EU not as one entity but as a conglo-
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merate of states, as a result of which the
business focus continues to be at the mem-
ber state level.
India confronts an image problem in
Europe. The dominant image of India still
is one of a distant, backward, conflict-
ridden, and poverty-stricken country
though there are periodic reports of the
economic and scientific achievements. The
popular attitude is one of indifference to-
wards India. The strongest clichés, it
seems, have the longest life. The European
Union too suffers from weak visibility and
low profile in India. Reporting in the In-
dian news media, for the most part, contin-
ues to be based on agency reports.
5.6 Current differences
Despite the shared values and common
ground on many issues, there are serious,
clear and basic differences in both percep-
tions and interests in many fields between
India and the European Union. The EU has
taken a stand contradictory to that of India
on many issues in the WTO. Where Brus-
sels has failed to get multilateral accep-
tance to the inclusion of norms (e.g. child
labour), it has integrated them in its new
GSP as incentives for greater access to
European markets. At times, both seem to
be more concerned about selling to each
other than developing a partnership, with
the result that trade disputes tend to cloud
other positive dimensions of the relation-
ship. New Delhi continues to be more sen-
sitive about sovereignty issues.
5.7 Future prospects
India and the European Union are at the
beginning of a process of building a strate-
gic partnership, which will necessarily be
built piece by piece, year by year. The re-
lationship is not based on any specific
short-term or immediate exigency, but on
long-term interests of India and the Euro-
pean Union. India realizes the advantages
of forging closer institutionalized links
with Brussels. For the most part, the driv-
ing force behind EU-India relations will
continue to be trade and commerce. We are
likely to witness slow progress in coopera-
tion on political and strategic issues. There
is a demonstration of political will on both
sides to take the relationship forward.
Shared values undoubtedly facilitate the
widening and deepening of a relationship;
however, shared interests will ultimately
determine the scope and content of the
India-EU strategic partnership.
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India and the Nonproliferation Regime
Seema Gahlaut
Introduction
During the July 2005 visit of Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh to the United
States, President Bush recognized India as
"a responsible state with advanced nuclear
technology" and promised to discuss with
the Congress and U.S. allies ways to allow
India access to civilian nuclear fuel and
technology for its energy sector.1 In ex-
change for the pledge, Singh committed
India to separate its weapons facilities
from its civilian nuclear facilities, to put
most of its civilian facilities under IAEA
safeguards, to sign the IAEA Additional
Protocol which will apply intrusive safe-
guards to its civilian facilities, harmonize
its export control policies with those of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the
Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), maintain the voluntary morato-
rium on nuclear testing, and participate in
good faith in negotiations regarding the
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
Critics of the agreement have advanced a
number of reasons why this is a wrong turn
in US policy. The primary criticism hinges
on the fact that the deal undermines the
spirit of the NPT, makes an exception for
India, and therefore sets a bad precedent.2
Supporters argue that the deal will garner
significant gains for the nonproliferation
regime, which NPT-centric approach has
not been able to achieve since 1971.3 The
crux of both arguments rests on assess-
ments of India's past and projected future
behaviour regarding the nonproliferation
regime.
Beyond this particular bilateral initiative,
the issue remains relevant for global secu-
rity. India's emergence as a major player in
Asia is likely to have an impact on the
economic, security, and technology archi-
tecture of the region and on the nonprolif-
eration regime. India's nuclear and missile
capabilities and its capacity to produce and
export WMD-relevant materials and tech-
nologies have implications for both vertical
(build-up) and horizontal (exports and
transfers) proliferation respectively. The
nuclear and missile build-up is also likely
to affect the regional security scenario in
South Asia and Asia.
This paper, therefore, will examine India's
projected capabilities and behaviour re-
garding the following issues:
⎯ International regimes aimed at control-
ling vertical proliferation. This will in-
clude a discussion of Indian policies
and practices with regard to the major
international nonproliferation treaties,
such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), the Fissile Material
Control Treaty (FMCT), the Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the
Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC), the
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and its Additional Protocol.
⎯ International regimes and initiatives
aimed at controlling horizontal prolif-
eration. This will focus on issues of In-
dia's national export controls regarding
sensitive technologies, its policies and
practices with reference to the major
multilateral export control regimes.4 It
will also include a discussion of India's
response to the UN Security Council
Resolution 1540, the Proliferation
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⎯ Security Initiative (PSI), and the bilat-
eral US initiative called the Container
Security Initiative.
Table 1: India's Membership in Nonproliferation Treaties and Regimes
Agreement Year India's Membership
(year of joining)
International Atomic Energy Agency
 – IAEA Additional Protocol
1957 Yes (1957)
- No
Partial Test Ban Treaty 1963 Yes (1963)
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 1993 No
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 1968 No
Antarctic Treaty 1961 Yes (19 August 1983)
Nuclear Suppliers Group 1975 No
Geneva Protocol 1928 Yes (April 9, 1930)
Biological Weapons Convention 1972 Yes (15 July 1974)
Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 Yes (29 April 1997)
Australia Group 1985 No
UN Register on Conventional Arms 1991 Yes (1992)
Landmine Ban Convention 1997 No
Wassenaar Arrangement 1995 No
Outer Space Treaty 1967 Yes (18 January 1982)
Missile Technology Control Regime 1987 No
Hague Code of Conduct 2002 No
1. Main theses explored in the
chapter
⎯ Indian response to the nonproliferation
regime is more nuanced than a mere
NPT/non-NPT characterization would
elicit.
⎯ India has almost always maintained a
cooperative stance toward the nonpro-
liferation regime, even when it has
been a non-member of major initia-
tives.
⎯ Indian non-cooperation with the non-
proliferation regime continues to re-
main focused on the discriminatory,
and increasingly contradictory, provi-
sions and implementation of the NPT
and the CTBT – on almost all other
components of the regime, Indian
behaviour has been very supportive, if
not exemplary.
2. Vertical nonproliferation
regimes
India is one of the four countries to have
never signed the NPT.5 It tested nuclear
weapons twice (in May 1974 and May
1998), but makes a distinction between
vertical and horizontal proliferation. Sim-
ply put, it regards itself as a domestic but
not an international proliferator.
India has opposed the NPT and CTBT for
their discriminatory structures which (a)
favour the nuclear haves over the have-
nots, and (b) focus on disarming/de-
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proliferating the have-nots at the cost of
reducing nuclear weapons capabilities and
stockpiles of the nuclear haves. According
to a letter to the IAEA, India believes that
"partial measures for non-proliferation will
not work. The road map is clear – we have
dealt with other categories of weapons of
mass destruction i.e. chemical weapons
and biological weapons by negotiating
multilateral treaties that are comprehen-
sive, universal and non-discriminatory. We
need to adopt a similar approach to deal
with nuclear weapons."6
2.1 NPT
According to India, this treaty attempts to
maintain the post-WWII power structure
unto perpetuity by privileging the P-5 and
continues to focus on strengthening ever-
more intrusive measures against the non-P-
5 [Article IV violations] without any at-
tempt to rein in the P-5 arsenals or even to
move toward eventual disarmament [Arti-
cle VI is being violated or ignored].7 The
most recent NPT PrepCom meeting vindi-
cated India's stand that NPT is unlikely to
become a vehicle for global disarmament.
India is not a party to the NPT, but its con-
duct "has always been consistent with the
key provisions of the Treaty as they apply
to nuclear weapon states. Article I of the
NPT obliges a nuclear weapon state not to
transfer nuclear weapons to any other
country or to assist any other country to
acquire them. India's record in this regard
is impeccable and a matter of public
knowledge. This is in contrast to the poor
record of some of the nuclear weapon
states who have been active collaborators
in, or silent spectators to, continuing clan-
destine and illegal proliferation, including
export of nuclear weapon components and
technology. Article III requires a party to
the Treaty to provide nuclear materials and
related equipment to any other country
only under safeguards. India's policies of
international cooperation in the nuclear
field have always conformed to this princi-
ple. Article VI commits the parties to the
Treaty to pursue negotiations to bring
about eventual global nuclear disarma-
ment. India is not only committed to com-
mencing negotiations for a Nuclear Weap-
ons Convention, it is also the only nuclear
weapon state ready to do so."8
2.2 CTBT
India opposes CTBT because it allows sub-
critical and sub-kiloton tests in the name of
stockpile stewardship. "India's refusal to
sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) was, in part, a reaction to (fusion)
research by the nuclear weapons states. In
turn, its subsequent decision to conduct
underground nuclear tests was partly re-
lated to its conclusion that the CTBT had
changed from a non-discriminatory in-
strument designed to promote both non-
proliferation and disarmament into a tool
for non-proliferation alone."9 India be-
lieves that the objective of CTBT was not
merely to end test explosions but to end the
qualitative development and refinement of
nuclear weapons whether through explo-
sive or other means. Yet, CTBT leaves the
door open for building leaner and meaner
warheads – to compensate for quantitative
cuts in P-5 arsenal.10 As such, it too seeks
to curb the weapons capabilities of the
non-P-5 alone. Moreover, India objects to
the Entry-into-Force clause of this treaty,
which, in effect, seeks to force sovereign
states to sign a treaty that they do reject.11
However, India has maintained a voluntary
ban on nuclear testing since its 1998 Shakti
series of tests. This has held despite strong
advocacy from some nuclear scientists and
strategic experts to conduct more tests to
validate design parameters of the warheads
that India plans to deploy as per its de-
clared nuclear doctrine.12
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2.3 FMCT
India supports the "cut-off" version of the
proposed Fissile Material Control Treaty,
which will require it to verifiably end fur-
ther production of fissile materials. But it
does not support the version that seeks to
eliminate existing stockpiles.13
FMCT concerns stockpiles of Plutonium
and Uranium 235. According to a recent
study,14 the largest stockpile of separated
Plutonium – 183 tonnes – will be owned
by Russia, followed by the UK (99), US
(92), France (86). India has approximately
1.9 tonnes. The largest stockpiles of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) – 1088 tonnes –
are in Russia, followed by the United
States (705), France (35.4), UK (23), and
China (22). India has approximately 0.51
tonnes.
2.4 IAEA safeguards and the
Additional Protocol
As an active member of the IAEA Board
of Governors since the 1950s, India's con-
tribution to the technical cooperation pro-
gramme is the largest from among the de-
veloping world. It maintains safeguards on
its imported nuclear power plants (US-
Canada-built Tarapur and Madras NPPs,
and the new Russian-built NPPs at Koo-
dankulam). India's bilateral agreement with
the United States regarding safeguards on
Tarapur [INFCIRC/154, Part 1] expired on
24 October 1993. However, India decided
to voluntarily continue the safeguards
bilaterally with the IAEA. Moreover, under
the original agreement, the United States
was to take back the spent fuel from Ta-
rapur – but, due to environmental concerns
at home, it has been unable to do so until
now. This spent fuel remains in Tarapur,
under the voluntary safeguards India has
adopted after the original agreement ex-
pired. Clearly, India has continued to abide
by the spirit of the NPT even after the sup-
plier state reneged on the contract.
In 2000, India signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) with the IAEA for
cooperation in connection with the
Agency's regional and interregional train-
ing events, individual and group fellow-
ships training programmes carried out as
part of the Technical Cooperation activities
of the IAEA. The MoU was an important
milestone in India's relationship with the
IAEA and formalized India's longstanding
offer to make the Bhabha Atomic Research
Centre (BARC) a "centre of excel-
lence/Regional Resource Unit (RRU)" un-
der the Agency's Technical Cooperation
for Developing Countries (TCDC) pro-
gramme.15
India does not have its indigenously-built
nuclear power plants under international
safeguards and is unlikely to accept full-
scope safeguards in the near future. There-
fore, India has not signed the AP – it is, in
effect, negotiating for exemptions similar
to those enjoyed by the P-5, viz. some
designated (weapons) facilities to be be-
yond the purview of IAEA inspections and
inspectors. The US-India nuclear deal of
July 2005 accepts that India will separate
its civilian and weapons facilities and put
its civilian facilities under IAEA safe-
guards – where the intrusive measures as
per the Additional Protocol will apply.
2.5 BTWC
India ratified the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention in 1974. It partici-
pated in all four Review Conferences of
the BTWC and in the meetings of the
Group of Governmental Experts. India was
an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group
working to strengthen the convention by a
protocol, until U.S. rejection effectively
abrogated the Group's efforts.
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2.6 CWC
India is an original signatory to the Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention, having signed it
on 14 January 1993, and was among the
first 65 countries to have ratified the
Treaty. The universal and non-
discriminatory character of the CWC are
primarily responsible for India's enthusias-
tic effort, as the first Chairperson of the
Executive Council of the Organization for
Chemical Weapons(OPCW), to guide the
deliberations of the organization during its
crucial first year.
Since April 1997, six States Parties have
declared chemical weapons stockpiles, to-
talling more than 71,000 metric tons. India
is one of these "possessor" states. "While
India, the United States of America, and a
third State Party met their obligation in re-
lation to the first destruction target (20 per-
cent of its Category 1 arsenal by the end of
2001), only India and the United States of
America met their obligation in relation to
the second destruction timeline."16 India
met the deadline set by the Convention for
the destruction of 45% of its Category 1
chemical weapons six months ahead of
schedule, and destroyed all of its Category
2 chemical weapons stockpiles.17
Thus, in 2005, from among the six posses-
sor states, India is alone in meeting its
deadlines for verified CW destruction and
for inspections of its facilities by the
OPCW. It has also incorporated all three
CWC Schedules of chemicals into its na-
tional export control list.
3. Horizontal nonproliferation
regimes
3.1 National export controls
Indian policy and system for controlling
exports of WMD-relevant items has been
voluntary and in operation since 1946. The
rationale for export controls during the
early phases of this policy stemmed from
consolidating national/federal control over
nuclear and other strategic minerals and
R&D assets. Over time, however, this was
replaced by the focus on projecting India
as a responsible member of the interna-
tional community and a reliable and safe
destination for technology-embedded part-
nerships. The export control system is ex-
tensive, fairly routinized, and has become
increasingly comprehensive and specific in
terms of the items controlled, the licensing
procedures, penalties, and end-use/user
requirements.18
India's excellent record in controlling
its sensitive exports despite remaining
outside the NPT/CTBT and outside the in-
formal export control regimes (see below)
is, therefore, best explained by the
non-episodic application of the policy
and high level of political commitment to
the principles of horizontal nonprolifera-
tion rather than a response to external pres-
sure. The consistency with which this
commitment has held over the years – even
during times of extreme economic and
political difficulties – also underscores
across-the-board political agreement on the
issue.19
3.2 Multilateral export control
regimes
India has been a critic of the four informal
regimes that have sought to work outside
the framework of the international nonpro-
liferation treaty regime. It has, in the past,
deemed that the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), the Australia Group (AG), the Mis-
sile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) are,
in essence, technology-denial regimes that
operate as closed, self-selected cartels. In-
dia, in turn, has been a target for technol-
ogy-denials by members of these regimes.
However, in the past few years, India ap-
pears to have changed its stance toward
these regimes to a certain extent.20
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As a non-member of the NPT and the ex-
port control regimes, India is not bound by
international norms and obligations against
nuclear, missile, and high-technology dual-
use exports, and as such, has the capacity
to undermine these regimes.21 In recent
years, India has scaled up its civilian as
well as weapons-dedicated nuclear pro-
grammes, and is simultaneously seeking
international cooperation to build addi-
tional nuclear reactors for power genera-
tion,22 and equipment to enhance the safety
of these installations. Given India's consid-
erable nuclear expertise, the international
export control community sees India's po-
tential both as a source of secondary pro-
liferation, and as a part of the nonprolif-
eration solution. The difficulty of recon-
ciling India's nuclear weapons status
within the NPT makes it even more urgent
to find a pragmatic modus vivendi.
Experts continue to debate the feasible op-
tions for eliciting cooperation from India in
restraining its dual-use exports in the fu-
ture.23 This is linked to the broader debate
among experts regarding reforms, and op-
tions to strengthen the effectiveness of the
export control regimes in promoting inter-
national security.24 This includes questions
such as whether the regimes should extend
membership to all countries that have the
capacity and incentive to exploit WMD
technology for economic reasons, or limit
it to countries that share similar values and
commitments, but might lack the capacity
to proliferate?25 India straddles both these
categories in that it possesses the WMD
capacity but has shown sustained commit-
ment to nonproliferation beyond its bor-
ders. Thus, it maintains a unilateral system
of controlling exports of WMDs, related
technologies and materials, and is an active
member of the IAEA on nuclear safety is-
sues, but refuses to sign the NPT.26 The
US-India deal of July 2005 responds to
these dilemmas by finding a way around
the NPT-India gridlock.27
It is also precisely within this context that
India and the NSG have approached their
recent dialogue, especially since the 1998
nuclear tests. India has been sending repre-
sentatives to the NSG outreach seminars
on export controls since 2003-04.28 An
NSG delegation, comprising the current
chair (South Korea), the Czech Republic
and Sweden visited India for an official
meeting on April 7, 2004. They were there
in India reportedly for consultations on
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-
proliferation.29 However, at least one report
in the Indian media suggested that India's
position on NSG has "recently changed
and India is seeking active US support in
its quest for NSG membership… without
signing the NPT."30 No breakthrough was
reported after the April 2004 NSG visit,
but both sides agreed to continue their
dialogue on a regular basis.
The Indian strategic community has begun
to openly debate the possibility of a rap-
prochement with the NSG based on a mu-
tually beneficial "bargain". "In recent
years, U.S. officials said, the French gov-
ernment has worked behind the scenes to
change the NSG rules with the aim of de-
veloping nuclear cooperation with India."31
Briefly, the bargain had centered round the
"islanding" idea that India has informally
explored in recent years. Under this, India
would place all its civilian facilities under
IAEA safeguards in exchange for receiving
international assistance in building addi-
tional nuclear power plants. "In mid-2002
New Delhi diplomats told US Deputy Sec-
retary of State Richard Armitage that India
would consider putting up to 80% of its
reactors under safeguards if the US would
not interfere with efforts led by the gov-
ernments of Russia and France to bend or
change nuclear export control laws and
allow industry in these vendor countries to
build PWRs (pressurized water reactors) in
India."32 With the July 2005 nuclear deal
with the United States, India has formal-
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ized this bargain – and U.K., France, Rus-
sia, and Canada have welcomed this by
announcing that they too shall engage in
civilian nuclear cooperation with India –
under IAEA safeguards.33
India's position on MTCR has also evolved
over time. Indian officials had seen the es-
tablishment of the MTCR (in 1987) as de-
signed to thwart its domestic Integrated
Guided Missile Development Program
(started in 1983) – a view that was mir-
rored in China during the previous dec-
ades.34 While the government of India has
acknowledged that MTCR-related technol-
ogy embargoes delayed its missile devel-
opment, it also forced India's domestic
programme to develop indigenous capa-
bilities, eventually boosting its overall ci-
vilian and military missile capacity.35 In
September 1994, the MTCR had sent its
first official delegation to India, and con-
sultation with MTCR was revived in
2004.36
While India has not reconsidered its oppo-
sition to seeking membership, India's poli-
cies in recent years reflect a growing sen-
sitivity to the MTCR. Thus, Categories 4
and 5 of India's control list (SCOMET)
clearly regulate MTCR-controlled items.
And like the MTCR, Indian laws do not
prohibit but restrict (i.e. require a license
for) the export of these items. Moreover, in
public statements in early 2005, Indian of-
ficials have emphasized that the range of
its BrahMos supersonic anti-ship cruise
missile (290 km range; Mach 2.8 speed)
has been deliberately kept under the
MTCR's range limits. This missile was de-
veloped by BrahMos Aerospace Pvt. Ltd, a
joint-venture company established in Feb-
ruary 1998 between India's DRDO and
Russia's missile design bureau NPO
Mashinostroyenia.37 India and Russia plan
to induct the missile into their armed forces
in the near future. An export version has
been offered in the international market,
and as mentioned in the first section of this
report, has generated strong response. In-
dian defense sources, however, stress that
"the missiles to be exported will in no way
contravene international norms or exceed
restrictions imposed by the Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime (MTCR), even
though India is not a signatory to it."38
Now, as of July 2005, Indian national ex-
port control list [SCOMET] is fully har-
monized with the control lists of NSG and
MTCR.39
India has also participated in outreach by
the Australia Group in recent years. India's
list of controlled chemicals is extensive as
per the requirements of the CWC. It also
controls a number a pathogens as per its
obligations under the BTWC and the In-
dian Environment Protection Act mandates
the establishment of procedures for secu-
rity and oversight of pathogens, micro-
organisms, genetically modified organisms
and toxins in production, import, export,
use and research. As such, there is a sig-
nificant degree of overlap between India's
control list regarding chemicals and bio-
logical materials. However, there is no in-
formation in the public domain on whether
India plans to expand its control list in or-
der to unilaterally reconcile it with the AG
control list, much like China has done
while increasing its outreach with the AG
since 2003.40
On a parallel front, from January 2004 till
July 2005, the US-India bilateral dialogue
included the initiative called Next Steps in
Strategic Partnership (NSSP). The NSSP
envisaged cooperation in the civilian nu-
clear and space sectors, high-technology
commerce, and missile defense. The two
sides concluded Phase One of this initia-
tive in September 2004, with India agree-
ing on procedures for conducting end-use
visits in India and enhanced non-
proliferation measures. The United States
also recently posted an export control atta-
ché at its embassy in New Delhi to conduct
end-use checks and outreach to Indian
government officials and industry on ex-
port controls.41 The two sides worked on
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additional phases of the NSSP, under
which India will continued to strengthen
its export control regime and harmonize
its dual-use control list with interna-
tional/multilateral lists. In return,
the United States further eased
certain restrictions on exports of dual-use
items to India. This also allowed each
side to build confidence and understand
each other's export control systems.42
In July 2005, the NSSP was declared
to have been concluded, and new agree-
ments have been put into place to carry
the detailed dialogue on further coopera-
tion.43
3.3 UNSC Resolution 1540
India is a signatory to the 12 UN Conven-
tions that deal with various aspects of ter-
rorism. (See Table 2)
Table 2: India's Membership in Multilateral Conventions on Terrorism
Name of Convention Year Signed Ratified
  1 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplo-
matic Agents
14.12.1973 State party
  2 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 17.12.1979 State party
  3 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings
15.12.1997 State party
  4 International Convention for the Suppression of the Fi-
nancing of Terrorism
09.12.1999 State party
  5 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft
14.09.1963 22.07.1975 20.10.1975
  6 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft
16.12.1970 14.07.1971 12.11.1982
  7 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation
23.09.1971 11.12.1972 12.11.1982
  8 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 03.03.1980 12.03.2002 11.04.2002
  9 Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence
at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supple-
mentary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
24.02.1988 22.03.1995 21.04.1995
10 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation
10.03.1988 State party
11 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
10.03.1988 State party
12 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the
Purpose of Detection
01.03.1991 16.11.1999 15.01.2000
13 SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism 04.11.1987 04.11.1987 04.11.1987
In October 2004, India submitted a com-
prehensive report to the 1540 Committee,
detailing its various laws, regulations, pro-
cedures and penalties that regulate/limit
unauthorized possession and use of WMDs
and related technologies. Subsequently, in
May 2005, the Indian Parliament passed
the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their
Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful
Activities) Act, 2005. This Act, as per
UNSCR 1540, criminalizes WMD-
possession by unauthorized individuals and
entities. The provisions of this comprehen-
sive Act apply to export, transfer, re-
transfer, transit and trans-shipment of ma-
terial, equipment or technology related to
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weapons of mass destruction – thereby
closing some of the loopholes in existing
Indian laws and regulations that could be
exploited by non-state actors and terrorists
seeking weapons of mass destruction and
related materials. The Act provides a more
comprehensive definition of "technology"
to include intangible technology transfers
by Indian citizens abroad and by foreign
nationals studying or working in India. It
also establishes specific civil and criminal
penalties for violations and expands liabil-
ity for WMD export control violations to
all individuals involved in a particular
business enterprise. Finally, the Act estab-
lishes that an individual will be deemed in
violation of its provisions if he/she
"knowingly facilitates" the prohibited
WMD-activity and exports an item
"knowing that the item is intended to be
used" in WMDs. This increased liability on
the individual suggests a clear insertion of
the intent of catch-all clause (although not
the clause itself) in the regulation as well
as implementation of India's controls on
WMD-relevant strategic exports.
3.4 PSI
India has become fairly concerned about
protecting its sea lanes of communication
and has been active in the Indian Ocean
region in the past few years. Since 2001,
Indian and Japanese Coast Guard warships
have undertaken four joint exercises fo-
cusing on anti-hijacking and sea piracy.
The latest of these took place off the
Mumbai coast in October 2004.44 Empha-
sizing the immediate necessity to institu-
tionalize regional mechanisms aimed at
dealing with these threats, the Indian De-
fense Minister, in his concluding address at
the 7th Asian Security Conference, said
Indian Navy and Coast Guards could play
a significant role in building up maritime
cooperation with other regional navies to
deal with these threats.45
With the Indian Navy sitting astride the
Indian Ocean's sea lanes of communica-
tion, Washington keenly seeks India's par-
ticipation to make PSI (Proliferation Secu-
rity Initiative) a broad-based venture ex-
tending beyond states under the US-led
nuclear umbrella and other security ar-
rangements. US Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld reportedly discussed India's par-
ticipation in the PSI during his visit to In-
dia during 2004.46 The US also raised the
issue of Indian participation in the PSI with
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during
the US visit in mid-July 2005. On the In-
dian side, there appears to be some debate
as to the suitability of India either joining
or even conditionally cooperating with the
PSI. One school of thought believes that
India needs to impress on the US that it
should seek suitable amendments to trea-
ties, conventions or international law to set
the PSI operations on a sound legal basis
before India can consider joining the PSI.47
Others had argued that "the central, unre-
solved issue is India's status. The US does
not desire or see the need to accommodate
India within the nonproliferation regime,
yet paradoxically wants India to extend full
cooperation to that regime."48 This par-
ticular criticism, however, is likely to go
away now as the United States and its al-
lies make concerted efforts to bring India
into the fold via the July 2005 deal. Those
who are cautiously considering the impli-
cations of Indian cooperation with the PSI
have highlighted some added concerns: (1)
the accuracy and unbiased nature of the
intelligence inputs provided by the PSI
core group to cooperating countries when
an interdiction is needed, and (2) the pos-
sibility that some WMD-transactions will
be ignored by PSI members because they
involve strategic allies (e.g. Pakistan).
On the other hand, there are some Indian
analysts who see value in India joining the
PSI. In May 2005, India's Chief of Naval
Staff, Admiral Arun Prakash, reportedly
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hinted at this by saying: "While it will be a
political decision whether or not to join the
PSI, the Navy has the wherewithal and is
also ready and willing."49 Some experts
believe that "by joining this initiative, New
Delhi will be in a position to share its in-
telligence on Pakistani proliferation as well
as have access to western intelligence on
the Pakistan-Chinese-North Korean inter-
actions. Since terrorism by non-state actors
has assumed global dimensions, the war
against that must necessarily be fought by
a world-wide coalition of democratic na-
tions. In such a war, intelligence-sharing is
of crucial importance."50 Other analysts
believe that PSI will augment the role of
the Indian Navy in the region and help In-
dia cement its strategic cooperation with
the United States, Japan and other Asian
members of the PSI.
3.5 CSI
India plans to start its partnership with the
United States on the bilateral Container
Security Initiative in 2005. The CSI pro-
gramme will begin with a pilot project at
the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust and will
be gradually replicated at other ports de-
pending on the programme's success.51 The
supporters of this programme see it as the
first step toward regionalizing (if not glob-
alizing) such bilateral undertakings, to
make container cargo safe from terrorist
actions – no matter which port it is heading
toward.
4. Conclusion
The above discussion shows that India's
relationship with the nonproliferation re-
gime is fairly nuanced. India has voiced its
consistent opposition to those components
of the nonproliferation regime which it
deems to be discriminatory and/or arbi-
trary: the NPT, the CTBT, and the informal
export control regimes fall in this category.
Treaties which are universal and apply uni-
formly to all signatories get enthusiastic
and firm support from India. However,
even where India has opposed particular
treaties and agreements by not joining
them, it has unilaterally adopted the prac-
tices and commitments of these agree-
ments. India, for instance, has unilaterally
maintained a moratorium on nuclear test-
ing since 1998, and has unilaterally
adopted a no-first-use principle in its nu-
clear weapons doctrine. Moreover, it has
unilaterally imposed and maintained strict
export controls on its nuclear, biological,
and missile capabilities – while remaining
a target of technology denials from mem-
bers of the NSG, MTCR, and AG.
In the past few years, increasing pragma-
tism is evident in Indian foreign and secu-
rity policies: there is a marked decline in
anti-NPT and anti-export control regime
rhetoric. This has been complemented by
initiation of focused and constructive dia-
logue with all nonproliferation agree-
ments/groups that hold out the possibility
of cooperation with India outside of the
NPT. There are several examples of the
new Indian desire for rapprochement with
those components of nonproliferation that
do not make de-nuclearization the corner-
stone of engagement with India. These in-
clude India's renewed dialogue with the
multilateral export control regimes such as
the NSG and MTCR on the one hand, and
with the IAEA and the United States on the
other.
Thus far, despite remaining outside the
NPT-CTBT, India has managed to enhance
its nuclear and missile capabilities signifi-
cantly – to the extent that Indian nuclear
and missile programmes are inured against
external sanctions and denials.52 At the
same time, India has not used its WMD
capabilities to undermine the nonprolifera-
tion regime – for instance, by aiding other
states in acquiring nuclear and missile ca-
pabilities. As one of the fastest growing
economies in Asia, and the fifth largest
economy in the world (in PPP terms), India
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has embarked on its path toward becoming
a knowledge economy and constituting 1
percent of global trade by 2007. As India
becomes a major economic and techno-
logical power in the coming decades, a
formal rapprochement between India and
the nonproliferation regime would be mu-
tually beneficial to both sides.
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Abstract
India and the United States have initiated a
sustained effort in recent years to pursue
strategic cooperation, with an explicit fo-
cus on security/defence, trade, and tech-
nology security issues. The process of bi-
lateral convergence across a range of eco-
nomic and security issues started imper-
ceptibly in the 1990s, expanded signifi-
cantly in content and scope in the last few
years, and is likely to have a growing im-
pact on the strategic stability and prosper-
ity of Asia in the future.
This chapter will look at three domains of
the bilateral relationship: economy/trade,
security/defence, and advanced technol-
ogy. For each domain, it will review the
level of existing US-India cooperation,
identify the drivers of this convergence of
interests, and assess the challenges and op-
portunities inherent in their efforts to
deepen the relationship in the coming
years.
1. Introduction
The May 2005 report by CIA identified
India "as an emerging global power" and
the Bush administration has publicly stated
that it welcomes this rise and wants to as-
sist India in reaching this position, so that
the two countries can work together to
solve a range of economic and security
problems in Asia and elsewhere in the
world. One explicit indication of the rapid
qualitative transformation of bilateral ties
was the agreement signed on July 18, 2005
by President Bush and the Indian Prime
Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, during the
latter's first state visit to the United States.1
The agreement recognizes India "as a state
with advanced nuclear capabilities" and
commits each side to a set of reciprocal
steps that will enable US assistance to In-
dia's civilian nuclear programme. This
agreement builds upon the progress made
under the previous bilateral initiatives,
specifically the High-Technology Coop-
eration Group (HTCG) of November
2002,2 and the Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership (NSSP) of January 2004.3 Both
initiatives helped improve the state of
technology security in India, and in turn
enabled the US side to assist India over-
come its energy deficit through nuclear
energy without undermining US nonprolif-
eration goals and commitments. Aside
from the above, the two sides are also en-
gaged in significant collaborative initia-
tives in counter-terrorism and defence,
apart from diverse programmes in agri-
culture, infrastructure and the broader
economic sphere.
This emerging partnership between the
world's most powerful democracy and its
largest represents one of the most signifi-
cant developments in the post-Cold War
international system. The end of the Cold
War provided both countries the incentive
and the latitude to emerge from decades of
relative estrangement to begin identifying
domains of mutual convergence. In 1995,
the US government recognized India as
one of the ten "big, emerging markets"
with which it wanted to increase trade and
economic cooperation. The same year,
with the initiative of Dr. William Perry, the
then US Secretary of Defense, the Indo-US
Defense Agreement was signed, aimed at
removing obstacles to greater defence and
high-technology cooperation. In 1996, both
sides coordinated their positions during the
early negotiations for the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but ended up
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with significant differences in their final
decisions.4 The upward trend lines of en-
gagement were ruptured following India's
second round of nuclear tests in May 1998,
with the US imposing severe economic and
non-proliferation related sanctions. How-
ever, within months, both sides began an
intense dialogue that by end-1999 resulted
in the lifting of most of the sanctions,
greater clarity about each other's strategic
positions, and the resumption of broad-
spectrum engagement.5
Bilateral ties received a big boost with
President Clinton visiting India in March
2000, although significant differences re-
mained, especially in the non-proliferation
and security arena. The Bush administra-
tion came into office with the clear recog-
nition that India merits a much higher pro-
file in the US strategic calculus than had
been reflected in US policies thus far.6
"President Bush viewed India not just in
the narrow and distorted perspective of a
sub-regional context, but as an emerging
global power."7 The traumatic events of
9/11 re-inserted Pakistan as an ally in the
US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT).
Nonetheless, the Bush team has continued
the Clinton-era approach of gradually "de-
hyphenating" US relations toward India
and Pakistan, crafting policies that enable
the US side to pursue closer relations with
both countries. Furthermore, apart from
deepening cooperation on counter-
terrorism, the United States has pursued an
impressive agenda of collaboration with
India that the current US ambassador to
India characterizes as "the most significant
strategic partnership for the United States
anywhere in the world."8
With President Bush slated to visit India in
February 2006, the pace and scope of co-
operation is expected to intensify further.
Although notable normative and practical
differences remain in select quarters, over-
all engagement has acquired sufficient
gravitas such that a convergent trend line
can be predicted for the foreseeable future.
It is within this context that the subsequent
sections of this chapter examine the di-
verse domains of US-India relations.
2. Economic dimension
US-India economic relations are long-
standing and diversified, and yet remain far
weaker than bilateral ties in defence and
technology sectors. The reasons for this
include their estrangement during the Cold
War period and the relatively insular na-
ture of the Indian economy until the 1990s.
Even so, the United States provided critical
and catalytic assistance to a range of Indian
initiatives during the Cold War, including
during the years when US policy "tilt" to-
ward its military ally, Pakistan, was most
discernible.
Thus, the United States provided crucial
assistance as India launched its three agri-
cultural revolutions -- the Green Revolu-
tion (food grain), the Blue Revolution (ma-
rine products) and the White Revolution
(milk/dairy products). During the Green
Revolution (1960s-70s), key US parties
introduced disease-resistant and high-yield
variety seeds and crops, and used PL-480
offset funds to introduce modern farming
and storage techniques. In less than two
decades, India became self-sufficient in
food grain production, liberated from the
scourge of famine and mass starvation to
become a net-exporter of select agricultural
commodities. During the Blue Revolution
(1970s), the United States provided mod-
ern technology for fishery and storage that
helped catapult India's annual fishing pro-
duction from 67,000 tons in 1981 to 5m
tons by 2004. Marine products are now a
large and growing share of Indian exports.
Similarly, during the White Revolution
(1980s), parties in the United States as-
sisted India develop its cooperative farm-
ing techniques and banking support struc-
tures. The result is that India is now the
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world's largest producer of milk and an in-
creasingly competitive exporter of milk,
cheese and assorted dairy products.
The government of India (GOI) is now
taking steps to launch its second green
revolution with US assistance. Its net food
grain production reached a record high of
213 million tons in 2003. GOI has set itself
the stiff target of reaching 300 mT by
2020, by increasing the production of not
only food grains but high value cash crops,
and also increasing the land area under ir-
rigation and improving farming, storage
and distribution techniques. In this context,
United States and India signed a landmark
Agriculture Initiative in July 2005 that en-
visages targeted US investment and tech-
nology assistance to help India reach this
ambitious goal.9 GOI will facilitate this by
further liberalizing investment norms and
reducing non-tariff barriers so that US
goods can compete more equally in the In-
dian markets.
For now, US-India trade in goods (at
$28b)10 appears anaemic in comparison to
US trade figures with Mexico, Canada, Ja-
pan and China, which are all in the range
of $200b. However, US-India trade in
goods has registered a compounded annual
growth rate (CAGR) of 16% during 2001-
04, and is poised to grow faster. Both sides
have set the target of $50b by 2010 and
crossing $100b by 2020. This should not
be difficult given the current growth rates,
although significant structural and factor
market barriers will need to be overcome.
And in addition to trade in goods, US-India
trade in services stood at $35b in 2004,
growing at over 35% CAGR in recent
years.
United States remains the largest trading
partner for India, and the second largest
investor (behind Mauritius) in terms
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and
foreign institutional investment (FII). In
2004, US annual FDI and FII flows to
India stood at $4.2b. In addition to these,
intra-company flow of funds has also reg-
istered an impressive growth in recent
years. Thus, US multinational companies
(MNCs) transferred over $20b into their
Indian subsidiaries during 1994-2004,
while Indian MNC investment into its US-
based holdings crossed $5b during the
same period.
Table One: United States-India Trade & Investment Figures, 1993-2004 ($ millions)
Year Exports Imports Trade
Balance
FDI
(Approved)
FII
(Approved)
1993 2,777.90   4,553.60 -1,775.70 1100   228
1994 2,293.80   5,309.60 -3,015.80 1112 1382
1995 3,295.80   5,726.30 -2,430.50 2138   587
1996 3,328.20   6,169.50 -2,841.30 2823 1166
1997 3,607.50   7,322.50 -3,715.00 3769 1144
1998 3,564.50   8,237.20 -4,672.70   869     33
1999 3,687.80   9,070.80 -5,383.00   830   488
2000 3,667.30 10,686.60 -7,019.30 1031   900
2001 3,757.00   9,737.30 -5,980.30 1247   973
2002 4,101.00 11,818.40 -7,717.40 1448 1488
2003 4,979.70 13,055.30 -8,075.60 1789 1787
2004 6,109.40 15,572.00 -9,462.70 2124 2261
Sources: Various US and Indian government websites.
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The above figures, especially of US-India
trade in services and intra-company trans-
fers, compare favourably with US trade
with the more developed economies of the
world. Beyond that, they highlight the
growing salience of two critical factors.
First, the private sector of India and the
United States is increasingly the locus for
dynamic growth in the future. And second,
in recognition of this fact, both the US and
Indian governments are devising strategies
to facilitate cooperation between their re-
spective private sectors. Thus, the US gov-
ernment is providing greater domestic
market access to Indian farm and agro-
industry products, seeking reciprocal non-
discriminatory access for its products and
services, and encouraging India to build
upon the successes of its first generation of
economic reforms and remove remaining
barriers to free trade and investment. And
in July 2005, an Indo-US CEO Forum was
established comprising CEOs of the top 10
companies in each country to advise the
two governments on specific strategies to
boost economic cooperation.
India's recent policies and initiatives reflect
growing political consensus and commit-
ment to continue and speed up economic
reforms that began in 1991. Over time,
successive governments have simplified
administrative procedures for transactions
at home and abroad, reduced structural bar-
riers to the entry and operation of domestic
and external firms, and enhanced the over-
all export-orientation of the economy. The
result has been a strong affirmation of the
salutary dividends to the Indian economy,
as the statistics clearly reveal. Thus, with
GDP growth averaging 6.5%, the economy
grew from about $280b in 1991 to $692b
in 2004-05, making India the tenth largest
economy in the world.11 During the same
period, exports grew to $80b and imports
to $104b, while foreign exchange reserves
swelled to $142b, sufficient to finance over
15 months of imports. Equally signifi-
cantly, peak import tariff duties of 300% in
1991 declined to 15% in 2005 (compared
to 10.5% in China), and are slated to reach
5% (i.e. ASEAN-levels) by 2008, with re-
ceipts from direct (i.e. income) taxes esti-
mated to exceed indirect (i.e. customs and
excise) taxes in 2006, mirroring the situa-
tion in developed economies.12
A notable aspect of the Indian growth
model is a balanced approach between tap-
ping the domestic market and reliance on
exports to drive production. As such, for-
eign trade contributes only about 25% to
the national economy, while the remainder
of domestic production is consumed by the
large and growing domestic market. On
one hand, this shields the economy from
any violent fluctuations in the international
market as was the case during the 1997
Asian financial crisis. And on the other,
with a population of 1b and a middle class
estimated at over 250m, this represents an
enormous opportunity for both domestic
and foreign companies to sell products and
services to this vast and rapidly growing
Indian market.
2.1 Issues of convergence
The first and foremost consensus on both
sides is that bilateral trade and economic
ties are far below their potential, and need
to dramatically improve if broad spectrum
Indo-US partnership has to become a real-
ity.13 Thus, both governments are engaged
in intensive efforts to increase flexibility in
the Indian labour market, raise equity and
investment limits for foreign participation
in India's medical, banking and insurance
sectors, and reduce tariff and non-tariff
barriers to make the cost of doing business
with India, or in India, a more competitive
proposition. It is estimated that India's poor
infrastructure, notably electricity, roads,
ports and civil aviation, has slowed eco-
nomic growth by as much as 2%. GOI has
estimated that India needs about $200b by
2020 to make its infrastructure internation-
ally competitive. And to induce FDI, it has
committed a massive $17b over the next 10
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years to various national and provincial
infrastructural projects. Further, given that
India's banking and financial sectors (in-
cluding capital and stock markets) are
strong by Asian standards, including those
of China and Japan, the potential for in-
creasing US-India trade and investment
ties is enormous.
A second area of tremendous growth po-
tential is in bio-technology.14 On the R&D
side, US companies are keen to tap into the
much wider pool of germs and pathogens
available in India relating to plants, ani-
mals and humans. Given GOI's less re-
strictive regulatory guidelines as compared
to the US FDA, and the availability of bio-
informatics to speed up R&D, a vast range
of clinical trials can be conducted for diag-
nostic and treatment purposes, and to gen-
erate vaccines and medicines. The two
sides are also cooperating to introduce
more genetically-modified (GM) crops in
India that are more disease resistant, can
withstand drier climate, and provide higher
yields. Similar initiatives are underway to
stagger the time for ripening of fresh fruits
and vegetables, and to improve their stor-
age and distribution techniques, which will
substantially augment the capacity to sell
them to domestic and export markets.
A third and related area is intellectual
property rights (IPRs).15 India has put into
place a WTO-compliant IPR regime via its
new IPR Act of January 2005 that provides
protection for both product and process
patents. However, the US government is
rightly pushing for much better enforce-
ment of private India companies, espe-
cially in the pharmaceutical sector. India is
the world's largest producer of generic
drugs, many of which violate national or
global process patents. A strong IPR re-
gime would facilitate US drug and phar-
maceutical majors to collaborate with In-
dian counterparts to produce a range of
vaccines and medicines. This would be of
particular help in treating the large
HIV/AIDS-infected population in India
and worldwide.
A fourth issue receiving growing attention
is on the merits of creating a bilateral Free
Trade Area (FTA), given the rapid growth
in collaboration across their private and
public sector entities. However, this issue
is still at an exploratory stage, with India
seeking an FTA in service sector first, and
in goods and movement of persons later,
whereas the US preference is for an over-
arching FTA, and not for negotiating a
segmented or sequential process. Besides,
with US companies establishing subsidi-
aries or partnerships with local companies
in India and vice versa, intra-company
transfers of capital, technologies and per-
sons are not going to be directly affected
by an FTA. Nonetheless, the FTA negotia-
tion reflects the pragmatic and forward-
looking approach by both governments to
streamline policies and procedures in an-
ticipation of a major surge in bilateral eco-
nomic cooperation.
2.2 Issues of divergence/challenges
The most visible and politically-sensitive
area of US-India disagreement relates to
outsourcing and off-shoring. The rapid ad-
vances in IT, broadband connectivity, dig-
itization of data, and ISP (internet service
providers) has made it possible for a range
of US companies to outsource their labour-
intensive operations to the lower-wage and
English-speaking pool of professionals in
India. This issue reached a feverish pitch
during the 2004 US presidential elections
with several US state governments making
those US companies ineligible to receive
government contracts that outsourced their
work abroad, especially to India and
China. This issue has abated somewhat
since then, in part because of a concerted
campaign by Indian and US companies and
business associations to point to the sig-
nificant cost savings from outsourcing. A
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study by the reputed McKinsey & Com-
pany in 2004 showed that the US economy
received $1.43 for every dollar outsour-
ced.16 And more information emerged
showing several Indian companies had ac-
quired US companies, opened their
branches, or entered into partnerships with
US companies that provided employment
to thousands of local labour, showing the
gains of economic openness.17 Even so,
with growing job losses in the United
States, this issue is likely to vitiate bilateral
economic discourse for at least two rea-
sons. One, US companies are outsourcing
not only their low-end operations, but in-
creasingly higher-end work in healthcare,
tax preparation, insurance and legal sectors
that are traditionally higher-paying, white-
collar jobs. And two, more US companies
are resorting to off-shoring, where they do
not outsource a foreign company to do a
job under contract, but simply establish a
subsidiary in that country and hire local
labour to do that work. The leadership in
both countries has prudently recognized
that these business practices are inevitable
as globalization blurs the distinction be-
tween domestic and international bounda-
ries regarding flow of capital, technology
and persons, and the only durable antidote
is not protectionism but to invest in creat-
ing an internationally competitive market-
place and workforce.
A second issue of contention in bilateral
discourse relates to the rigidities in the In-
dian labour and the capital sectors. Rigid
laws and strong trade unions constrain the
capacity of businesses to set market-
clearing wages, and to hire and fire work-
ers depending on demand and supply
needs. Similarly, high interest rates for
borrowing capital and bureaucratic delays
in securing loans from banks thwart the
capacity of foreign and domestic producers
to scale up production in response to mar-
ket signals, and to reduce per unit cost of
production and enhance competitiveness.18
GOI response reveals its growing accep-
tance of the need to adopt more market-
friendly policies while also tackling the
need to create more employment for over 1
million new entrants to the job market each
year. And although India has one of the
fastest growing workforces in the world,
government policies in recent years have
progressively liberalized norms and re-
duced price distortions in the factor mar-
kets, especially in the labour and capital
sectors.
Data in the public domain clearly shows
that foreign and Indian private companies
have registered impressive gains in labour
productivity over the past decade, with
smaller but notable gains in the public
sector as well.19 Similarly, India's effi-
ciency of capital utilization has improved
considerably during the past decade.20 This
is in spite of, or perhaps because of, the
relatively lower level of FDI inflows into
the country ($5.33b in 2004) compared to,
say, $60.65b to China in 2004.21 Even so,
pressure from US and Indian sources for
further and faster liberalization is expected
to continue in the future.
A third area with the potential for discord
relates to textiles. With the WTO replacing
the Bretton Woods-era GATT (General-
ized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade),
textile quotas determined by the MFA
(Multi-Fibre Agreement) were phased out
on December 31, 2004. This has led to a
surge of 36% more Chinese textiles into
US markets in 2005 and 16% more from
India. For now, this issue has injected fresh
steam to the US trade spat with China that
includes concerns over trade imbalance,
valuation of the renminbi and unfair Chi-
nese labour practices. It has also provided
new opportunities for Indian textiles ex-
ports to the United States. But over time,
given the significant job losses that are
feared in the US textile industry, an
emerging concern is whether the US gov-
ernment might introduce non-tariff barriers
to shield its domestic producers from
cheaper Indian textiles flooding the US
markets.
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A fourth area of discord relates to envi-
ronmental safeguards in agricultural and
industrial production. The US government
is unwilling to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions to comply with its obligations
under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. And India
has not responded positively to certain
radical US proposals such as "carbon re-
serves" wherein Indian farmers could re-
ceive payment for not farming their land,
and the emissions foregone would be tal-
lied under US reduction of emissions.
However, in July 2005, the United States,
Australia, Japan, South Korea, India and
China – which together account for more
than half of global greenhouse emissions –
signed an accord on environment that es-
sentially takes this issue out of the Kyoto
framework.22 This new, non-binding but
'results-oriented partnership', will make
newer pollution-reducing technologies
available to the Asian signatories, and the
flexibility to all members to set their own
targets of emission reduction. If imple-
mented as planned, this accord will facili-
tate US demand that India makes stiffer
environmental safeguards mandatory for
its industry. So far, the GOI has resisted,
contending that the added cost of these
safeguards in production and waste dis-
posal would erode the already thin profit
margins for Indian industry in an era of
declining domestic tariffs and subsidies
and the increasingly competitive export
market.
It is notable that Indo-US economic inter-
action has over time become more prag-
matic with issue-oriented negotiations,
moving away from the era of lofty ideol-
ogy and desultory implementation. Each
side will continue to have differences on
specific issues but these irritants will not
stymie overall cooperation. A notable il-
lustration of this pragmatism relates to the
on-going Doha round of WTO negotia-
tions. While India is spearheading the de-
mand from G-20 nations for sharp reduc-
tion in agricultural subsidies by the devel-
oped world, it is also closely coordinating
its position with a parallel dialogue with
the USTR (United States Trade Represen-
tative).23
A final cementing factor for US-Indian
economic cooperation is the large (2 mil-
lion strong) cadre of Indian-American IT
professionals, doctors, engineers, scientists
and entrepreneurs who over time have dis-
tinguished themselves in their fields and in
public service, and act as informal bridges
to help integrate the two economies across
a wide spectrum.24 As India positions itself
to emerge as a "knowledge-intensive"
economy, their role will assume added im-
portance in promoting bilateral technology
cooperation, which is discussed in the third
section of this paper.
3. Security dimension
United States and India have in recent
years expressed increasingly convergent
views regarding threats to national and
global security. There is also a growing
overlap in their strategic outlooks and in-
terests for enhancing security and prosper-
ity in Asia, the world's fastest growing re-
gion but also beset with several "unsettled"
security equations. This convergence has
provided the overarching normative ration-
ale as well as the pragmatic impetus for the
United States and India to deepen and
widen their security cooperation in recent
years.
The process began in 2000 with the crea-
tion of a joint working group on counter-
terrorism, shortly after the conclusion of
the intense bilateral (Talbott-Singh) nego-
tiations that followed the Indian nuclear
tests of May 1998. To an extent, those 14
rounds of negotiations clarified respective
national positions relating to proliferation,
terrorism and other security challenges,
and facilitated rapid progress on counter-
terrorism. The two sides created a Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty25 to help in extra-
dition of terrorists, among others, and had
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met three times before the tragic events of
September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) cata-
lyzed them toward greater cooperation.
The prosecution of the US campaign in
Afghanistan, and the terrorist attacks on
the Indian parliament and the state legis-
lature of Jammu and Kashmir during 2001-
02 intensified intelligence cooperation, and
the creation of a Cyber Security Forum26 to
track the financial flows and encrypted
communications amongst Al Qaeda and
other terrorist groups.
This was followed by the creation of the
Defense Policy Group (DPG) which over-
saw and coordinated progress in two criti-
cal areas. The first relates to increasing
familiarity about the operational concepts
and arsenals of the two militaries and later
positioning them to conduct joint opera-
tions. Under this umbrella mechanism, the
army, air force and navy of both countries
have conducted a series of exercises with
their counterparts. The two sides have con-
ducted over 20 exercises since 2002, in a
variety of locations in each country, in-
cluding sharing of command and weapon
systems, and increasingly complex simula-
tions of joint operations during combat and
peacetime.
     Table Two: US-India Joint Military Exercises
TYPE OF EXERCISE NAME DATES
Naval Exercises
(Annual Series)
Malabar Sept 25-Oct 4,
2005
Oct. 1-9,
2004
Oct. 5-13,
2003
Sept 29-Oct 2,
2002
1996
1995
1992
Air Force Exercises Cope India Nov-05
Feb 16-25, 2004
Oct 20-26, 2002
Cope Thunder Jul-04
Geronimo
Thrust
Sept 29-Oct 2,
2002
Counter Insurgency Exercise Yudha Abhyas March-April
2004
Vajra Prahar Apr-03
Jungle Warfare
School
Jul 11,
2002
US Special Ops & Indian
paratroopers
Balanced
Iroquois
May 14-16,
2002
Peacekeeping Command Post Exercise Apr-03
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The second component of DPG's work has
been carried out under a sub-group called
the Joint Technical Group (JTG), dealing
with issues such as materials sciences,
nano-technology, use of IT in network-
centric warfare, and test and evaluation of
equipment. A diverse team of defence sci-
entists from each side have explored the
avenues of collaboration in R&D and joint
production. India has also signed the Gen-
eralized Security of Military Information
Agreement (GSOMIA) to ensure the integ-
rity of sensitive information shared under
this cooperative endeavour. A notable sign
of progress is the resumption of coopera-
tion relating to the Indian Light Combat
Aircraft whose on-board mission comput-
ers had been tested aboard US F-16s until
the US sanctions on India after its nuclear
tests in 1998 had suspended all contacts.
With the lifting of the sanctions, General
Electric has been permitted to sell F-404
engines that will power the early LCA air-
crafts until the indigenous (Kaveri) engine
being built by GTRE can be used to power
the aircraft that will be built in the future.
Bilateral defence cooperation received a
big boost with the signing of a 10-year
agreement on June 28, 2005 by the US
Secretary of Defense and the Indian De-
fence Minister. The DPG remains the apex
body to provide policy-level support and to
coordinate the work of the sub-groups,
some of whom have been restructured, and
some new ones created. The most notable
new group is the Defense Products and
Procurement Group (DPPG) that will over-
see defence trade and explore prospects for
co-production, technology transfers and
collaboration, broadening the scope of its
predecessor sub-group, the Security Coop-
eration Group.
The sale of advanced weapons systems is
another area of growing bilateral engage-
ment. In 2003, the US government ap-
proved the sale of eight Firefinder weapon-
locating radars (WLRs) for a sum of
$180m, the biggest-ever sale to India. The
WLRs, built by Raytheon Corporation, are
being deployed along India's porous
land/water boundary with Pakistan in
Kashmir to deter the cross-border move-
ment of terrorists. Since then, the US side
has offered several state-of-the-art weap-
ons systems to India, including maritime
patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (Hornets
and P-3C Orion), multi-role combat air-
craft (F-16, F-18), and anti-missile systems
(Patriot Advanced Capability i.e. PAC-2 or
PAC-3). GOI is currently evaluating bids
by US companies versus those from Euro-
pean, Russian and Israeli companies, some
of which are worth several hundred million
to above one billion dollars. India now has
amongst the world's highest procurement
budgets, and is keen to rapidly modernize
its military and diversify its procurement
sources. This has opened up an important
new avenue for expanding US-India de-
fence cooperation.
3.1 Issues of convergence
The clearest area of convergence is ex-
panding cooperation on counter-terrorism
and promoting the development of democ-
racy worldwide. Both sides are convinced
that the best long-term antidote to the
range of social and economic afflictions
that give rise to terrorism is to strengthen
democratic institutions, which in turn fa-
cilitate articulation of competing interests
and their resolution in a consensual man-
ner. Indo-US cooperation is most visible in
their leadership of the Conference on De-
mocracy at the United Nations to which
both sides have pledged substantial
amounts for a Democracy Fund, and are
pursuing initiatives to foster institutions
that are more transparent and accountable
to democratic aspirations.
Aside from creating the legal and institu-
tional framework for bilateral cooperation
discussed earlier, they are employing so-
phisticated technology to unearth terrorist
communication. One example is the use of
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"steganography" which can read coded
messages below the visible image in an
email communication. Both sides have
found that since 9/11, with heightened
scrutiny of "suspect" communications, ter-
rorists are using the image of Allah, or
even pornographic images, as the visible
(external) image in an email, and hidden
underneath that image is encrypted com-
munication about a terrorist plot or other
sensitive correspondence. Indo-US intelli-
gence cooperation has helped access sev-
eral such communications and take correc-
tive action.
Both countries have intensified policy and
logistical coordination along India's north-
eastern borders. Over the past decade,
mass poverty and other domestic malaise
has fuelled violence and Islamic radicalism
in neighbouring Bangladesh, which has
worsened after 9/11 with a significant in-
flux of elements of Pakistan's secret serv-
ice (Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI). US
and Indian economic interests, especially
in Bangladesh's natural gas sector, have
been repeatedly targeted. In 2003, when
the Indian Army cooperated with neigh-
bouring Bhutan to flush out terrorists, a
large number of them took refuge in
Bangladesh. Despite repeated GOI re-
quests, Bangladesh has refused to extradite
them or cooperate in staunching the flow
of illegal immigrants into India. While In-
dia is building a fence along this porous
boundary, the alarming rise in Islamic
radicalism and violence in Bangladesh has
persuaded New Delhi and Washington to
increasingly coordinate their policies re-
garding the regime in Dacca. Similarly,
Indo-US counter-terrorism strategies and
supply of armaments is being increasingly
coordinated to stem the Maoist insurgency
in Nepal and to seek a negotiated solution
to the long-standing Tamil-Sinhala strug-
gle in Sri Lanka. And on October 3, 2005,
United States and India signed the protocol
to streamline work within their Mutual Le-
gal Assistance Treaty on counter-terrorism,
narcotics, drug trafficking, economic of-
fenses and organized crime.
A second area of convergence relates to the
enhanced Indian role in maritime security
– from the Straits of Hormuz near the Per-
sian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca in
Southeast Asia. With over 60% of interna-
tional cargo and oil supplies transiting
through these waters, and the Indian Navy
rapidly augmenting its blue water capabil-
ity, Indo-US cooperation is designed to
keep the sea lanes of communication open,
and secure this territory from piracy and
acts of terrorism. India has recently joined
the US-led Container Security Initiative
(CSI) that seeks to introduce "smart" con-
tainers, and to harmonize procedures for
identifying, screening and handling of
high-risk cargo at domestic ports. Simi-
larly, India is deliberating the legal and
procedural ramifications of joining the US-
led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) –
designed to interdict illicit WMD cargo at
national ports or in international waters –
that currently has 61 subscribing states.
A third area of convergence relates to mis-
sile defence. India was among the earliest
supporters of the US initiative to move
away from the offensive-deterrence under-
girded by the ABM Treaty to a defensive-
deterrence paradigm wherein a country
will deploy a missile defence shield to
protect against incoming missiles. While
the United States is testing a range of in-
terceptor missiles to be integrated into a
national missile defence shield, India has
been working for some years to develop a
far smaller system comprising point-
defence and area-wide defence shields. In
essence, India is building an open-
architecture design wherein its indigenous
radars and quick-reaction short-range mis-
siles can form the inner core of defence,
and longer-range radars and interceptor
missiles from Russia and Israel would
form the outer core, while an aircraft-
mounted AWACS system would provide
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early warning for initiating preemptive or
retaliatory strikes.
The United States has offered a customized
version of the Patriot system that India
could integrate into its missile shield, and
in March 2005 provided a classified brief-
ing to GOI about the operational parame-
ters of the PAC system. And Indian scien-
tists and armed forces personnel have wit-
nessed live missile defence tests on US soil
on at least three occasions since 2003 to
help improve the smaller version that India
is working to deploy.
A fourth area of emerging convergence
relates to the need for greater Indo-US co-
operation to maintain strategic stability of
Asia. If this "grand" strategic objective
were to be pursued in earnest, it would
have a transformative impact on the con-
tours of the Asian balance of power in the
coming decades, and is best understood in
its two separate dimensions.
One dimension relates to the rapid ad-
vances in the military capabilities of China,
and the shared US and Indian uncertainty
about predicting China's behaviour in the
future. The United States is currently pur-
suing a strategy often described as "con-
gagement", i.e. a judicious mix of con-
tainment and engagement. On the one
hand, it is encouraging China's member-
ship in key regional and global economic
and security institutions, in the hope that
China will increasingly become a major
stakeholder in the stability of the Asian and
international system. On the other hand, if
unilateral assertiveness returns to Chinese
behaviour as was the case in its past, then
the United States should have its own
forces stationed in the region, and the help
of regional allies, to counter any Chinese
moves that undermine regional stability.
India, which is engaged in negotiations
with China to solve their boundary dispute,
is concerned about China's growing mili-
tary assistance or economic-security influ-
ence in its periphery, especially Pakistan,
Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal. While
Sino-Indian economic cooperation is pro-
ceeding rapidly, New Delhi shares many of
Washington's concerns about China's pos-
sible behaviour in the near future. And al-
though India has refused to join a US
military alliance, unlike Japan and South
Korea, closer relations with the United
States is a critical variable as India recali-
brates its "sphere of influence" vis-à-vis
China in maritime and wider domains.
The second dimension of this grand strate-
gic objective relates to the Indian arsenal,
the need to reorient its predominantly Rus-
sian-based weapons platform to enable in-
ter-operability with US armaments, and the
absorptive capacity of the Indian defence
industrial base for technology transfers and
joint-production of armaments. The US
Department of Defense (DOD) has con-
ducted assessments that rank India fa-
vourably in the above areas compared to
Washington's allies in East Asia. The ma-
jor concern before initiating joint pro-
grammes, however, is to ensure an ade-
quate level of technology security in India.
This requires robust "firewalls" separating
India's weapons facilities from its civilian
sector, and separating the unit that is
working with the US side from other units
of the parent entity working on an indige-
nous programme or with a foreign partner.
This assumes added importance because
India's public-owned majors, such as Hin-
dustan Aeronautics Limited, have on-going
collaborative programmes with Russia, Is-
rael, and possibly France in the near future.
Moreover, some large Indian private sector
entities are crucial vendors to the Indian
defence public sector undertakings, and
might be added to the US-India defence
collaboration programmes.
3.2 Issues of divergence/challenges
The area of sharpest disagreement between
India and the United States relates to the
"means" each has adopted to secure their
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shared "ends" regarding Pakistan – that of
assisting it to become a moderate Islamic
country with greater democracy, and at
peace with itself and its neighbours. India
contends that Pakistan never completed its
process of nation-building, and its armed
forces, landed aristocracy and civilian bu-
reaucracy have consistently undermined
democracy by dominating the country's
economic, political and security policies.
This troika has recruited radical domestic
Islamic groups since the 1980s to pursue
its aggressive goals regarding Kashmir
through a calibrated use of cross-border
insurgency at low cost to itself. As such,
Kashmir is a violent manifestation of the
anti-India agenda of this troika, and bilat-
eral relations will not become peaceful
even after a negotiated settlement of
Kashmir.
Washington has belatedly begun to share a
diluted version of some aspects of this In-
dian assessment. But it has repeatedly sub-
ordinated its demands for democracy and
stopping insurgency against India by re-
cruiting Pakistan to pursue more pressing
US goals. Most recently, following US
strikes on Afghanistan, Pakistan has been
granted a "major non-NATO ally" status
and is a key ally in the US-led Global War
on Terror. Further, Washington has not
pressed for direct access to AQ Khan or
applied any punitive pressure on Islamabad
for its lax export controls and the worst
nuclear proliferation spanning two decades
that involved transfers to Iran, Libya and
North Korea. In sum, US policies toward
Pakistan will continue to cast a long nega-
tive shadow on the deepening and widen-
ing of US-India security ties.
Another area of divergence relates to mu-
tual suspicions in increasing technology
cooperation in the defence sector. During
the Cold War, the Soviet Union supplied
almost 80% of the Indian weapons sys-
tems. With its overwhelming dependence
on this source, New Delhi was careful not
to publicize its problems regarding cost
over-runs and delays in receiving spares
and servicing, both of which became worse
as Russia struggled to honour its Soviet-era
contractual obligations. Over the past dec-
ade, as India diversified its procurement
sources to include Britain, France and Is-
rael, Russia has responded by entering into
technology-embedded, licensed co-
production agreements with India for ma-
jor combat platforms. India's decision-
makers contrast Russia's time-tested part-
nership with decades of technology-denials
from Washington in evaluating whether the
United States can prove to be a reliable
technology partner. An additional consid-
eration is the massive investments required
to make the Indian weapons platform
flexible enough to integrate both US and
Russian technologies and armaments.
From the US perspective too, after decades
of perceiving India on the opposite side of
the proliferation and technology divide, it
will require pragmatic successes in im-
proving technology security in India to
build greater institutional confidence. The
steadily productive military exercises, and
growing interaction across governmental
agencies on a range of security issues im-
pacting Asia and beyond, are likely to as-
sist in charting a convergent course.
A related broader area of concern stems
from the varying US and Indian approach
to international security. Washington has
often pursued a binary approach of "you
are with us or against us" in seeking deci-
sions regarding Iraq, and more recently
Iran. India, on the other hand, has to tem-
per its impulse to be the voice of the de-
veloping world with a better recognition of
the bargain-embedded nature of realpolitik
as it seeks a greater role for itself in global
decision-making bodies, including the UN
Security Council. In the near term, Indo-
US cooperation in dealing with the Asian
tsunami disaster in December 2004, and in
taking the reciprocal steps to implement
their July 2005 agreement, will likely in-
still greater mutual confidence and help
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them chart a more convergent path over the
longer term.
4. Technology dimension
As the preceding sections demonstrate, In-
dia and the United States have identified a
wide range of common economic and se-
curity interests, established bilateral
mechanisms for regular consultation, and
agree that lack of movement in the conten-
tious areas should not stymie progress in
others. However, both sides also acknowl-
edge that if all the proposed economic and
security objectives are to be achieved, the
state of technology security in India will be
a critical element. The US Government and
US industry are interested in Indian poli-
cies, institutions, and practices regarding
technology innovation as well as in tech-
nology security because that alone will set
in motion greater flow of technology-
embedded US capital and managerial in-
vestment into India.
In 2003, the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) visited In-
dia for the first time in more than five
years to discuss safety and emergency-
operating procedures for India's civilian
nuclear programme. Other NRC delega-
tions have subsequently held technical dis-
cussions and made visits to select Indian
nuclear facilities. Similarly, in June 2004
the two governments organized a confer-
ence on space science and commerce in
Bangalore which identified specific areas
in which cooperation has already begun. In
2004, India purchased counterterrorism
equipment worth $29 million for its special
forces, and received sophisticated U.S.-
made electronic ground sensors to help
stem the tide of militant infiltration in
Kashmir.27 In July 2005, the US Congress
was notified of the proposed sale of aircraft
self-protection systems worth $40 million
to be mounted on the Boeing 737s that
transport the Indian head of state. The
State Department has also authorized Israel
to sell their jointly-developed Phalcon air-
borne early warning system to India. Other
U.S.-made weapons under negotiation, as
discussed earlier, include PAC-3 anti-
missile systems, P-3C Orion maritime
patrol aircraft, electronic warfare systems,
F-16 fighters and/or F/A-18 multi-role
fighters.
Given the rapid strides made by each side
as of July 2005, considerable expansion in
the scale and scope of bilateral cooperation
is on the anvil. And technology will remain
the critical determinant for both economic
and security re-orientation. "Technology
and innovation are the keys to competi-
tiveness, economic growth, and prosperity,
and present opportunities for international
cooperation. But ... these opportunities
come with challenges and responsibilities
that, in turn, require critical attention."28
On the economic side of technology initia-
tives, the High Technology Cooperation
Group (HTCG) was initiated in November
2002 to pursue the growing bilateral com-
mitment to stimulating high-technology
commerce. Comprised of senior officials
from both governments, it is co-chaired by
the US Under Secretary of Commerce for
Industry and Security and the Indian For-
eign Secretary. It seeks to identify steps to
create a favourable environment for high-
technology trade and collaboration, while
enhancing security related to such trade. Its
agenda is to "explore possibilities of ex-
panding cooperation in space, diverse
forms of energy, high-technology com-
merce, and science." However, a testament
to the critical role of technology in US-
India relationship is the fact that a cyber
security forum was launched in April 2002
– several months before the HTCG was
established.29
On the security side, the Next Steps in
Strategic Partnership (NSSP) was initiated
in January 2004 to bolster cooperation in
civilian space and nuclear programmes,
high-technology commerce, and to pro-
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mote bilateral dialogue on missile defence.
India agreed to the posting of an Export
Control Attaché at the US Embassy in
Delhi, and came to an agreement about
regular conduct of post-shipment verifica-
tions by the US side.30 It also instituted
changes in its export control and customs
regulations, such as introducing catch-all
provisions and expanding its unified dual-
use control list, and passed a new WMD
Act to cover exports, re-exports, transit,
transshipment, and brokering in WMD
items.31 In return, the Indian Space Re-
search Organization (ISRO) headquarters
was removed from the Entity List, and the
US government reduced licensing re-
quirements for exports to the 7 ISRO sub-
units remaining on the Entity List by about
80 per cent - by removing any licensing
requirements for EAR99 and "999" items
exported to those facilities. USG has also
established a "presumption of approval"
for all items not controlled for nuclear pro-
liferation reasons when going to the "bal-
ance of plant" operations in safeguarded
Indian nuclear facilities.
The July 2005 Agreement builds on these
established ground rules: US nuclear coop-
eration will be directed solely at safe-
guarded Indian facilities – and more coop-
eration would take place now as India will
separate civilian facilities from weapons
facilities, and place them under Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards. The IAEA has welcomed this
'unilateral' US initiative. India is likely to
enter into similar nuclear cooperation
agreements with France, UK, Canada, and
Russia.
4.1 Issues of convergence
The first area of general consensus relates
to India's deficiencies in IPR [Intellectual
Property Rights] protection and data pri-
vacy regulations. Most US actors believe
that India needs to enhance its data privacy
framework to fully meet the requirements
of US businesses operating in India or
working with companies in India. Indian
actors, however, believe that this is more a
perception problem among US officials
and businesses and that India's legal sys-
tem already provides significant protec-
tions for data. Nevertheless, they too agree
that Indian regulations in this sphere need
upgrades and that they themselves can play
a crucial role in disseminating information
about Indian regulations to their foreign
partners. Indian industry associations, for
instance, are fully engaged in conducting
assessments of domestic regulations and
violations, and establishing unilateral
codes of conduct to establish data privacy
practices. Interestingly, in a clear indica-
tion of competitiveness concerns, US in-
dustry has suggested that India not adopt
European Union-style privacy legislation,
as its restrictive nature might force many
American companies to send data service
work to markets other than in India.
A second area of convergence is in defence
trade. USG favors greater defence exports
to India to further strengthen the overall
relationship. US defence industry sees In-
dia as a lucrative and untapped market
where, owing to restrictive US export con-
trol regulations, foreign competitors (Rus-
sia, France, UK and Israel) have estab-
lished long-term business relationships
with the Indian armed forces. The Indian
government, for its part, wants to ensure
stability of defence imports and to diver-
sify its procurement sources. On the other
hand, Indian private and public sector enti-
ties are interested in not just being a mar-
ket for US defence firms, but collaborators
in R&D, components and sub-systems, and
potential partners for joint exports to third
countries. It should be noted that India's
signature on the General Security of Mili-
tary Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
was aimed at facilitating this entire range
of options, beyond simple imports of US
defence technologies. As an example of
growing competitiveness of the Indian
manufacturers, in March 2004 the US Bell
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Helicopters placed an order worth $5m
with India's HAL to produce composite tail
rotors.32 And while US defence exports to
India have grown from $5.6m in 2003 to
$64m in 2005, 33 and could exceed $1b if
PAC, P-3C Orions or F-16/18 sales are ap-
proved, the two sides are separately ex-
ploring technology transfer and co-
production mechanisms for select conven-
tional munitions.
The third area of convergence is in recog-
nizing that unless the security of US dual
use exports to India is ensured, via
strengthened export and re-export controls
and firewalls, neither economic nor de-
fence related trade is likely to reach its true
potential. An unwritten understanding be-
hind the NSSP process was that India
wanted the removal of unilateral US export
controls via relaxation and re-interpretation
of the EAR requirements, and the quid pro
quo was a concerted Indian effort to make
its export control policy more transparent
and to adopt international best practices in
high technology export controls. As such,
the commitments undertaken by India un-
der the July 2005 Agreement include har-
monization of its control lists with those of
the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers' Group
and the Missile Technology Control Re-
gime.
4.2 Issues of divergence/challenges
For a long time, the United States cited the
closed nature of the Indian economy as the
biggest impediment to expand ties. Now,
with India having reduced tariffs, and ex-
ports from China, Japan, Korea, Singapore
and the European Union freely available in
the Indian market, US high-tech exporters
are facing stiff competition in expanding
their share in the Indian market. The US
demand has accordingly shifted now to the
rigidities in India's labour laws where, as
discussed earlier, GOI will move slowly by
balancing this demand with the need to
provide employment security to the disad-
vantaged sections of the society.
Similarly, in the near term US defence ex-
ports to India will likely have to contend
with residual foreign policy concerns and
ignorance about procurement/licensing
procedures. In the past, the US balancing
act between India and Pakistan stymied
processing of major defence sales to India,
especially by the State Department and the
Congress. This perspective is unlikely to
change significantly in the short term. On
the Indian side too, entrenched lobbies
could hobble progress citing unreliability
and capriciousness of US policy. And, as
mentioned earlier, India also prefers to
maintain defence relationships with less
volatile suppliers such as Russia, Israel and
Europe – as much to ensure uninterrupted
defence supplies as to cement strong tech-
nology-embedded security relationships
with these states.
On a different axis, lack of awareness of
mutual policies and procedures might also
hinder the Indo-US defence export rela-
tionship in the near term. For instance, the
Indian industry and public sector importers
remain unclear about the precise implica-
tions of India being a "friendly foreign
country" in US export licensing regula-
tions. They seek a one-time vetting of In-
dian buyers of US equipment and a clear
negative list of items that require a license.
The perceived complexity and delays of
the US export licensing regime has forced
some Indian firms to avoid purchasing
from US suppliers if possible. There has
also been a disconnect, most notably in
terms of timing, between Indian requests
for proposals (RFPs) and US export li-
censing processes. This is likely to be
minimized in the coming months as USG
has begun to offer public outreach in India
regarding its dual use export licensing pro-
cedures.34 US defence exporters, for their
part, are unclear about Indian defence pro-
curement procedures and are wary of vio-
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lating strict US laws about bribery or non-
proliferation. Beyond these lie a set of
even deeper concerns about issues such as
deemed exports and intangible technology
transfers. USG requires defence exporters
to establish a range of procedures for
shielding proprietary data on equipment
and processes from foreign customers and
partners. These practical issues will need to
be sorted out before US and Indian compa-
nies can establish Joint Ventures or enter
into co-production agreements – a process
that could take months or even years.
The major Indian export to the United
States in the high tech sector is brain
power – thousands of Indian citizens
working in US defence-related projects.
The new Indian WMD Act prohibits Indian
citizens from "knowingly" contributing to
a WMD programme. GOI has to establish
implementing procedures that define how
an authorization might be granted to Indian
citizens falling in this category and under
what conditions they could be recalled
and/or prosecuted. Tens of thousands of
technically qualified Indian citizens cur-
rently work in the United States and
throughout the developed world in organi-
zations that directly or indirectly cooperate
with the host country's nuclear and space
programmes. If India were to establish
criteria as strict as is currently used by the
members of the multilateral export control
regimes, a vast majority of civilian nuclear
and space activities in these host countries
would fall in the proscribed category. This
is an issue that has not yet been clarified in
Indian policy, although most observers as-
sume that India would create an exemption
for its citizens working in the United
States. This, however, might depend upon
how the bilateral nuclear deal develops:
India might make such an exemption con-
ditional upon reciprocal changes in US
deemed export and intangibles regulations
regarding Indian citizens.
In the nuclear and missile area, it is clear
that NSSP was declared to have been com-
pleted because both sides realized that no
further relaxation of US licensing laws was
possible within its limited (nonprolifera-
tion and NPT-oriented) framework.35 Uni-
laterally-imposed controls had been re-
moved by July 2005, and for the rest, US
exports would continue to be restricted as
per the NSG and MTCR lists. At best, the
US could have made exceptions regarding
some NP-controlled items on the NSG's
Dual Use List – on grounds of safety-
assistance to safeguarded facilities. How-
ever, Indian export restraint had to be sus-
tained beyond the changes in Indian export
control laws. At the same time, India was
no longer content with what many consid-
ered minor changes in India's position vis-
à-vis US nonproliferation policy. For in-
stance, the major Indian clients for con-
trolled or dual-use goods from US are the
triad of strategic departments - Atomic En-
ergy, Space and Defense Research - with
the Department of Space accounting for a
major share. Licensed exports to Indian
industry, particularly the private sector, are
insignificant even now, and licensed ex-
ports of most such items in the past years
(after the relaxation in US rules) have been
to US MNCs operating from India! As
such, neither side was able to see a long-
term future as per the NSSP. This was
probably one of the major reasons behind
the July 2005 nuclear deal.
However, bringing this deal to fruition may
itself be one of the greatest challenges for
both sides. Critics in both countries have
begun to line up the reasons why the deal
is detrimental to respective national secu-
rity and nonproliferation policies. They
have also pointed out varying interpreta-
tions of what each side has agreed to "sac-
rifice" and the low value of reciprocal
benefits. Thus, US lawmakers are seeking
Indian "acquiescence" with every US de-
mand in the IAEA regarding Iran, and
contend that the US side should fulfill its
side of the July deal only after India has
completed all steps that it has promised.
Outside experts argue that the United
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States should not permit India to decide
which of its nuclear facilities will remain
outside of IAEA safeguards. Others have
sought a unilateral freeze on India's fissile
material production even before FMCT
negotiations in the CD reach any consen-
sus. Similarly, on the Indian side, support-
ers of maximalist nuclear posture contend
that India should not separate its civilian
and weapons facilities until after US Con-
gress has changed its laws. Others argue
that only a minimal list of civilian facili-
ties, comprising some power plants, should
be placed under safeguards, or demand that
India should retain the option to withdraw
some civilian facilities from the safeguards
if its security needs require more fissile
material in the future. Clearly, it is not
merely the details of the proposed July
2005 deal, but also the sequencing of re-
ciprocal actions under it, that will remain a
matter of intense debate in both countries
in the coming months. At the same time, if
some of the salient steps envisaged in the
deal are completed, it will go a long way
toward strengthening the hands of the pro-
engagement lobbies in both countries.
5. Conclusion
The US-India relationship has undergone a
significant transformation in the past dec-
ade. Modest military assistance of the past
has been replaced by training on interdic-
tion of technologies and materials. The
sales of military equipment are no longer
subsidized by the US government via the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme,
but take place at market prices via Direct
Commercial Sales (DCS).36 The weapons
package currently on offer to India exceeds
$1b, and if approved, will make the United
States a major contributor to the Indian
weapons platform. The two sides are coop-
erating in missile defence, and their mili-
tary exercises involve arsenals and war-
gaming simulations that are more similar
to US exercises with its major NATO
partners.
In the economic sphere, both sides are
committed to a quantum jump in bilateral
trade which currently stands at $28b in
goods, and $35b in services. They are ne-
gotiating a free trade area, reduction of
tariff and non-tariff barriers to products,
services and investments in each other's
markets, and coordinating closely on issues
like textiles, agricultural subsidies, and en-
vironment in bilateral and global institu-
tions.
In the technological sector, the HTCG and
NSSP have moved the bilateral focus away
from the era of technology embargoes and
sanctions to where IPRs, firewalls and
technology security now dominate the dis-
course. If resolved, this will provide the
legal and institutional framework to initiate
broad-spectrum engagement in economic
and security spheres from technology-
embedded sales to joint R&D and co-
production for domestic and third-country
markets.
An important foundation for bilateral rap-
prochement was laid with President
Clinton's March 2000 visit to India, sig-
naling the end to the estrangement that
followed India's nuclear tests of 1998.
President Bush has built astutely and
imaginatively over this edifice, and ani-
mated it with his vision that the two coun-
tries should partner in pursuing a range of
shared regional and global priorities. And
in distinct contrast to the Bush Admini-
stration's brusqueness in dealing with dis-
senting states, its handling of India has
been marked with sensitivity and prefer-
ence for quiet diplomacy.
The Indian side has also shown greater
pragmatism and a similar preference
for understated public diplomacy and be-
hind-the-scenes consultations. Indeed, such
pragmatism is increasingly apparent in the
formulation, implementation, and assess-
ment of India's overall foreign, secu-
rity and economic policies. Its strategic
elite – in the government, academia and
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industry – has pursued coherent strategies
to elevate the country's position in the in-
ternational system and promote it as a
worthy partner for the United States in
addressing the weighty security and eco-
nomic issues of Asia.
There is growing recognition in the United
States that India's rise in the international
arena can exert a stabilizing influence on
South and Central Asia, wider Asia, and
beyond. American policymakers and the
'military-industrial complex' visualize a
greater role for India in the US strategic
calculus in maintaining security, promoting
democracy, and fighting terrorism in Asia
and elsewhere. As prominent stakeholders
on the US side have enunciated a vision
that elevates India beyond the confines of
the "South Asia paradigm," their counter-
parts in India have outlined the growing
synergy in mutual visions and interests.
At the same time, unless each side is will-
ing to take bold steps to move beyond
"bounded" cooperation, the immense po-
tential of this bilateral relationship might
well remain unrealized. The simple and
forthright declaration of the July 2005
agreement and the Indian vote at the IAEA
on Iran are steps in this direction. These
were preceded by less spectacular but
rather significant turnarounds in US and
Indian policies in the past few years, in-
cluding President Clinton's public repri-
mand to Pakistan during Kargil (1999), and
US stance that Kashmir is a purely bilateral
issue for India and Pakistan to solve. On
the Indian side, it includes support for the
US National Missile Defense initiative be-
fore even the traditional European allies
accepted it in varying measures, and its
supportive vote in the OPCW for the re-
moval of Director General Jose Bustani.
More recently, an indication of the grow-
ing maturity in bilateral dialogue was the
juxtaposition of two news items within the
space of a few days: reports of Indian For-
eign Minister's statement in support of
Iran's nuclear programme and a US dele-
gation from the Pentagon making a classi-
fied presentation on missile defence in
New Delhi!37
Despite this convergence of interests and
aspirations, however, significant sections
of the strategic elite on both sides remain
uncertain about the ultimate "end game" of
this engagement. The Cold warriors on ei-
ther side continue to question the scope of
this bilateral engagement, mechanics of its
implementation, and the over-arching ra-
tionale of the other side. Moreover, even
the most ardent supporters of this new en-
gagement agree that problems in imple-
mentation of the bilateral agreements are
likely to drag the process down. These im-
plementation problems are likely to emerge
from diverse factors ranging from the dif-
ferent bureaucratic cultures and political
systems to differing interpretations of the
agreed agenda of cooperation. The chal-
lenge facing each side is to normatively,
institutionally and politically separate the
agreements in different areas, and ensure
that problems of implementation in one
area do not cast a negative shadow on
progress in other areas. The current status
of this relationship represents signifi-
cant but early steps to realize a bold dream,
and will require the ingenuity and re-
solve of stakeholders on each side to sus-
tain and strengthen a convergent course of
action.
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India's New Global Role after the US-India Nuclear Deal
Karsten Frey
The upgrading of Indo-US relations into a
close strategic partnership has emerged as
one of the core aims of the US Admini-
stration under President George W. Bush.
When President Bush signed a comprehen-
sive agreement over nuclear cooperation
with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
during his visit to New Delhi on March 2,
2006, he was not just aiming at increasing
bilateral trade in the area of civilian nu-
clear power production. The agreement
forms the cornerstone of a new strategic
partnership, and as such its importance for
the Asian power balance resembles the
normalization of relations with China by
the US Nixon Administration in 1971/72.
1. The content of the agreement
Nuclear cooperation between the two
countries was established in two steps.
During the visit of Prime Minister Man-
mohan Singh to Washington on July 18,
2005, both states agreed on the principles
of close Indo-US cooperation in the nu-
clear field. On this basis, a more detailed
agreement on nuclear cooperation was
signed during President Bush's visit to
New Delhi nine months later. However,
the way to the cooperation had already
been paved by the Clinton Administration
in the 1990s. The establishment of the bi-
lateral partnership, which, next to the nu-
clear deal, further encompasses coopera-
tion in the fields of defence, space technol-
ogy, trade and financial services, health,
and agriculture, undoubtedly has the po-
tential to transform the Asian balance of
power as a whole. The fact that nuclear
technology was chosen as the symbolic
cornerstone of the partnership was based
less on economic than on political con-
siderations. The USA and India belong to
the few states (with the possible inclusion
of France) that give nuclear technology the
most attention and define their interna-
tional positions by the possession of nu-
clear weapons to a greater extent than do
other countries. In this context, to place
this technology on the symbolic top of the
bilateral partnership appears to be quite
consequential.
Within the agreement, 14 of India's nuclear
installations are labelled civilian and are
made accessible to International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, ac-
cording to its safeguards provisions. Eight
further installations are declared military,
and are therefore excluded from inspec-
tions and from nuclear technology transfer.
For its civilian nuclear infrastructure, India
receives access to nuclear know-how, and,
more importantly, nuclear fuel from the
USA and other country members of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), pending
cartel approval for relaxing non-
proliferation provisions. The division of
India's nuclear infrastructure into a civilian
and a military programme remained the
most difficult issue during the negotiation
process. The debate focussed on the classi-
fication of the so-called fast breeder reac-
tors for reprocessing burned fuel rods, in
which fissionable plutonium is produced as
a by-product. Although the fast breeder
technology is not yet sufficiently devel-
oped for the commercial production of
energy, India emphasized its potential ci-
vilian application in the future. Still, it re-
fused to actually declare it civilian and
place it under the IAEA safeguard regime.
While in the first agreement of July 2005 it
appeared as if the USA had asserted its
demand for inspections of the Indian fast
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breeder reactors, the final cooperation
agreement signed in March 2006 adopted
the Indian position by excluding them from
the safeguard inspections regime.
2. Obstacles for the implementation
of the agreement
The crucial precondition for the imple-
mentation of the agreement is the lifting of
export restrictions to India, which had been
imposed by the US government after In-
dia's first nuclear test in 1974 in consent
with several other leading nuclear supplier
states. As these restrictions are laid down
in American national law, their repeal has
to be confirmed by the US Congress. The
existing legal position does not allow the
export of nuclear technology to countries
not member to the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT). The original condition
of US Congressmen for their support of the
agreement had been a clear-cut separation
of civilian and military installations, and it
is still unclear whether the exclusion of the
fast breeders from inspections will meet
their approval. As some Congressmen in-
dicated, the US Congress will most likely
approve the agreement with some marginal
changes.
The debate on the necessary adjustments to
US legislation, which began in the US
Congress in October 2005, triggered some
negative repercussions in India. Next to
approval by Congress, the US Administra-
tion aims at seeking a consensus among the
45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group to change their basic respective
policies. However, the NSG's Charta is not
an international treaty with legally binding
provisions, but only formulates 'practices'
and norms of conduct. This legal structure
suggests that the US Government would
adhere to the agreement even if some NSG
members opposed it.
3. The relevance of the agreement
for the USA
In economic terms, the USA is not only
hoping to give new life to its civilian nu-
clear energy industry, but views the
agreement as a first step towards close
economic cooperation between the two
countries in the future. Washington is in-
creasingly aware of the risk that the two
emerging giants China and India might not
only create rosy export markets for Ameri-
can goods and services, but that the
American economy might also be more
affected by the displacement process in
key sectors than other economies, such as
the European Union. The strategic alliance
with India would, as the US government
hopes, help to cope with the negative ef-
fects of this competition. In addition to
these long-term economic interests, the US
government is hoping that the increase in
Indian nuclear power production will re-
lieve the global oil market in the medium-
term future.
Geopolitically, the agreement is part of an
American strategy to prevent the emer-
gence of China as the dominant Asian
power. The alliance with India is intended
to maintain American influence in the
Asian power balance. Despite past frictions
in their bilateral relationship, India appears
to be a reliable partner for the US govern-
ment due to its democratic structure,  eco-
nomic prospects, and foreign policy out-
look. In American official language, the
US-India alliance is thus labelled a 'natural
partnership'.
The insistence and haste with which the
Bush Administration pushed the agreement
through in 2005 and 2006 was caused in
part by the criticism and negative assess-
ments most of its other foreign policy proj-
ects had attracted. The agreement was
reached at a time when the engagement in
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Iraq faced increasing difficulties, and
widespread anti-Americanism limited the
room to manoeuvre in other parts of the
world, such as Latin America and Europe.
In this context, the creation of a Washing-
ton-Delhi axis appeared to be an attractive
possibility for improving the administra-
tion's record in the foreign policy arena.
Correspondingly, several government offi-
cials have already expressed the view that
this partnership would become the most
important achievement of the George W.
Bush Presidency.
4. The relevance of the agreement
for India
Today, the USA is India's most important
trading partner. In a memorandum attached
to the agreement, both countries declared
the goal of increasing the already consider-
able bilateral volume of trade from 22 bn $
(2005) to more than 50 bn $ in 2008.1 Next
to a wide range of commodities, the bilat-
eral trade agenda is planned to include nu-
clear power plants and fuel rods.
In 2006, nuclear power's share of India's
overall energy production was less than
3%.2 According to the projections of the
Indian government, this share will increase
to about 25% by the year 2050. The
agreement reached in 2006 is thereby con-
sidered to be the most crucial element in
the government's strategy to reach this am-
bitious target. While these projected fig-
ures appear overly optimistic to many ob-
servers, the transfer of badly needed know-
how in reactor design and the import of
nuclear fuel undoubtedly have the potential
to improve the relatively low cost-benefit
performance of India's nuclear energy in-
dustry to an acceptable level. Correspond-
ingly, India's nuclear scientists and engi-
neers mostly welcomed the agreement: in
former Atomic Energy Agency Chairman
M. R. Srinivasan's words: "It re-establishes
India's capabilities in the international
stage while removing the decades of isola-
tion in which atomic energy in India was
developed".3
In India, criticism of the agreement was
modest at best, which is remarkable con-
sidering the traditional scepticism among
India's elite with regard to any agreement
which would ostensibly curtail the coun-
try's sovereignty. The vehement criticism
raised by the oppositional BJP party was
widely considered to be guided by partisan
considerations. As one analyst remarked,
"[w]hat is astonishing, however, is the in-
tense criticism emerging from India, par-
ticularly from leaders of the BJP who when
they were in power had made proposals
embodying identical principles to those
underlying the current agreement".4
Overall, regardless of whether the civilian
use of nuclear energy will ever play the
crucial role for India's economic develop-
ment that the government hopes it will, the
agreement remains of vast importance for
the Indian government beyond its eco-
nomic implications. According to a view
widely shared in India, it symbolizes the
ultimate recognition of India as a major
nuclear power. American policy makers
were well aware of the fact that India's
desire for this status could be presented as
the single most dominant foreign policy
issue in this country, and skilfully adjusted
their rhetoric in declaring that the USA
was keen "to help India become a major
world power in the twenty-first century".5
This rhetoric turned out to be most com-
pelling, and was crucial in removing any
criticism and objections the agreement
would have otherwise faced in India.
5. The relevance of the agreement
for the Southern Asian region
A possible problem for India is the geopo-
litical outlook of the agreement as intended
by the USA. Positioning against China or
against Iran is not in India's interest, as
maintaining good relations to both coun-
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tries appears strategically essential with
regard to its energy demand,  trade inter-
ests, and regional security interests. But in
view of the traditional emphasis of India's
foreign policy on sovereignty and non-
alignment, a shift towards commitments
unfavourable to its genuine interest appears
to be a rather unlikely scenario.
Of more concern is the risk of a further
deterioration of India's relationship with
Pakistan. The satisfaction with which In-
dia's opinion leaders reacted to the em-
phatic flattering by President Bush during
his stay in New Delhi, which contrasted
sharply to the cool distance he maintained
during his subsequent visit to Islamabad,
appears short-sighted. The rather brusque
way in which the American President
turned down the request of Pakistan's
President Pervez Musharraf for a similar
agreement between the USA and his coun-
try was perceived by many observers in
Pakistan as a loss of face. Correspond-
ingly, reactions by Pakistan's public and
opinion leadership were indignant. Presi-
dent Musharraf indicated that Pakistan
would now orient itself towards China for
the transfer of nuclear know-how. In fact,
China had promised to sell Pakistan three
fast breeder reactors, a deal which was
welcomed by Pakistan as a tit-for-tat re-
sponse to Indian efforts in this field. Fur-
thermore, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Kur-
shid Kasuri declared that his government
could question its support of the interna-
tional nuclear nonproliferation regime in
light of India's successful instrumentaliza-
tion of its nuclear programme in its strug-
gle for international status and power.
For India, these developments bear two
major new risks: first, a positioning of the
Washington-Delhi axis against China
could lead to a rethinking of Beijing's ex-
port policy towards Islamabad, which has
become increasingly restrictive since 1991.
As one analyst remarked:
"Since there are theorists in both Wash-
ington and Delhi who seek to play the In-
dia card against China, it makes sense for
Beijing to use the lower-cost option of
propping Pakistan's military capabilities
against India. Never shy of upgrading its
military strength, Pakistan in effect gets a
licence to weaponize, with materials and
technology from China".6
Second, the increasing isolation of Paki-
stan could further poison the bilateral rela-
tionship between the two countries.
6. The Indo–US non–proliferation
dialogue
The US–India nuclear agreement faced
substantial criticism around the globe, as it
was feared that this deal ran counter to
global efforts to prevent the spread of nu-
clear weapons. The three most important
institutional pillars of the international
nonproliferation regime – the rules laid
down in the NPT, the attendant interna-
tional safeguards regime of the IAEA, as
well as the rules established by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group – are thought to be se-
verely weakened by the agreement, for it
not only accepts the build-up of a nuclear
arsenal by a non-member country of the
regime, but clearly rewards it. As a conse-
quence, the credibility of the USA as the
major driving force behind the implemen-
tation of global nonproliferation standards
might be damaged irreparably, and further
countries might learn the wrong lessons
from India's success by launching nuclear
weapons programmes themselves.
In view of such problems, many critics
within the American polity expect the US
Congress to block the nuclear deal, or at
least modify some of its conditions. Ana-
lysts from the Brookings Institution, one of
the most reputed think tanks in Washing-
ton, summarize this viewpoint:
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"Many administration critics on and off
Capitol Hill believe that the deal, which
would open nuclear commerce between the
United States and India without requiring
New Delhi to give up its nuclear weapons
program, is so fundamentally flawed that it
cannot be salvaged. They argue that states
join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) and forgo nuclear arms in large part
because membership grants them access to
civilian nuclear technology. Now that India
will be allowed such access without join-
ing the NPT and giving up nuclear weap-
ons, those who are party to the treaty will
feel cheated and may decide to opt out.
Given the coming confrontation with Iran
over similar issues, the Indian deal comes
precisely at the wrong time, the critics ar-
gue, so Congress should reject the deal out
of hand".7
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
countered such apprehensions by empha-
sizing the fact that India, for the first time
ever, gave IAEA inspectors access to parts
of its nuclear installations, which would
finally lead to the strengthening of this
institution. This argument, however, ap-
pears questionable, for the agreement ex-
cludes every installation from IAEA in-
spections which would be necessary for the
production of nuclear weapons. Anticipat-
ing criticism about the ostensible damage
done to the struggle against the global
spread of nuclear weapons, Condoleezza
Rice stated:
"Aspiring proliferators such as North Ko-
rea or Iran may seek to draw connections
between themselves and India, but their
rhetoric rings hollow. Iran is a state spon-
sor of terrorism that has violated its own
commitments and is defying the interna-
tional community's efforts to contain its
nuclear ambitions. North Korea, the least
transparent country in the world, threatens
its neighbours and proliferates weapons.
There is simply no comparison between
the Iranian or North Korean regimes and
India".8
This weak response to critics within the
American polity actually worked to rein-
force their doubts about the agreement.
Indeed, the exclusion of military nuclear
installations from safeguard inspections
appeared to be a point of sensitivity for
many US legislators. Defenders of a more
liberal export policy for nuclear technology
counter this criticism by pointing to the
fact that the USA claims similar exceptions
from IAEA safeguard inspections for its
own nuclear installations. This application
of double standards became visible in
David Albright's testimony on the issue
before Congress:
"India may want similar considerations as
the five nuclear weapons states. These
states accept IAEA safeguards, but in gen-
eral offer no commitments not to use such
facilities for nuclear weapons purposes.
Granting India the same safeguards condi-
tions as the nuclear weapon states would
make this agreement worthless".9
While differing on their judgement about
the impact of the nuclear deal on global
nonproliferation, both critics and defenders
agree that its provisions in certain ways
'legalize' India's military infrastructure
through the back door. Correspondingly,
many among India's strategic elite, above
all their leading figure K. Subrahmanyam,
welcomed the agreement as the 'formal'
recognition of India as a nuclear armed
major power. Subrahmanyam's positive
assessment of the nuclear deal reflects the
worldview inherent in India's traditional
strategic thinking:
"Ever since US made up with China in
1971, the US had been applying pressure
on India to cap, halt and roll back Indian
capability. This policy was consistently
pursued from 1967, when US would not
extend a nuclear guarantee to India till the
Bush administration took office in 2001.
For the nuclear nonproliferation ayatollahs
in the US, proliferation by China to Paki-
stan was acceptable but not legitimate ac-
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quisition of nuclear weapons by India. It is
to the credit of President George W. Bush
that he realized that a nuclear China, also
the third largest market, on the way to be-
coming the second, upset the balance of
power in Asia unless the Indian nuclear
weapon capability was recognised and le-
gitimized".10
A further problem caused by the agree-
ment, in the critics' view, is the renuncia-
tion of the principle which had previously
been adopted by all major nuclear export-
ing countries: not allowing the transfer of
nuclear technology or the export of fis-
sionable material to countries that are non-
members of the NPT (and correspondingly
have not placed all of their installations
under the IAEA safeguards regime).
7. The relevance of the agreement
for global nuclear proliferation
Despite such legitimate concerns about the
fairly pragmatic handling of export and
nonproliferation provisions by the USA,
those who view the agreement as the death
of multilateral efforts to prevent the global
spread of nuclear weapons clearly over-
shoot the mark. Obviously, at no time in
history have such efforts rested on the
principles of equity and consistency, ide-
ally the basis of international treaties. Be-
yond the fact that the NPT gives  privi-
leged status to five specific states, there is
also the manner in which specific cases of
(alleged) non-compliance were guided less
by global principles than by the particular
political and economic interests of certain
states. Whether a defector's nuclear build-
up was tacitly accepted (Israel, India), ig-
nored (Pakistan), fiercely condemned
(Iran, North Korea), forcibly stopped (Iraq
1991), or cooked-up (Iraq 2003), did not
primarily relate to the state of its progress
towards weaponization, nor by its threat
potential, but first of all by the realpolitik
considerations of the leading states in the
global nonproliferation movement. In this
context, the US agreement with India ap-
pears less as a renunciation of multilater-
alism than as a continuation of predomi-
nantly bilateral patterns of nonproliferation
policy making. Leading U.S. strategic
thinkers emphatically defend this ap-
proach:
"Using U.S. power to prevent some coun-
tries from securing controlled technologies,
even as Washington assists others to ac-
quire them, is eminently defensible – as
long as it comports with national interests.
If nonproliferation were the sole U.S. na-
tional security objective, or if India did not
matter in this regard and others, such in-
consistency would be intolerable. Precisely
because this is not the case, enhanced co-
operation with New Delhi becomes a com-
promise that the United States ought to
settle for – however reluctantly – given
India's importance for the success of both
U.S. nonproliferation goals and other geo-
political objectives".11
Such prioritizing of considerations of
power politics over nonproliferation inter-
ests is looked at much more critically in
strategic circles outside the USA and India.
For many analysts, more worrisome than
the inherent bilateralism is the timing of
the nuclear deal. The agreement was
reached at a time when the USA, together
with other four states, was intensively en-
gaged in complex and embittered negotia-
tions with Iran over the progress of its nu-
clear programme. As Michael Krepon re-
marked:
"The weaknesses, as well as the impor-
tance, of the rule designed to prevent pro-
liferation are now evident in the cases of
North Korea and Iran. This is an awkward
moment, to say the least, for the Bush ad-
ministration to set a high priority to relax
these rules in favour of India. But the nu-
clear deal has become a fixed idea for
President Bush, Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, and their inner circles".12
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Formally, the American position in the
negotiations with Iran rested on the identi-
fication of Iran's alleged violation of IAEA
safeguards and NPT rules. The cooperation
with a nuclear weapons state, which did
not violate the treaty only because it never
signed it, is thought to seriously damage
the credibility of this argument. It is feared
that this application of double standards
might cause Iran to follow suit and turn its
back on the nonproliferation regime as a
whole.
However, the overall likelihood that the
nuclear agreement between the USA and
India will cause an acceleration of the
global threat of nuclear weapons is rather
modest. Next to the eight states with
proven arsenals of nuclear weapons, only
two further countries allegedly run an ac-
tive military nuclear programme: North
Korea and Iran. Among the further 30
states that have the potential and technical
expertise to launch a weapons programme,
when weighing the benefits of possession
of the bomb on the one side, and the bene-
fits of a non-nuclear weapons status on the
other, there is an increased preference for
the latter. In this light, the risks that one of
these countries might actually activate such
a programme as a consequence of the
Indo–US deal appears to be quite low.
The nuclear programme of a largely iso-
lated North Korea mainly follows a dy-
namic widely detached from the interna-
tional discourse on the nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons. As such, it is unlikely
that the Indo–US nuclear deal, or for that
matter, any other event occurring outside
the East Asian region, will immediately
affect North Korea's nuclear policy. The
case of Iran is different. The paramount
importance India has given to nuclear
technology, either civilian or military, for
international status gains can be similarly
detected in Iran's nuclear discourse, though
to a lesser degree. Similarly to India, Iran
asserts a regional leadership position and
views nuclear technology as an important
tool in enforcing this claim. Indeed, the
discourse strategies applied by the Iranian
government in the negotiation process dis-
play many similarities to the Indian nuclear
discourse before 1998. As with the India of
that period, the Iranian leadership is em-
phasizing the exclusively civilian nature of
its nuclear programme. Further, it views
any attempt to restrict its programme as an
act of discrimination and an insult to its
identity as a proud and sovereign nation.
Such efforts are rejected as being designed
by the West to prevent its emergence as an
internationally important actor. An addi-
tional resemblance to pre-1998 India is
how the discriminatory nature of the inter-
national nonproliferation regime has
emerged as the epitome of an unjust world
order, and, as a logical consequence, the
resistance to this order has become both a
heroic act and a national duty. The US–
India nuclear agreement reached in March
2006 has the potential to amplify such per-
ceptions in Iran.
8. Conclusion
For India, nuclear cooperation bears many
advantages and few disadvantages; for the
USA, on the other hand, the deal bears
many more risks. Next to the economic
advantages related to the transfer of badly
needed know-how and nuclear compo-
nents, the agreement is viewed by India
first of all as valuable in terms of increas-
ing its international status, and its goal of
finally becoming recognized as a major
power. India's opinion leaders displayed
great satisfaction from their perception that
the agreement has finally awarded India
with the status of an important interna-
tional actor, which it deserves. Critics of
the agreement point to the loss of sover-
eignty which India faces due to its acces-
sion to the IAEA safeguard inspections
regime. In view of the long list of restric-
tions and limitations of the inspections,
such criticism appears to be more symbol
than substance.
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For the USA, the value of the agreement is,
next to the expected boost to its nuclear
energy industry, considered to be above all
geopolitical. It is hoped that the emerging
partnership with India provides the neces-
sary basis for shaping the tilting of the
Asian balance of power to its advantage.
Paradoxically enough, the USA is cur-
rently the most important Asian power.
The fostering of a partnership with India is
hoped to consolidate this position.
It is unclear whether the American econ-
omy will actually benefit from the agree-
ment to the desired extent after dropping
the export restrictions of nuclear technol-
ogy, as several other nuclear exporters
have simultaneously increased their efforts
to get a slice of the cake. With regard to
the envisaged Indian acquisition of nuclear
power reactors, France appears to have the
best chances to win the bidding war. With
regard to India's acquisition of uranium
fuel, Russia has taken the lead position, a
fact already causing some discontent in the
USA.
The main problem of the agreement for the
USA, however, is its potential damage to
the country's position in the global struggle
against nuclear proliferation in general,
and in the negotiation process with Iran in
particular. The agreement has the potential
to cause a lasting loss of credibility to its
reputation as the spearhead of this struggle.
The agreement obliges the United States to
transfer nuclear technology to India in re-
turn for its partial accession to the IAEA
inspections' regime. As a consequence,
India's obligations would cease should the
USA decide to stop transferring nuclear
technology for political reasons – further
Indian nuclear tests, to name a realistic
scenario – which could have severe con-
sequences for America's overall position in
Asia.
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India and the New International Economic Order:
a Focus on Trade∗
Lawrence Sáez
1. India and the new international
economic order: a focus on trade
While India's demonstrated nuclear capa-
bility has raised its profile internationally,
India's prospects and challenges as it
emerges as an economic power in a new
international economic order remains un-
der-examined. Some scholarly analysis has
tended to subsume India's growing eco-
nomic status within a broader framework
of its security environment.1 These analy-
ses have either framed India's impact re-
gionally or have attempted to frame it
globally. This chapter offers an interna-
tional political economy perspective on
India's external economic prospects and
challenges irrespective of its military am-
bitions globally or its security pretensions
regionally.
This chapter will outline the critical devel-
opments in India's emergence as growing
economic power. Although India has made
impressive gains since 1991, this author
will show that India's global integration
has not been impressive if measured in
terms of relative gains, that is India's
global integration has been unimpressive
relative to other emerging markets. Some
authors have, for instance, tended to offer
structural explanations for India's weaker
export performance relative to other peer
countries, like China.2 The chapter will
show that it is the nature of India's trade,
rather than its aggregate volume, that has
made India's recent trade growth notewor-
thy. This chapter extends this analysis fur-
ther to show that, paradoxically, India's
global integration may be hampered by the
unique structure of its national output,
which is primarily concentrated in the
services industry. Although export growth
in the services sector has been impressive,
India's future global integration has been
fraught by the lack of trade with its re-
gional neighbours. This chapter will show,
however, that there are important structural
constraints that will inhibit the growth of
India's trade reach regionally, a factor that
may have important implications for re-
gional security in South Asia and for the
sustainability of India's economic growth.
2. The new international economic
order
India's global integration has been facili-
tated by the conjuncture of several devel-
opments. The first has been the growing
building of an international trade regime.
The features of this regime include in-
creased global interdependence in trade
and other forms of mobile capital stock.
India's emergence as an economic power is
closely linked to the building of this new
international economic regime. Second, as
a result of a balance of payments crisis in
1991, successive Indian governments have
responded to the challenges posed by both
the crumbling of a state directed economy
and the external vulnerability posed by a
potentially volatile international trade re-
gime. Third, India is based in an unique
regional sphere that has permitted it to en-
gage in specific types of trade, namely in
the services industry, that are unusual for
low-income economies.
The concept of globalization has engen-
dered an extraordinary amount of intellec-
tual output in the international political
economy literature, largely focusing on the
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positive and negative externalities of such
a phenomenon. However, little attention
has been paid to empirically verifiable in-
dicators of globalization in developing
countries.
Globalization can be defined narrowly as
the growing international integration of
markets. This definition can be derived
from the simple aggregation of a few criti-
cal macroeconomic indicators. Therefore,
the most basic measures of such global in-
tegration should include trade (TRA), port-
folio equity investment (PEI), and foreign
direct investment (FDI). Trade itself can be
further disaggregated into imports and ex-
ports in a given economy. In accordance
with Garrett (2000), I have measured glob-
alization as the sum of these basic meas-
ures of international integration.3 These
indicators are, of course, not the only rele-
vant yardsticks of the impact of mobile
capital stock, but it would be difficult to
argue that they are not crucial ones.4
Using these measures, we can see that
since 1990, there has been a steady in-
crease in all four forms of global capital
flows (i.e., exports, imports, PEI, and FDI).
[See Graph 1]
Graph 1. Pattern of global capital flows (1990-2000)
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Source: IMF 2001a (for export and import data) and IMF 2001b (for PEI and FDI data). Legend: EXP equals the
sum of global exports; IMP equals the sum of global imports; PEI equals the sum of global portfolio equity in-
vestment flows; and, FDI equals the sum of global foreign direct investment flows.
As Graph 1 shows, the global sum of ex-
ports and imports has increased dramati-
cally, especially for the 1993-1996 period.
Graph 1 also shows that there was a slight
decline in global exports and imports in
1997-1998, followed by a period of recov-
ery thereafter. As expected the global vol-
ume of imports and exports is closely cor-
related during the entire time period.
Similarly, Graph 1 shows that there has
been a steady increase in the two other
forms of global capital flows, namely PEI
and FDI. Although the increase in FDI
flows has been incremental, global PEI
flows have been appreciably sensitive to
financial crises, particularly in emerging
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markets. Thus, there was a sudden decline
in PEI during the 1994-1995 period (fol-
lowing the tequila crisis) and 1997-1998
(during the East Asian financial crisis).
Faced with this phenomenon, India has
been one of the most rapidly integrating
economies. India's economic integration
into the global markets began slowly in the
mid-1980s with a modest series of trade
liberalization measures largely designed to
encourage capital imports and commodity
exports. During the first year of Rajiv
Gandhi's rule (1984-89), tariffs on imports
of capital goods were slashed by 60 per-
cent. Other subtler trade liberalization
measures included the reduction of taxes
on profits from exports and the simplifica-
tion of the import licensing system. As a
result of these measures, India experienced
unprecedented growth in exports and im-
ports.
India's integration into the global markets,
though, was not achieved without some
pitfalls. In 1990, India suffered a balance
of payments crisis, largely prompted by
mounting current account deficits. For in-
stance, in 1983, India had a current account
deficit of 1.9 billion U.S. dollars (-0.9 per-
cent of GDP). This deficit increased to 7.1
billion U.S. dollars by the end of 1990 (-
2.6 percent of GDP). India's level of cur-
rent account deficits was not unsustainable.
However, long term financing of balance
of payments deficits could not be sustained
with the gradual depletion of foreign ex-
change reserves that India experienced
during the 1980s, reaching a low of 1.5
billion U.S. dollars at the end of 1990.5
The change to India's policy direction,
largely under the guidance of then Finance
Minister Manmohan Singh as well as
Commerce and Industry Minister Thiru
Murasoli Maran, has been widely de-
scribed and analyzed elsewhere. To sum-
marize the crucial developments, India's
domestic currency became convertible and
was devalued sharply, from 25.7 rupees
per U.S. dollar in 1990 to 45.8 rupees per
dollar in 1994.6 At the same time, Manmo-
han Singh and Murasoli Maran further ad-
vocated the reduction of tariffs (from an
average of 85 percent to 25 percent of im-
port value) and eliminated a wide array of
quantitative restrictions. Although India's
trade volume increased steadily in the
1990s, the current account balance began
to decline. By 1993, India's current account
deficit reached 1.8 billion U.S. dollars
(-0.6 percent of GDP). A decade after these
measures took effect, India began to run its
first current account surplus, 1.7 billion
U.S. dollars (0.7 percent as a proportion of
GDP in 2001). This development is im-
portant because from 1993-2003, the aver-
age annual growth in the export of goods
and services reached 13.3 percent.7
The 1990 crisis suggested a critical prob-
lem in India's macroeconomic landscape
because it highlighted the disproportionate
weightage of remittances to balance of
payments stability. For that purpose, fol-
lowing the 1990 crisis, India also began to
undertake a gradual program of financial
liberalization in order to diversify the
source of capital inflows. In this sense, In-
dia began to strengthen its capital and fi-
nancial accounts while at the same time
building up its foreign exchange reserves.
During the first decade of financial liber-
alization, both foreign direct investment
(FDI) and portfolio equity investment
(PEI) increased. For instance, FDI inflows
to India increased from a mere 277 U.S.
million dollars in 1992, reaching a high of
4.3 billion U.S. dollars in 2001. Likewise,
PEI increased tenfold, from 289 U.S. mil-
lion dollars in 1992, reaching a high of 2.7
billion U.S. dollars in 2000.8
3. India's trade and economic
growth
Trade has a disproportionate impact on an
emerging market's global economic inte-
gration. For instance, in the year 2000,
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trade in goods and services as a proportion
to GDP reached 53.5 percent among all
middle income countries and 69.8 percent
among all emerging markets.9 In this
sphere, the position of India is unique. In-
dia's economic integration (measured in
aggregate terms) has been increasing
steadily, yet the country lags compared to
other emerging markets. In the year 2000,
for instance, India's aggregate trade only
amounted to 25.4 percent as a proportion
of GDP (well below the average of 69.8
percent for all emerging markets). Like-
wise, India's share of world merchandise
trade exports in 2004 was a meagre 0.8
percent.10 Given that endogenous growth
theory suggests a strong link between trade
and economic growth, the relationship
between India's trade performance and
economic growth needs to be examined in
more detail.
Early empirical tests of export-led growth
typically have found that there is a strong
positive correlation between both factors.11
Subsequent studies have found that export-
led growth has also been associated with
important inter-industry repercussions and
a rise in investment and productivity. For
instance, in an empirical study of 57 coun-
tries between 1970 and 1989, Wacziarg
showed that an increase in investment is
positively associated with greater trade
openness.12 Finally, a World Bank policy
research report has conclusively claimed
that, in a sample of 24 LDCs, more glob-
alized poor countries have had compara-
tively higher rates of economic growth
than their less globalized counterparts.13
The link between trade openness and eco-
nomic growth has not been universally ac-
cepted in the literature. For instance, in
Rodriguez and Rodrik, lower tariffs and
non-tariff barriers to trade were shown not
to be significantly associated with eco-
nomic growth.14 Other studies have ques-
tioned the link between the level of exports
and economic growth.15 In this sense there
appears to be an inconclusive link between
exports and economic growth among all
emerging markets.
Nevertheless, I will now address how some
low-income countries – like India – have
specifically benefited from global market
integration.16 The most visible impact of
the growing global economic interdepend-
ence has been the promotion of trade in
commercial services, that is intermediate
inputs in the production process for final
goods.17 While starting from a low point in
the mid-1980s, India's growth in commer-
cial services exports has been impressive.
For instance, in the year 2003, India's an-
nual percentage change in commercial
services exports reached 20 percent, one of
the world's fastest rates of growth. In the
year 2004, India's share of world trade in
commercial services was a respectable 1.5
percent.18 It is for this reason, namely the
type of trade rather than the volume of
trade, that India's trade growth is note-
worthy.
As I have argued elsewhere, the critical
increase in international trade in services –
such as banking, insurance, telecommuni-
cations, etc. – can be specifically traced to
the WTO's General Agreement on Tariffs
and Services (GATS) and later to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs).19 Overall, the WTO-
led liberalization in trade in services can
have important implications on national
economic welfare and for the international
competitiveness of goods and services in-
dustries. Although this influence has gen-
erally had a positive effect on the invest-
ment climate of both developed and devel-
oping nations, there are continuing gaps
between developed and developing
economies on the long-term acceptance
and agreement upon the precise extent of
trade openness and the liberalization of
capital accounts. Nevertheless, several no
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table empirical studies, mostly using
Engler-Granger cointegration and error-
correction modelling procedures, tend to
find strong support to the export-led
growth thesis in the Indian case.20 There-
fore, although the empirical studies on the
relationship between trade and growth in
India are strong, an extrapolation from the
Indian experience to other emerging mar-
kets may not be apt.
4. The challenge of regionalism
Having highlighted India's performance
globally, I shall now turn to its economic
role regionally. Compared to other mar-
kets, India's global economic integration in
the 1990s is less notable than discussed. If
we examine the data on Table 1, we learn
that Pakistan and Sri Lanka have similar
levels of economic integration to India.
Table 1. Leading indicators of global economic integration in India, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka (1980s and 1990s compared)
Country TRA/
GDP
(a)
TRA/
GDP
(b)
 Δ FDI/
GDP
(a)
FDI/
GDP
(b)
 Δ PEI/
GDP
(a)
PEI/
GDP
(b)
 Δ
India 11.9 20.4 8.5 0 0.7 0.7 0 0.6 0.6
Pakistan 27.4 35.6 8.2 0.02 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.6
Sri Lanka 55.7 65.3 9.6 0.7 1.3 0.6 n.a. 1.1 ***
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 2001. The indicators represent trade as a proportion of GDP, for-
eign direct investment as a proportion of GDP, and portfolio equity investment as a proportion to GDP. Legend:
TRA: Trade (exports plus imports), PEI= Portfolio equity investment, FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP=
Gross domestic product. GDP figures at current prices. Figures in column (a) represent 1980-1989 cumulative
averages. Figures in column (b) represent 1990-1999 cumulative averages. Figures in columns (a) and (b) repre-
sent percentages.
For instance, the indicator of trade as a
proportion of GDP for Sri Lanka for the
1990s is 65.3 and for Pakistan it is 35.6 for
the same time period. In contrast, India's
total trade as a proportion of GDP for the
1990s is 20.4. Likewise, using other indi-
cators of globalization, the level of eco-
nomic integration in the 1990s is slightly
higher for Sri Lanka and Pakistan than for
India. Thus, using the indicator of FDI as a
proportion of GDP, we learn from Table 1
that Sri Lanka's average rate for the 1990s
rate is 1.3, higher than Pakistan's ratio (0.9)
and almost twice as high as India's ratio
(0.7). Similar differentials can be observed
if we examine PEI as a proportion of GDP.
Sri Lanka, once again, has a higher level of
economic integration (1.1) compared with
Pakistan (0.7) and India (0.6).
Finally, if we compare India, Sri Lanka,
and Pakistan in terms of nominal economic
growth, we find that India's performance,
although laudable in such a short time
span, is not much more impressive than the
performance of Sri Lanka and Pakistan
over the long run. For instance, during the
1990s, Pakistan achieved an average eco-
nomic growth of 4.25 percent, while Sri
Lanka (with an ongoing civil war) had an
average level of economic growth of 5.23
percent. India's average economic growth
in the 1990s was slightly higher than Sri
Lanka's (5.56 percent).
I would argue that the reason why India's
long-term global trade performance may be
constrained concerns the lack of intrare-
gional trade. Regional trade patterns within
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South Asia, but especially between India
and Pakistan, are peculiar. For instance, if
we examine the patterns in the direction of
trade, we learn that in 2001, India exported
more goods and services to Switzerland or
Nigeria than it did to Pakistan. It imported
more from Uganda or the Czech Republic
than it did from Pakistan. Pakistan ex-
ported more to Portugal than it did to India.
Likewise, with a cursory examination of
the International Monetary Fund's Direc-
tions of Trade Statistics Yearbook
(DOTSY), we learn that Pakistan ranks
11th (among Asian nations) as a destination
for India's exports. In turn, India ranks 7th
(among Asian nations) as a destination for
Pakistan's exports.21
It is important to stress that the marginal
level of trade between India and Pakistan
does not account for hidden or shadow
trade between both countries. In addition to
smuggling, it appears that a favoured
channel for such unofficial trade transac-
tions is via the United Arab Emirates (es-
pecially Dubai) and Singapore.22 Some
authors have estimated that the unofficial
trade between India and Pakistan through
these channels may currently range be-
tween $1 and 2 billion. If these figures are
correct, then we should anticipate – with
lower transactions costs – a threefold in-
crease in official Indo-Pakistan trade, a
level that would be on par with current bi-
lateral trade between India and Bangla-
desh. However, for the structural reasons
listed below, it may be imprudent to de-
duce that a hypothetical long term nor-
malization of political relations between
India and Pakistan would lead to an explo-
sion of bilateral trade between India or that
the level of trade would increase to such an
extent that it would constrain the incen-
tives for militarized interstate conflict.
The obvious absence of cross border link-
ages with positive externalities, such as the
case of trade, has been a concern among
scholars and policy-makers of India-
Pakistan relations. These concerns have
important theoretical implications within
the international political economy (IPE)
literature on the role of institutions in con-
straining state behaviour. The perception
that improved trade between India and
Pakistan should contribute to regional sta-
bility is premised on the idea that bilateral
trade increases the collective wealth of na-
tions and creates incentives to minimize
the likelihood of militarized interstate dis-
putes in order to preserve economic inter-
ests.
5. South Asia as a test case
The case of South Asia is interesting be-
cause it provides an important empirical
test case to this array of neoliberal institu-
tionalist claims. Although not explicitly
linked to theoretical arguments, calls for
increased trade between India and Pakistan
are often couched in neoliberal institution-
alist premises. For instance, Sridharan has
argued that "the way forward towards
eventual resolution of the India-Pakistan
conflict lies in growing economic coopera-
tion."23 Inversely, some policy makers,
such as Maleeha Lodhi, have expressed
optimism that intra-regional trade in South
Asia would improve if India and Pakistan
did not have hostile military and political
intentions. In Lodhi's assessment, "[t]here
can be little doubt about the economic and
trade benefits that could accrue to the
global economy from a peaceful and stable
South Asia."24
Supporters of the perspective that India
and Pakistan (and South Asian countries in
general) ought to increase trade relations
are not unaware of the critical challenges
facing both countries, namely with the
festering problem in Kashmir. However,
trade is viewed as having a long-term
beneficial effect, even if the immediate
outcomes are marginal. Zaidi has argued
that "even if trade and better economic re-
lations between the two countries do not
resolve or even address the Kashmir issue,
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they will certainly not make things much
worse as this is a win-win situation."25
The abysmal trade relations between India
and Pakistan are also viewed as an im-
pediment towards the improvement of re-
gional trading arrangements among South
Asia nations. Since its inception in 1985,
the SAARC has been portrayed as a poten-
tial institution that may facilitate intra-
regional trade.26 During the 11th SAARC
summit held in January 2002, the member
states voiced their interest in creating a
South Asian Economic Union. Later, at the
12th SAARC summit held in Islamabad on
4-6 January 2004, they once again renewed
their calls for such levels of regional coop-
eration. These calls, since the Agreement
on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrange-
ment (SAPTA), have followed a decade
long effort in South Asia to provide for the
adoption of various instruments of trade
liberalization on a preferential basis.
The precise ways in which South Asian
nations pledge to liberalize trade is enu-
merated in the Agreement on South Asian
Free Trade Area (SAFTA). In the Agree-
ment, the contracting states pledged to en-
gage in a trade liberalization programme
composed of accelerated tariff reductions,
harmonization of standards, and a dispute
settlement mechanism. Within the South
Asian context, these debates have been
subsumed by the view that the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) may be a possible venue with
which to jumpstart India and Pakistan's
poor trade relations.
The expectation that improved trade rela-
tions need to form part of the larger peace
process between both countries has been
fully enumerated elsewhere. Kavita San-
gari and Teresita Schaffer, for instance,
have stated emphatically that "the biggest
barriers to trade [between India and Pakis-
tan] are political."27 Likewise, Kishore
Dash stresses a similar theme for the lack
of overall intraregional trade in South Asia.
He argues that "political differences and a
lack of willingness to create trade com-
plementarities among the leaders of the
South Asian countries contribute to the
current low level of intraregional trade."28
In what follows, though, I will instead ar-
gue that there are specific structural (and
not political or institutional) barriers that
prevent trade between India and Pakistan,
just like they impede trade between South
Asian countries.
6. Structural impediments to
India's trade growth:
the challenge of divergent
economic asymmetries
The primary structural impediment to in-
traregional trade are growing macroeco-
nomic asymmetries between India and its
neighbours. India and Pakistan both have
among the world's largest armed forces
(ranking 3rd and 7th respectively). Although
all South Asian economies are low-income
– with equivalent levels of purchasing
power parity per capita – if they measured
in terms of net GDP, India is the world's
12th largest economy, Pakistan is ranked
48th, Bangladesh is ranked 53rd and Sri
Lanka is ranked 73rd.29
The asymmetries in economic power be-
tween India and other South Asian coun-
tries are dramatic and there has been a
growing divergent trend. If we examine net
exports from the leading South Asian
economies, we find that over time there
has been an overall increase in exports
from the region. As Graph 2 shows,
though, India's exports have increased
dramatically during the 1990s, while the
rest of South Asia's economies have lagged
behind. (See Graph 2)
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Graph 2. Comparison of net exports among the leading economies in South Asia
(1990-2000)
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As Graph 2 shows, India's net exports have
increased dramatically during the 1990s,
particularly in relation to its regional com-
petitors. Similar disparities occur if we ex-
amine other forms of mobile capital flow
(such as foreign direct investment and
portfolio equity investment).
Under these conditions, a trade regime in
South Asia would lead to asymmetric trade
bargains. Given India's comparative eco-
nomic strength vis-à-vis its South Asian
neighbours, there is a possibility for trade
to act as a vehicle for regional stability. It
is for India's neighbours to accept these
disparities and to engage in what may be
termed submissive trade, namely a condi-
tion in which a weak power accepts the
hegemony of the regional power (in this
case India). This is a condition under
which the Maldives, and to a lesser extent
Nepal, find themselves in vis-à-vis India. It
is unlikely that other South Asian countries
(especially Pakistan) would accept this role
in an Indian-dominated South Asian trade
regime.
A related problem with the regional he-
gemony in South Asia is the asymmetry of
corporate power. For instance, there is a
possibility for Indian and Pakistani corpo-
rations to engage in mutually beneficial
joint ventures. For this, international insti-
tutions such as SAARC can act as a useful
intermediary to suggest a harmonization of
rules. Nevertheless, given the asymmetry
between corporations from India and other
South Asian countries, joint ventures of
any note are only likely to take place with
respect to Indian companies establishing
ventures abroad. Only a handful of indus-
tries, primarily in the services sector, are
likely to be represented. They would in-
clude banking (State Bank of India, ICICI,
Bank of India, Bank of Baroda, Canara
Bank, Punjab National Bank), telephone
operators (MTNL), pharmaceuticals (Ran-
baxy), software makers (Infosys, Wipro),
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or physical infrastructure concerns (Reli-
ance, Hindustan Lever, Bharat Petroleum,
Indian Oil Corporation, Gail).30 In contrast,
there is only one Pakistani company with
combined annual sales of $1 billion or
more. The asymmetry between Indian and
other South Asian corporates is particularly
important in this context because these are
the most likely institutions that could have
a deterring effect on foreign policy aggres-
sion.
There are some crevices for potential in-
creased trade between India and Pakistan
and among South Asian countries in gen-
eral. The most viable of the possibilities
for increased trade between India and
Pakistan concerns tourism. Although they
are not as lucrative as high-end tourists,
there is a prospective market for middle-
income Pakistani and Indian tourists that
can be catered by a network of tour opera-
tors, domestic hotel chains, etc. Neverthe-
less, for tourism and related downstream
industries to have a measurable impact on
the betterment of Indo-Pakistani relations,
it would first be necessary to secure ex
ante agreements between India and Paki-
stan relating to the free transit of potential
tourists. Given India's concern about cross-
border terrorism from Pakistan, negotia-
tions leading to free transit agreements are
certain to be protracted and complex.
An option is for South Asian nations, but
especially India and Pakistan, to engage in
what may be termed symbolic trade,
namely trade in non-essential commodities
(films, regional foodstuffs, etc.) that may
serve part of a larger set of bilateral confi-
dence building measures. In this sense,
there may be some sociological spillover
effect from trade, one that could increase
contact and communication in other chan-
nels. Operationalizing such spillover ef-
fects, it may prove to be impossible to
measure the success of such a strategy.
Moreover, this author is too sceptical about
the effect symbolic exchanges would have
in minimizing tensions among nuclear ad-
versaries.
One of the basic premises in the calls for
increased trade between India and Pakistan
(as well as among South Asian countries in
general) is that whilst trade may not allevi-
ate existing political tensions, it will not
make things much worse. A potential flaw
with this line of argument is that increased
trade is not neutral and need not lead to a
reduction in conflict. Given the sizable
disparity in economic might, trade could
play a mischievous role. For instance, In-
dia's interest in the Israeli Phalcon early
warning system and the Arrow anti-
ballistic missile system sparked a great
deal of concern in Pakistan. This illustrates
that in a situation of bilateral military con-
flict among nuclear adversaries, trade can
acquire strategic importance, though sel-
dom to decrease tension. For instance,
trade in seemingly beneficial products
(such as pharmaceuticals or food) could be
subject to boycott or sabotage. Moreover,
past military conflicts between India and
Pakistan have led to the expropriation of
Indian and Pakistani assets.
A great deal of expectation has been ex-
pressed with respect to the building of in-
terstate oil pipelines, either between India
and Iran or India and Bangladesh. While
these ventures could have an obvious bene-
ficial payoff for all the players concerned,
they have not been undertaken for three
more powerful reasons. First, trade in-
volving Iran, especially on strategic com-
modities such as oil, would destabilize re-
lations with the global hegemon. Second,
an oil pipeline between India and Bangla-
desh, for instance, would not be practicable
due to continuing upheavals by insurgents
in India's northeast, an event for which
there is some speculation that either
the Bangladeshi intelligence service or
Al Qaeda operatives may play a part.
Third, it may be too much of a risk for In-
dia to make itself dependent on Pakistan
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for such a strategically important natural
resource.
The inherently asymmetrical nature of
economic interdependence in South Asia
has important theoretical implications for
the proposition that trade promotes peace.
As I have argued elsewhere, the theoretical
expectation that trade leads to peace has
been empirically and theoretically con-
tested. Most of these debates concern vari-
ants of the democratic peace argument,
namely the expectation that democratic
states do not wage war with each other. My
view is that these types of neoliberal insti-
tutionalist claims are difficult to sustain in
specific circumstances, specifically in
cases where there is a lack of trade com-
plementarity between contiguous military
adversaries.31
As noted at the start of this chapter, trade
relations between India and Pakistan are
notoriously weak. Moreover, as I outlined
in the previous section, there are signifi-
cant obstacles that prevent the improve-
ment of trade relations between India and
Pakistan. In the case of South Asia, the ar-
gument about democratic peace is difficult
to disentangle due to the wide variation of
democratic swings regionally, but espe-
cially in Pakistan. In a historically driven
exploration of Indo-Pakistani relations,
Sumit Ganguly shows that the evidence for
democratic peace is mixed at least as it
pertains to these two specific adversaries.
Ganguly argues emphatically that 'the
presence of democratic governments in
both states had little to do with the avoid-
ance of war; on the contrary, democratic
political powers in both countries pushed
toward increasing conflict'.32
7. Further structural impediments
to India's trade growth:
the problem of trade
complementarity
I would suggest that the principal impedi-
ment to intraregional trade is that South
Asia's economies are incongruent.33 South
Asian economies are unique among devel-
oping countries in that they are driven by
services, not manufacturing, or agriculture
as is the case in other developing countries.
Among the four largest South Asian
economies, the trend away from agricul-
tural production and towards services has
been dramatic. If we use broad macroeco-
nomic measures, such as agriculture, in-
dustry, and services as a proportion of total
output, the dominant (and growing) sector
in all four economies has been services. In
contrast, agriculture as a proportion of
GDP has declined in all the four leading
economies in South Asia (See Graph 3).
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Graph 3. Agriculture, industry, and services output as a proportion of total GDP output
in selected South Asian countries (1982, 1992, and 2002)
0
20
40
60
agriculture IN
agriculture PK
agriculture SL
agriculture BD
industry IN
industry PK
industry SL
industry BD
services IN
services PK
services SL
services BD
1982
1992
2002
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004. Legend: BD = Bangladesh, IN = India, PK = Paki-
stan, and SL = Sri Lanka.
As Graph 3 shows, services account for
over 50 percent of total output in all four
leading economies in South Asia. In con-
trast, agricultural output has declined in all
four leading economies in South Asia, av-
eraging 30.9 percent of total output in 1982
and dropping to 22.2 in 2002.
As a consequence of South Asia's service
dominated economies, there is no demand
for its products among other South Asian
nations. Moreover the complementary na-
ture of South Asia's economies is reflected
in the share of imports and exports as a
proportion of total trade per country.34 If
we compare the dominant sectors in Indian
and Pakistani exports and imports, we see
that the three leading exports for India are
textiles (30.5 percent of total exports),
chemicals (16.2 percent), and mining
quarry products (16.2). In turn, Pakistan's
leading export is industrial textiles (76.7
percent of total exports), food, beverage,
and tobacco (7.4 percent), and agriculture
(5.4 percent).
If we examine the three primary imports
(in declining order of total import share)
for India and Pakistan, we find a similar
level of non-congruence. India's three
leading imports (in declining order to total
import share) are: primary fuels (33.6 per-
cent of total imports), processed industrial
supplies (20.3 percent), and primary in-
dustrial supplies (15.6 percent). The listing
of the three leading imports for Pakistan is
almost identical: processed industrial sup-
plies (26.4 percent of total imports), proc-
essed fuels (21.5 percent), and machinery
(13.9 percent).
Any potential viability in a trade relation-
ship between India and Pakistan must take
into account the fact that neither country
can be a supplier of the other country's
leading import demand. Moreover, the
likelihood of trade cooperation is weak
given that India and Pakistan are evidently
competitors in their respective leading ex-
port (textiles).
If we compare the structure of exports and
imports in the other South Asian econo-
mies, we come to the realization that the
likelihood of improved trade relations
within South Asia is also unlikely to be
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realized. Sri Lanka's leading export is tex-
tiles (encompassing 59.5 percent of Sri
Lanka's total exports) and Bangladesh's
leading export is industrial textiles
(amounting to a staggering 86.3 percent of
Bangladesh's total exports). Textiles are
also Nepal's leading export (accounting for
55.9 percent of total exports). Just as was
the case with India and Pakistan, the lead-
ing three imports for Sri Lanka, Bangla-
desh, Nepal, and the Maldives include the
three following items: primary or proc-
essed industrial supplies, capital equipment
or machinery, and primary or processed
fuels. No other South Asian country can
currently meet this demand.
It is true that some South Asian nations
have a comparative advantage in relation
to other South Asian nations by virtue of
their specialization in a given primary
commodity. For instance, 4.8 and 8.1 per-
cent of Bangladesh's exports are rice and
cereals respectively. Likewise, 14.5 per-
cent of Sri Lanka's exports are tea. Exports
from the Maldives are dominated by the
export of fish, crustaceans, and molluscs
(amounting to nearly 56.6 percent of total
exports). Nevertheless, South Asia's do-
mestic economies are dominated by oli-
gopolistic industries that meet basic do-
mestic consumer demand. Therefore, the
demand of these primary commodities is
likely to be weak among other South Asian
countries, primarily because demand is met
with domestic production. Moreover, as
shown before, future trade relations be-
tween South Asian countries are unlikely
to be dominated by agricultural products
(or seafood) given the declining share of
agriculture as a proportion of total GDP
output.
Overall, the previous data on trade statis-
tics show several things, none of which
point to improved trade relations between
India and Pakistan or between South Asian
nations in general. First, in addition to be-
ing regional military competitors, India
and Pakistan are also trade competitors.
Neither the structure of its exports nor its
import demand structure provides much
hope for an improvement in trade relations.
Second, given that South Asian economies'
exports are so dominated by textiles and
industrial textiles, there is little likelihood
that a lowering of tariffs among South
Asian nations would have a noticeable ef-
fect in increasing trade among South Asian
nations (it should however increase textile
exports by South Asian countries vis-à-vis
other textile manufacturing centres).
The existing dynamics of South Asia's
economies suggest a very low level of
interregional trade, even in the absence of
hostile relations between India and Paki-
stan. This pessimistic observation is as ro-
bust empirically as it is in theory, primarily
because there are going to be continuing
regional asymmetries in the production of
either labour intensive or capital-intensive
goods.35 Viewed in this context, the ex-
pected gains from growing intraregional
trade in South Asia, regardless of the inter-
national vehicle chosen to undertake this
trade (such as SAFTA), can only have a
marginal impact.
8. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to make a con-
tribution to the growing literature on the
relationship between the growth in India's
military and economic apparatus. The
chapter started by highlighting India's
gradual integration into the global econ-
omy. This was first accomplished by a
gradual current account liberalization and
followed by capital account liberalization.
During my discussion, though, I have il-
lustrated that compared to other emerging
markets, India's gains have not been as im-
pressive.
As I have shown in this chapter, South
Asia's economies depart from other low-
income developing countries in one im-
portant respect; they are economies where
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total output is skewed towards services.
Over time, agricultural output as a propor-
tion of total output has declined in all
South Asian countries and industry has, as
a proportion of total output, remained
steady. As it pertains to manufacturing ex-
ports and imports, the dominant South
Asian economies (India, Pakistan, Bangla-
desh, and Sri Lanka) also exhibit similar
factor endowments. Despite India's im-
pressive achievements in services-oriented
growth in the 1990s, I have also argued
that India's long term growth sustainability
may be hampered by a low level of in-
traregional trade.
This chapter has offered a pessimistic per-
spective on the likely effects of increase
upon regional stability in South Asia. Al-
though they are low-income economies, I
have first demonstrated that South Asia's
economies are service-based, hence there
is little likelihood that there will be a great
deal of demand for these inputs in other
low-income economies in South Asia.
Moreover, I have shown that, based on the
pattern of trade needs by the leading South
Asian economies, these economies are
competitive and unlikely to engage in great
increases in trade even under the most op-
timal geopolitical circumstances. For this
reason, I have concluded that neither the
nature of the interstate relationship nor the
expectation of future gains from trade may
lead to peace if two adversarial nations
(like India and Pakistan, for instance) are
not trade congruent.
My discussion doesn't need to be inter-
preted as a comprehensive rejection of the
possibility of increased trade between India
and Pakistan or among South Asian coun-
tries in general. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to see that the facility of constrained
state behaviour in the face of growing eco-
nomic interdependence has minimal appli-
cation in South Asia. More importantly,
though, a constrained parameter of export-
led growth could have a damaging impact
to India's long-term economic growth.
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